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Abstract 
Most ﬁnancial markets operate as double auction markets in which buyers 
and sellers submit limit and market orders. In this case the traders have 
to decide ﬁrstly whether they want to submit a buy or sell order and then 
secondly what the limit price of this order is. In this thesis I develop further 
a theoretical model based on Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) in which two 
traders trade with each other in a double auction market. Assuming that 
both traders assign a private value to the asset they are trading, which is 
known only to them but not their trading partner, I determine whether the 
traders should submit a buy or sell order and what the optimal limit price 
should be. I develop a single-period model in which traders only trade once 
and thus cannot learn each other’s private values from trading as well as a 
multi-period model that allows to infer to some degree the other trader’s 
private value from their order submission behavior. 
Using this theoretical model as a benchmark, I then conducted experiments 
with students to evaluate whether the actual behavior of students ﬁts the 
theory developed. Although we ﬁnd that in general the behavior of traders 
is consistent with the proposed theory, there are some signiﬁcant diﬀerences. 
Most notably traders seem to underreact to diﬀerences in their own private 
value, i.e. do not adjust their limit price to the extend suggested by theory. 
I evaluate these outcomes in light of results established results in behavioral 
ﬁnance. 
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1 
Introduction 
1.1 Limit order markets 
Limit order markets are one of the most popular markets around the world. Most stock 
markets are organized either as pure limit order markets, such as Nasdaq and Tokyo 
or allowing limit order trading, such as NYSE. The prevalence of limit order markets 
beneﬁts from the development of the electronic trading system. Meanwhile, the growth 
of ECN limit order markets also takes market share away from deal markets. Limit 
order markets facilitate the trading of ﬁnancial products, decrease the transaction costs 
by increasing the competition among ﬁnancial ﬁrms and increase the transparency of 
the ﬁnancial markets by allowing traders to access more trading information (Swan 
and Westerholm, 2006). In limit order markets, traders are facing the choice to submit 
market orders or limit orders. Market orders are orders to buy or sell a speciﬁed quantity 
at the best price currently available and limit orders are orders to buy a speciﬁed 
quantity at a price not exceeding some speciﬁed maximum, or to sell a speciﬁed quantity 
at a price not less than some speciﬁed minimum (Luckock, 2001). Unlike market orders 
which are executed immediately, limit orders are stored in limit order book at ﬁrst. And 
then, the incoming market orders would be matched with the best oﬀer in this book. 
Limit order markets are diﬀerent from other trading systems, such as dealer markets and 
call auction markets, because, in limit order markets, there are no intermediaries to clear 
markets. The execution of limit orders is subject to the price priority rule: the ﬁrst, 
market orders are executed; the second, only after all market orders have been executed, 
the limit order with the best price (the lowest price for a buy order and the highest price 
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for a sell order) would be executed ﬁrst, then the second one, the third one... When 
prices are equal, the execution follows the time priority rule that the orders submitted 
earlier would be executed prior to the orders submitted later. Traders who submit 
limit buy (sell) orders with the price lower (higher) than ask (bid) ones would gain less 
execution costs when these limit orders are ﬁlled. Furthermore, limit orders also provide 
price-contingent executions when traders are unable or unwilling to monitor the market 
continuously. Therefore, traders could use limit orders to improve the execution price 
and take advantage of time priority. However, the execution probability of limit orders 
is uncertain, which depends on market conditions, competition among traders, and so 
on. In addition, when limit orders are matched with the market orders submitted by 
informed traders after information announcement, they are picked oﬀ, which called the 
’winner’s curse’. Overall, traders who submit limit orders face the trade-oﬀ among the 
price improvements, the execution probability and the ’winner’s curse’. 
1.2	 The gap between limit order markets and double auc­
tion markets 
Nowadays, more and more researchers explore the theories of limit order markets. They 
are interested in the eﬃciency of limit order markets, the liquidity provision of limit 
order markets and the submission strategies of traders. In my research, I investigate 
the optimal dynamic order submission strategies of traders in limit order markets. In 
limit order markets, automated trade execution systems use continuous double auction 
mechanism. So, it is possible for us to apply auction theories to research of limit order 
markets. To investigate the traders’ behavior in limit order markets, it is important to 
understand traders’ strategies in double auction markets. In most of the research on 
limit order markets, the execution probability is treated as an exogenic factor without 
considering the game-theoretical problems among traders. With auction theory, it is 
easier to solve the game-theoretical problems faced by traders when they compete with 
others to obtain proﬁts. It is also convenient to observe how individuals’ behavior 
to aﬀect the formation of transaction price. I hope to develop a dynamic model to 
investigate the order placement strategies of traders when they comprehend the game-
theoretical problem and the price formation process under competition among traders. 
In most double auction models, traders only act as buyers or sellers in double auction 
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market. In my model, I allow informed traders to choose the orders side according to 
their own status and market condition. As we all know, in limit order markets, the 
informed traders place limit orders on either the bid or the ask side depending on their 
expected proﬁt. To allow traders to choose the order side makes my research closer 
to the essence of limit order markets. So far, the research on auction theory and the 
ones on limit order markets were separated before. Considering their advantages and 
disadvantages, my research bridges between auction markets and limit order markets 
and throws light on the research of the traders’ behavior in limit order markets. 
1.3 Research aim 
My research aim is to investigate the informed traders’ submission strategies in a dy­
namic double auction market and the eﬃciency of the market to disseminate private 
information. This research will focus on the informed traders’ submission strategies 
in double auction markets. In limit order markets, the traders’ behavior is aﬀected 
by various factors including their private information, the public information about 
others and assets. I will investigate the relationship among these variables. To better 
understand the traders’ behaviors in double auction markets, it is important to clarify 
the game-theoretical problems among traders during the process of trading. Mean­
while, I would investigate the process of private information disclosure and the change 
of transaction prices in the continuous trading game. These implications would reveal 
the process of belief update of traders in the context of game theory. 
1.4 The dynamic model of double auction market 
The ﬁrst static model describes the trading game between two players in a simple 
double auction market with incomplete information. This model is based on the classic 
bargaining model of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). Diﬀerent from other bargaining 
models, I allow traders to choose the order side. λ denotes the probability of traders 
to submit a buy/sell order. With this parameter, I could observe the optimal traders’ 
behavior and the eﬀects of their strategies on the equilibrium price and other variables in 
the market. The outcome of this model is consistent with previous research. The trader 
would like to pay more when his reservation price is higher and ask more compensation 
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when he places a sell order. Besides his private information, the information of the 
other one also aﬀects his submission strategies. As the trader would increase/decrease 
his oﬀers to match the orders of the other one, the mean value of the other one’s 
reservation value distribution has a positive relationship with the oﬀer prices of the 
trader. However the variances of the other one’s reservation value distribution have 
diﬀerent eﬀects on the traders’ optimal behavior. The variance has negative eﬀect on 
the traders’ buy oﬀers and positive eﬀect on the trader’s sell oﬀers. Considering the 
traders’ valuations follow normal distributions, the higher variance means a fatter tail 
of normal distribution. The buyer need to increase his oﬀer price to achieve the same 
probability of execution while the seller could improve his price with same execution 
probability. I also ﬁnd that the parameter λ equals 0.5 when every aspect of these two 
traders are the same. I then extend this simple one period model to a multi-period one. 
The extension is necessary because the trader’s strategy behavior would be diﬀerent 
under the condition of multi-trading periods. Under this condition, to draw a clearer 
picture of the valuation distribution of the other one, they would consider not only the 
behavior of the other one, but also the information from the previous trading. This 
multi-period model is also important to the research on the market eﬃciency of double 
auction markets. In this market, the information asymmetry should be reduced quickly 
in the process of trading. In my multi-period model, the variables have similar eﬀects on 
the traders’ submission strategies as ones in the single-period model have. This multi-
period model also reveals that the traders could increase the execution probability 
by updating their information on the other one. During the process of multi-period 
trading, the execution probability increases to make trade happen and the traders’ 
private information come to be disclosed. 
I designed experiments to test the results from my theoretical models. Subjects are 
asked to trade in pairs as rational informed traders. They are provided private signal 
on the reservation price and the common value distribution. Although there are some 
bias between the experimental results and the implication of theoretical models, most 
of the experimental results are consistent with my theoretical models. The bias can be 
explained by the heuristic bias of subjects, such as overconﬁdence, and the irrational 
behaviors of the subjects. As I selected the students with basic knowledge of ﬁnancial 
markets as subjects, they are diﬃcult to act as good as professional rational traders that 
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are assumed in the theoretical model. The experimental results prove the eﬃciency of 
my theoretical model and help us to better understand the traders’ behavior in double 
auction markets. It also provides some implications for future research by reducing the 
gap between my theoretical model and real ﬁnancial markets. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related 
literature and theories on double auction markets. Section 3 concerns the theory of 
limit order markets. Section 4 describes the single-period model and section 5 develops 
the multi-period model. Section 6 introduce the process and results of the experiments. 
And conclusions in section 7. 
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6 
2 
Auction markets 
Auction is one of trading systems for exchange, in which assets or bids are allocated 
to the winners by competition. The auction mechanism is important because of its 
vital role and long-historic inﬂuence on many aspects of the economy. Many markets 
are organized as some forms of auction markets in which goods or service such as 
antique, treasury bills, operating rights, and etc., are traded. Properties, antiquities and 
precious art objects are sold under the hammer in auction markets, which are familiar 
to most of people. Service, rights and licences are also auctioned oﬀ to enterprisers. 
The range of commodities that trade in auction markets is from ﬂowers, tobacco to 
securities, treasures, and etc. In recent years, with the emergence of e-markets via 
internet, more and more resource is allocated by auction markets. Because of growing 
demand to transfer the assets between diﬀerent sectors, there is tremendous growth of 
auction markets all over the world. Therefore, the properties of auction mechanism 
always draw lots of attention. 
Auction theory focuses on the people’s behavior in auction markets and the prop­
erties of auction mechanism. The competition among participants in auction markets 
raises game-theoretical problems. The application of the game theory in auction mar­
kets is one of eﬃcient methods to research auction markets, especially semi-eﬃcient 
markets with incomplete information. Previous researchers focus on not only inves­
tigate the game-theoretical problems of the traders in auction markets, but also try 
to improve the eﬃciency of auction markets. The context of the auction theory in­
cludes negotiation between buyers and sellers, optimal auctions, price formation, and 
7
 
2. AUCTION MARKETS
 
etc. Furthermore, auction theory, which links to other theories, such as market eﬃ­
ciency, is used as an essential instrumental to solve many economic puzzles. In order to 
improve market eﬃciency, much work bridges auction theory and market competitive 
theory. Some researchers investigate the trading behavior of traders by combining the 
auction theory and bargain theory (a part of game theory). For either research, the 
experimental method provides good supports. In recent years, experimental work on 
auctions is increasing. 
There are four diﬀerent types of basic auction markets: ﬁrst-price sealed auction, 
second-price sealed auction, English Auction (open-ascending auction), Dutch Auction 
(open-descending auction). In these auctions, English auction is the oldest and the 
most common auction in use. Based on this four basic auctions, more and more new 
auction forms have been developed in the context of theory or in practice, such as CDA 
(continuous double auction) and Anglo-Dutch auction. CDA is one of the important 
forms of auctions applied in ﬁnancial markets with electronic systems. 
2.1 Introduction to auction markets 
2.1.1 Main types of auctions 
According to the numbers of diﬀerent types of participants, auction markets are clas­
siﬁed as standard bid auction, procurement auction, and double auction. Bid auctions 
deal under the situation that there is one seller facing many buyers. In procurement 
auctions, many sellers compete to trade with one buyer. Most research work on auction 
markets use the perspective of normal auction. It is not necessary to specify that the 
auction is bid auction since there is not much diﬀerence between bid or sell auction. 
Double auction is the auction market that many buyers face many sellers to trade more 
than one unit of objects simultaneously. According to the oﬀer submission procedure, 
double auction could be classiﬁed as open and close auction markets. In open auction 
markets, traders are free to resubmit their oﬀers according to the information of other 
traders oﬀers. In close auction markets, traders submit sealed oﬀers without informed 
of the oﬀers of others. There are four types of standard auctions in practice: En­
glish auction, Dutch auction, ﬁrst price sealed auction and second price sealed auction 
(Krishna, 2002). 
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The English auction, also referred to as ascending auction, is the auction market 
in which bid price increases from low price called out by an auctioneer until only one 
bidder accepts the price. It is very common in many traditional markets, such as 
antique and property markets. It has been using since 1674. In this auction market, 
the auctioneer is important to start with low price and promote the participants to call 
out their oﬀers. As the price goes up, bidders quit the competition one by one once the 
price reaches his own reservation price. The auction ends until there is just one bidder 
left in the market. The object is allocated to the winner with the highest oﬀer price. 
When the last bidder with highest signal on the object calls out the price that equals to 
the reservation price of the one with the second-highest signal, the second person quits 
and the last bidder gets the object with the second-highest price which is lower than his 
own reservation price. Therefore, the English auction is also called second-price open 
auction. Normally, the auctioneer sets ‘reserve’ price before the start of auction. If the 
reservation prices of the buyers are all lower than this price, the object would remain 
unsold. Because of the repeated bidding, the procedure of English auction is longer 
than other auctions. The English auction is widely used in markets of arts, antiques, 
real estate, and etc. 
The Dutch auction, also referred as descending auction, is auction market in which 
the auctioneer starts with high price, then decreases the price gradually until one bidder 
accepts the price. The buyer who ﬁrst calls out to accept the price is the one who 
successfully get the object in the auction and pay the price when he hits the oﬀer. The 
procedure of the auction is longer than the ﬁrst-price sealed auction but shorter than 
the English auction. The Dutch auction is used in the market of tobacco, wholesale cut 
ﬂower (Dutch tulip auctions), and some other farm products. The descending auction 
is also called the ﬁrst-price open auction because the trading price is also the highest 
price provided by the bidders. 
The ﬁrst-price sealed auction is the auction market in which the bidders are asked 
to submit their own oﬀers simultaneously without knowing the oﬀers of other partic­
ipants. The object would be allocated to the bidder with the highest oﬀer price and 
the transaction price is equal to the bid oﬀer of the winner. The procedure for bidding 
is very quick because all the traders submit their oﬀer simultaneously and the bids 
could only be submitted once. The auction for industrial real estate is a good example 
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of ﬁrst-price sealed auction. Buyers provide their sealed oﬀer according to their own 
information about the value of the estate. The one who will pay the highest price for 
the estate will get the asset on his oﬀer price. Other participants get nothing without 
any payment. This auction is also used to sell securities. Similarly, the auction to buy 
service is the ask auction where the winner is the one who submits the lowest sell price. 
In the competition for building construction contract, the monopolist buyer seeks the 
company that provides the lowest price for their service. 
The second-price sealed auction refers to the auction markets in which all the bidders 
submit their sealed oﬀer together, and the object will be sold to the buyer who provides 
the highest oﬀer. The submitting rules are same as the ﬁrst-price sealed auction’s. The 
successful bidder only pays the second highest price submitted by the bidders. This 
auction is also called Vickery auction, which is proposed by Vickrey (1961). In practice, 
the Vickery auction is rare. There are some auction markets similar to the Vickery 
auction. One is the auction market for Treasury bills in which the bills are sold at one 
price, not the highest bid. In the auction markets on the internet such as eBay, the 
winner just pays the price with an increment on the second price instead of his bid. 
There are other types of auctions. All-pay auction asks all the participants to 
pay their oﬀer at the end of the auction while the object only goes to the one with 
highest oﬀer price. The model lobbying is an example of this auction. French auction 
is also known as Walrasian auction, in which the buyers provide their price as well as 
the quantities that they want to buy. The price is the optimal price that reaches the 
highest quantity being traded. It is used to price gold, bonds, and etc. There are some 
hybrids of basic auction or market design with more complex market rules. 
2.1.2 Double auction market 
Diﬀerent from standard auctions where one monopolist has absolute power to decide the 
price and faces multiple bidders on the other side of the market, double auction markets 
operate standardized goods where both buyers and sellers could submit oﬀers to trade 
speciﬁed quantities at speciﬁed prices and also initiate trades by accepting the other 
side of oﬀers. Furthermore, the continuous double auction market refers to the double 
auction markets with two-side traders operating continuously to provide the condition 
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for bid or ask matching. The double auction mechanism is used in the majority of stock 
exchanges, such as New York Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock exchange. Normally, 
there is a book or list to store the orders that have been submitted. In this order book, 
the highest buy oﬀer matches the lowest sell order with the condition that the bid price 
is higher than sell price. The large volume order will be splitted into small parts to 
match with the ﬁrst highest existing opponent oﬀer and then the second best oﬀer, 
then the third... The orders, which are not executed, are stored in the book to wait for 
trading until they have fulﬁlled the trade condition or expire. Double auction market is 
linked to the bargain theory with incomplete information. The main diﬀerence between 
double auction and standard auction is that buyers and sellers are treated symmetrically 
in double auction while there is a monopolist in standard auction. 
2.2 The main results in single auction markets 
2.2.1 The revenue equilibrium 
Various types of auction markets operate under diﬀerent circumstance of economy 
around the world. They bring up diﬀerent questions for the participates in the mar­
kets, which will be solved from their own prospective. The regulars are concerned with 
how to exert the tax on the monopolists without the information of their cost. They 
also seek more eﬃcient way to simulate the monopolists by adopting the proper auction 
mechanisms which allocate the resource more eﬃciently. The monopolist choose the 
optimal auction design to extract more revenues, reduce the probability of collusion 
and attract more bidders. The bidders choose the optimal submission strategies which 
provide him the maximum surplus. One of the most important theories about the opti­
mal auction is the Revenue Equilibrium. Early in 1961, Vickrey (1961) ﬁrst addressed 
some important problems of auction markets including introducing the special case of 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem. Following his work, some other researches (John, 1989; 
Myerson Roger, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981)proved that the Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem could be applied in various auction markets generously. 
Although the Revenue Equivalence Theorem are constructed based on a series of 
restricted assumptions, it provides the essential theory for further research on auction 
markets. The assumptions for the Revenue Equivalence Theorem are: 
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1. The participants in the auction market are risk-neutral. 
2. Every bidder has a private signal independently drawn from a common increasing 
distribution, which is not convex heavily. 
3. Every bidder bids for one unit of items. 
4. The bidder with a higher evaluation on the objective will submit a higher oﬀer. 
In standard auction markets, one single seller faces N buyers. With the assumption that 
the bidders are symmetric, all the valuations of bidders come from the same function. 
Also, with the assumption that higher valuation leads to higher oﬀer, makes that the 
object would be allocated to the bidder with the highest valuation. It is not diﬃcult to 
prove that the bidder with a higher valuation has a higher probability of winning. In 
the Vickery auction, the optimal strategy of the buyer is to reveal his reservation price. 
The surplus for a bidder from the auction equals the amount of his reservation price 
times the probability of winning, then minus his expected payment. The surplus for the 
bidder with the lowest valuation will be zero. Both of these two markets have the same 
surplus function and the function of probability to win. Then these two markets will 
provide same revenue to the auctioneer because the expected payment from the bidder 
is same. Therefore any market design contributes the same revenue to the monopolist. 
This theory is generously applied in not only standard auctions but also other auction 
forms. 
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem also fulﬁlls the private value case or common-
value case. These two value types are main value types in auction research. As we 
know, in auction market, the information is not complete. The sellers do not know the 
valuation of the buyers. Every buyer has his own private information. The situation 
for private value is simple. There is no actual value for the object. Each bidder sets his 
reservation price according to his private information about the actual value. In the 
common-value case, there is a common sense about the actual value of asset. However, 
everyone has a private signal for the true value and this signal will change when he 
considers signals of others to update his evaluation on the object. Although considering 
the coeﬃcient among individuals’ signals, it is more complex to seek the resolution 
for the common-value model. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem still provides some 
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support for the research on common-value model. Furthermore, some research ﬁnds 
that the Revenue Equivalence Theorem can be extended to the case of κ unit object ­
κ is larger than 1. 
2.2.2	 Optimal auctions on the perspective of margin revenue vs. mar­
gin cost 
Another important basic theory for auction markets is optimal auctions on the per­
spective of margin revenues vs. margin cost. There are some analogies between the 
auction theory and the price theory. The basic economic theory of demand and supply 
curve presents that the highest revenue for a company is achieved when the margin 
revenue equals zero. Bulow and Roberts (1989) applied the margin revenue theory in 
the research on optimal auctions. From the perspective of the demand and supply 
curve, the auctioneer acts as a company that faces a demand curve for its product. 
Because the reservation price of bidders is derived independently from an increasing 
distribution, the margin revenue of the seller to certain bidder actually equals the ac­
tual value of the bidder. According to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, in any form 
of auction markets, the object is allocated to the bidder with the highest signal. Then 
the monopolist extracts the revenue that exactly equals to the expected margin revenue 
of the bidder with the highest signal. The margin cost for the seller is his reservation 
price. Therefore, the monopolist will not sell the object to the bidder whose margin 
revenue is lower than his margin cost. This theory states the fact that any type of 
auction markets could achieve the optimal status to get the highest margin revenue by 
allocating the object to the bidder with the highest signal when the monopolist sets 
his reservation price properly. 
2.2.3	 Risk-averse traders 
It is an important assumption for the Revenue Equilibrium Theorem that bidders and 
monopolist are risk-neutral. Some research relaxes this assumption and considers the 
situation of the risk-averse bidders or risk-averse traders in auction markets. First, 
we address the situation that bidders are risk-averse. Because the small amount of 
increase on the bidder’s oﬀer will increase the probability of winning, which leads to 
13
 
2. AUCTION MARKETS
 
dramatically higher expected proﬁt, the risk-averse bidder acts more aggressively in 
the ﬁrst-price auction. Although the aggressive submission behavior will reduce the 
expected surplus of bidders, bidders could get the higher utility with their high risk-
averse parameter in the ﬁrst-price auction. Therefore, the risk-averse bidders prefer the 
ﬁrst-price auction to second-price auction. If the seller is risk-neutral, the risk-averse 
bidders could provide more revenue for him in the ﬁrst-price auction than the second-
price auction. This result is diﬀerent from the one of equilibrium revenue. In the 
papers written by Matthews (1987)and Maskin and Riley (1984), these results about 
the risk-averse bidders are presented. 
The situation that the risk-averse monopolist faces many risk-neutral bidders is 
diﬀerent from the one above. Waehrer et al. (1998) address this situation in their 
research. According to the Revenue equilibrium theorem, the seller would receive the 
same expected revenue because the bidder with the highest signal will bid the price 
with expected revenue. In the ﬁrst-price auction, the price that the bidder needs to 
pay is ﬁxed. And in the second-price auction, the price is random which adds more 
risk to the seller. Therefore, the risk-aversion seller prefers the ﬁrst-price auction to 
the second-price auction. 
2.2.4 Asymmetric signals 
Some research seek the resolution for the problem in which the private signals are drawn 
from diﬀerent distribution. First, we consider the private-value model. Imagine there 
are two demand curves with same shape but diﬀerent shift. It is not diﬃcult to see 
that the margin revenue of the bidder with lower distribution curve is higher than the 
one of the bidder with higher distribution curve. Therefore, the monopolist prefers to 
sell the object to the weak bidder rather than the strong one. The situation of optimal 
auction mechanism will be diﬀerent from the one of asymmetrical signal. Bulow et al. 
(1999) address the asymmetric situation in the ﬁrst-price auction. In the second-price 
auction, the dominant strategy for the bidder is to tell his true value. While in the 
ﬁrst-price auction with symmetrical signal, the bidder from a lower distribution acts 
more aggressively with lower surplus. The bidder’s expected revenue in the ﬁrst-price 
auction that the seller could extract is probably higher than the expected revenue in 
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the second-price auction. Therefore, the seller prefers the ﬁrst-price auction to the 
second-price auction when he faces asymmetric bidders. 
Imagine that the distribution curves are diﬀerent in the shape but have the same 
support, the bidder with ﬂatter distribution acts more aggressively in the open market 
than the sealed market, which contributes more expected revenue to the seller. So the 
open auction is the optimal mechanism for the monopolist whose trading purpose is to 
maximize his expected revenue. Maskin and Riley (1985) state the optimal mechanism 
for the seller when he faces the bidders with diﬀerent distributions. 
The results above are based on the private-value model. In the context of common-
value model, the bidder will face the problem of the ”winner’s curse”: if he does 
not include the bad signal of other bidders and increases his evaluation based on the 
accumulated information of the good signal, he is likely to pay more on the object in 
the auction he wins. Klemperer (1998) describes the situation of the buyer with small 
advantage on the reservation price in the common-value model in ascending auction 
markets. The buyer prefers to adopt less aggressive strategies to avoid the winer’s curse 
problem. His opponent will also act less aggressively if he thinks that the others will 
adopt less aggressive strategies. Therefore, in ascending markets, traders will act less 
aggressively if the valuations have common-value components. 
2.3 The main results in double auction markets 
2.3.1 κ-double auction 
2.3.1.1 Two person bargain model 
As a widely used trading mechanism, double auction markets are one of the hottest 
research topics that has been investigating from various prospectives. Diﬀerent from 
the standard auction in which the monopolist has absolute bargain power in double 
auction markets, both buyers and sellers have the power to decide the trading rule. 
From the function of κ-double auction: p = κb + (1 + κ)s, we could see that the trading 
price is decided by the key factor κ. If the κ equals 0.5, the buyer and seller has equal 
weight to decide the trading price. 
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Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) ﬁrst introduce the κ−double auction model about 
trader behavior in double auction markets. They construct a two-person bargaining 
model with incomplete information in single stage. Their research bridges the gap 
between the double auction theory and the bargaining theory. In their model, they 
introduce the game-theoretical resolution into the double auction model to investigate 
the optimal behavior of traders. They also ﬁnd the boundary conditions for traders’ 
behavior in the equilibrium. Their results present that traders have the incentive to 
conceal their true value in the κdouble auction markets with incomplete information. 
This basic model is constructed under some important assumptions: there are just 
two rational risk-neutral traders standing on diﬀerent sides of the market. They submit 
their oﬀer simultaneously to trade one unit of asset. Traders have their own reservation 
price and assess the possible strategy of the other one according to his information about 
the distribution of the opponent’s reservation price. The opponent is also aware of his 
adversary’s reservation distribution and knows his adversary’s assessment on his own 
reservation distribution. This situation continues and inﬂuences the traders’ submission 
strategies. vi and v3−i are the reservation price of the buyer and the seller on the asset 
separately. Mi(v3−i) denote the reservation distribution for the seller regarded by the 
buyer. Then we have Fi(v3−i) as the oﬀer distribution of the seller induced by the 
underlying value v3−i. Similarly, the oﬀer distribution for the buyer regarded by the 
seller is G3−i(vi) with underlying value vi. Moreover, the bid/ask oﬀer by buyer/seller 
is denoted by b/ s. The expected proﬁt for the buyer is aﬀected by the strategies of 
the seller, this expected proﬁt will be: � b 
πi(b, vi) = (vi − P )gi(s)ds b ≥ s, (2.1) 
s 
= 0 b < s. (2.2) 
The buyer could obtain proﬁts only if his bid oﬀer is higher than the ask oﬀer. gi 
is the density function of Gi. Similarly, the proﬁt of the seller only occurs under the 
condition that his sell oﬀer is lower than the highest buy oﬀer. The function for the 
seller’s expected proﬁt is given: 
b 
π3−i(s, v3−i) = (P − v3−i)f3−i(b)db s ≤ ¯ b, (2.3) 
s 
= 0 s > ¯ b. (2.4) 
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In Nash equilibrium, the trader’s optimal strategy of responding to the other one is 
the strategy that the trader could not increase his proﬁt without changing the strategy 
of the other one. With these two equations, they prove that the optimal submitting 
oﬀers of the traders increase with the reservation price. In other words, the buyer 
provides a more generous oﬀer when he has a higher reservation price and the seller 
asks more compensation with a higher underlying value. They also derive the bounded 
conditions for strategies of traders when their reservation prices have been changed. 
When the reservation price of buyer vi is lower than the optimal strategy oﬀer of 
the seller with the lowest reservation price S˜(v3−i), no trade will happen. With the 
˜increase of the reservation price, at vi = S(v3−i), the buyer submits the bid that 
equals to S˜(v3−i). When the optimal strategy of the buyer with the highest underlying 
value B˜(v¯i)is higher than the optimal strategy of the seller with the highest reservation 
price S˜(v¯3−i), the probability of the trade is higher than zero but lower than 1. If 
˜the buyer adopts the strategy b = S(v¯3−i), the trade must happen with probability 
1. Therefore, it is impossible that the buyer submits the oﬀer higher than S˜(v¯3−i). 
S˜(v¯3−i) is the up bounded condition for the buyer’s bid oﬀer. Similar situation happens 
on the oﬀer submission strategies of the seller. The up and below bounded condition is 
min[S˜(v¯3−i), B˜(v¯i)] and max[ S˜(v3−i), B˜(vi)]. In this range, the traders’ oﬀers increase 
with the increase of reservation price. Their results reﬂect optimal strategies of the 
traders in double auction markets. In this simple two-person double auction market 
with single stage, the market is not eﬃcient to reveal the true reservation price of assets 
under the behaviors of the traders to cover their true valuation of assets. It is true that 
the buyer will provide an oﬀer lower than his reservation price and the seller raises 
his oﬀer above his reservation price in the situation that either of these two stands 
symmetric or asymmetric. The parameter κ has great eﬀect on the behavior of both 
sides and, furthermore, their proﬁt. When κ increases, the buyer has more weight to 
decide the transaction price, which makes the buyer reduce his oﬀer far more from his 
reservation price. On the other side, the strategy of the seller is closer to his reservation 
price. He has the tendency to tell his true value when he stands in a weak position in 
deciding the price. Their model gives insightful observations in to the game-theoretical 
problems among participates in double auction markets. However, this model just 
describes a simple two person market. Some further research is needed to extend it to 
multi-traders. 
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2.3.1.2 Multi-trader double auction model 
Wilson extends the two-person bargain model to the multi-trader model to investigate 
market eﬃciency. As we state above, traders with incomplete information in double 
auction markets have the incentive to misreport their true value. Therefore, the mar­
ket mechanism in a two-person double auction market is not eﬃcient in concealing the 
information to achieve market eﬃciency. This result is not applicable in the multi-
traders double auction markets. Wilson supposes that there are numerous buyers and 
sellers who have independent private valuation drawn from the identical distribution. 
Everyone just submits one oﬀer to trade one unit of the asset. Their model prove 
that the double auction mechanism is incentive eﬃcient if the number of traders is 
suﬃciently large. The double auction markets are independent of the trader’s infor­
mation distribution and its eﬃciency is caused from its rule rather than the type of 
participants. Rustichini et al. (1994) investigate the extent of the misreport behavior of 
traders in double auction markets. They prove that the misreports for a buyer/ seller 
is small - O(1/m)/O(1/n) and the corresponding ineﬃciency is even smaller - O(1/m2) 
/O(1/n)(m is the total number of buyers and n is the total number of sellers). Traders 
tend to report the true value about the asset with increase of market size. The domi­
nant strategy in double auction markets is to tell the true valuation, which means the 
double auction market is eﬃcient in revealing the information. McAfee (1992)explains 
the reason of the eﬃciency of double auction markets with multi-traders from another 
aspect. In his model, he supposes that the buyer buys at the next highest value and 
the seller sells at the next lowest value. This situation is similar to the one in the 
second-price sealed auction in which the best strategy of the traders is to report their 
true valuations. The eﬃciency of double auction markets has been attained. 
2.3.1.3 Buyer’s bid double auction 
As a special case of the κ double auction, the buyer’s bid double auction is the double 
auction market in which the κ = 1. The transaction price is determined by the oﬀers 
of buyers, while the sellers have no power to inﬂuence the trading price. Therefore, 
the dominant trading strategy for the seller is to submit the oﬀer on his reservation 
price. The buyers have the incentive to misreport their true valuation because their 
strategic behavior may have eﬀects on the transaction price. Williams (1991) gives 
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insight into the strategic behavior of the buyers in the buyer’s bid double auction with 
diﬀerent numbers of buyers and sellers (m � n). The main result is that this double = 
auction market will converge to become eﬃcient as the number of buyer increasing. The 
departure rate of the buyer’s oﬀer from his reservation price is O(1/m). The similar 
function for the buyer is also attained from their model. This rate is very small and 
the market tends to become eﬃcient when the number of the buyer becomes large. 
2.4 Experimental research on Auction theory 
Experiments are widely used on the research of auction markets. Experimental re­
search is eﬃcient to identify the people’s behavior in the auction market and capture 
the implication of the auction theory. There is plenty of experimental work on sin­
gle auction market to investigate various theoretical models, such as the private-value 
model, common-value model, asymmetric information model etc. Most experimental 
research on double auction markets focus on the equilibrium formation in the double 
auction market. Some experiments on double auction markets try to explain the double 
auction theory from the viewpoint of demand and supply curves. However, the diﬀer­
ence between the experiment results and theoretical models is not trivial and leaves 
many questions for further research. 
2.4.1 Experiments on standard auction 
On the aspect of private-value model, the experimental results do not follow the Rev­
enue Equilibrium Theorem. The experiments of Coppinger and Titus (1980) show that 
the bid price in ﬁrst-price auction is higher than Dutch auction. Furthermore the 
higher bids in second-price auction than English auction is also found by J.H. Kagel 
and Levin (1987). The diﬀerence between the laboratorial results and auction theo­
ries is explained by the subjects’ behaviors and preconization. As the common-value 
model is more complex than private-value model, the subjects’ performance is worse 
in the experiments of common-value auction. Evidence shows that bidders in sealed 
bid common value auctions suﬀer ’winner’s curse’ heavily (Dyer, 1989). Because of 
the eﬀects of ’winners curse’, public information reduces revenues in the experiment, 
which increase the revenues predicted by theory. The ’winner’s curse’ is found in other 
experiments on English auction and ﬁrst-price auction as well. 
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2.4.2 Experiments on double auction 
Diﬀerence from the research of standard auction that focuses on auction theory, the 
experimental research on double auction markets put more eﬀorts to investigate the 
available double auction models. Cason and Friedman (1993) investigate three double 
auction markets concerned with price formation: Wilson (1987) Dutch auction model, 
in which the transactions always happen between the highest buyer and lowest seller; 
Fridman’s double auction market, in which traders ignore the feedback of the other one 
and follow the Bayesian game to update their order prices; Gode and Sunder (1993) 
ZI model, in which traders submit their orders randomly. Comparing with the other 
two models, the model of Wilson’s is more close to the experiment results. Kagel and 
Vogt (1993) investigate the buyer’s bid double auction model by experiment. Their 
results show that the buyers bid more as the ones in standard ﬁrst-price auction. The 
eﬃciency does not increase as fast as the implication of theory with the increasing of 
the number of traders. 
Under most of the situation, the results of the experiments show that the subjects’ 
behavior is better than the ones in ZI model. However, the auction model with rational 
traders assumption can not explain the implication of the experiments. Although there 
is no compatible experimental results for my experimental results, the previous exper­
imental research indicate that people’s behaviors can partially explain the diﬀerence 
between the theoretical model and experimental results. 
2.5 Investor psychology and behavioral ﬁnance 
The research on auction markets in the extent of auction theory focuses on the traders’ 
behavior from the point of game theory. As a separate branch of economic and ﬁnancial 
theories, behavioral ﬁnance analyzes the investors’ behavior from aspect of human psy­
chology. By investigating the cognitive process or heuristic traits of human, researchers 
can better understand the behavior of investors or consumers, the price formation and 
the equilibrium in ﬁnancial markets. The assumption of rational traders is an impor­
tant assumption in many ﬁnancial theoretical models. This assumption implicates that 
the individual errors are canceled out systematically. In recent years, more and more 
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researchers found that traders are biased systematically . The ﬁnancial theories on as­
pects of market eﬃciency only partially explain some phenomena in ﬁnancial markets. 
It is important to introduce behavioral ﬁnance to solve some economic puzzles from the 
point of psychology. In the model of behavioral ﬁnance, the subjects are supposed to be 
irrational and their speciﬁc actions are the results of their cognitive bias under certain 
circumstances, for example, the temporary demand and supply imbalance. Behavioral 
ﬁnance theory is divided into two parts: cognitive psychology and limits to arbitrage. 
The main part is cognitive psychology, which is concerned with the cognitive process of 
investors. Hirshleifer (2001) classiﬁes the deriving of the cognitive bias into three types: 
heuristic simpliﬁcation, self-deception and emotional loss of control. The heuristic sim­
pliﬁcation includes the imprecise assessment of information about himself or outside 
environment, the selective problem on the samples, and etc. The researchers ﬁnd that 
people are prone to pay attention to on the salient, concrete, short-term and irrelevant 
information and ignore the abstract, statistical, long-term, information. People are 
found to overreact or underreact to certain types of the information, or optimize their 
expectation. Furthermore, the overconﬁdence of investors can be reduced by repeating 
or training, but cannot be eliminated. The inﬂuence of the overconﬁdence is complex. 
It increases the cost of investors and decreases their expected utility, even decreases the 
eﬃciency of the market (Odean, 1998). Some claim positive eﬀects of overconﬁdence in 
ﬁnancial markets (Daniel et al., 1998). Overall, the eﬀects of overconﬁdence depends 
on the type of investors and the circumstance they are involved. 
In auction markets, traders set up order price according to the information available 
to them. They need to obtain, analyze and update information before and during the 
trading. Rational investors in the theoretical model could act correctly to maximize 
their proﬁt or utility by appropriate assessment of information. Whereas, the irra­
tional investors have heuristic bias and have problem understanding and assessing the 
available information (Odean, 1998). In my theoretical model, I assume that traders 
are rational and risk-neutral to simplify my model. Much research ﬁnds that many 
investors are not only risk averse, but they also have cognitive bias such as overconﬁ­
dence or underconﬁdence. I design the experiments to research the traders’ submission 
strategies in the laboratory environment following the trading rules of my theoretical 
model. The subjects are asked to trade under certain trading rules as in the theoretical 
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model. Comparing with rational traders in the theoretical model, these unprofessional 
students are prone to act with heuristic bias. They have problems understanding the 
information, are overconﬁdent or underconﬁdent on their judgement or miscalibrate 
their ability. We could consider that rationality of individuals is limited by their com­
putational ability to analysis the information of the other one and the ﬁnite amount 
of time they have to make decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the be­
havioral ﬁnance theory into my research framework to explain the diﬀerence between 
the results of experiments and theoretical model and better understand the behavior of 
investors in the simple double auction market. Furthermore, behavioral ﬁnance helps 
us to construct the link between my theoretical model and the real ﬁnancial market. 
In addition, besides the modeling with rational traders, researchers explain the 
diverge of the subjects’ behaviors by boundary rational subjects and ZI model etc. 
Boundary rational traders have limited ability to predict the behaviors of their oppo­
nents, which is diﬀerent from the assumption of rational traders. Furthermore, the 
feelings of traders aﬀect the their decision marking and result diﬀerence outcome ac­
cording to the research of behavior ﬁnance. The researches on these topics provide 
useful theory to understand and analyze the experimental results of my research. 
2.5.1 Concept of overconﬁdence 
As a well-documented bias, overconﬁdence exists widely in people’s behavior. Over­
conﬁdence refers to people who optimize their expectation or trust their own ability 
to make a decision. Normally, overconﬁdence can be miscalibrate, positive illusion, 
and etc. Miscalibrate describes the distance between the accuracy rate and probability 
assigned. Under this conception, the overconﬁdent people are bias on accuracy of their 
knowledge to make the right decision. Miscalibrated people who are overconﬁdent in 
their judgement, actually have less accuracy rate based on their previous experience. 
The miscalibrated behaviors in ﬁnancial markets are observed as underestimating the 
uncertainty of the circumstance, the bias expectation to the information precision, the 
optimism in predictions of price variations. Slovic et al. (1977) found that the people’ 
conﬁdence increases when they are asked more diﬃcult questions, which shows they 
miscalibrate their ability. Most research report that professional people perform better 
calibration behavior compared with non-professional people. Brenner et al. (2005)also 
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points out that, although experts can improve their resolution, it does not ensure good 
calibration. However, even with more experienced or repeated tasks, miscalculated 
behaviors could not be eliminated entirely. 
Another kind of overconﬁdence is positive illusions. Positive illusion includes better-
than average eﬀect, unrealistic optimism and illusion of control. Positive illusion also 
prevails to be used to explain the phenomena in ﬁnancial markets and economy. The 
better-than average eﬀect refers to people believe that their abilities are higher than 
others and their positive view is higher than others’. People are found to assign more 
responsibility for success and less for failure to themselves (Taylor and Brown, 1988). 
de Bondt (1998) found that investors are overly optimistic about the performance of 
their own stocks and ignore the performance of the index because of the aspects of the 
better-than-average eﬀect. The optimistic bias means that people tend to give more 
positive views to the present than the past and they also give more positive views to 
the future. 
Actually, most the research work which applies the psychology theory to ﬁnancial 
markets does not distinguish the types of overconﬁdence, while it focuses on the eﬀects 
of overconﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets. In sum, overconﬁdence widely exists and inﬂu­
ences the judgement of people in ﬁnancial markets and is not eliminated by reputations 
or increase of experience. 
2.5.2 Overconﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets 
Most researchers ﬁnd that investors usually are overconﬁdent in ﬁnancial markets, 
especially non-professional investors. The overconﬁdence of investors is useful for inter­
preting some of phenomena in ﬁnancial markets. For example, the overconﬁdent traders 
prefer to sell winners short and hold losers long (Odean, 1998). Also, the December 
eﬀect can be explained by the behaviors of overconﬁdent traders. The abnormal return 
of the stocks of small ﬁrms is caused by the trading behaviors of the individual investors 
who are more overconﬁdent than institutions and like to trade small stocks(Hirshleifer, 
2001). Overconﬁdence also aﬀects the variables in ﬁnancial markets. For example, over­
conﬁdent traders trade more frequently than the others in ﬁnancial markets (Barber 
and Odean, 2001). Overconﬁdent traders increase the market depth, underreact the 
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information from the rational traders, and reduce the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets. 
They also increase volatility because of their bias in interpreting information. 
Because traders are overconﬁdent on their ability to assess the information, the 
bias behaviors of traders, who could not assess the strength and weight of information 
accurately, are regarded as one types of miscalibration. Harris and Raviv (1993) inves­
tigate the judgement of the risk-neutral traders on the public signal and claim that the 
reactions of diﬀerent types of traders to information are diﬀerent. Furthermore, Kandel 
and Pearson (1995) also ﬁnd that risk-averse traders have diﬀerent interpretation to 
the mean and the variance of a public signal. One of types of overconﬁdence is that the 
traders are overconﬁdent in the precision of their own information (Kyle and Wang, 
1997). In the research of Daniel et al. (1998), the risk-neutral traders overreact to pri­
vate information and properly weigh public information. The result of these behaviors 
is that they have positive return. On the other side, overconﬁdent traders undervalue 
the information of the other one. Overconﬁdent investors underweigh abstract, sta­
tistical and highly relevant information and overweigh salient, anecdotal and extreme 
information (Odean, 1998). They are prone to overreact to the concrete, salient in­
formation. For example, the information likely to be underweighed are price change, 
the recommend of certain analyst, and the issue of IPO; the information likely to be 
overweighted are the dividends, the issue of SEO and the oﬀer price of other rational 
traders. Besides the research of the existance of overconﬁdence, Gervais and California 
(2001) model the development of overconﬁdence. They point out the people attribute 
too much of his success to his own ability, which leads to overconﬁdence. With the in­
creasing of experience, people reassess themselves and better judgement his own ability. 
On my research, the subjects’ behaviors in experiments are irrational because of 
their heuristics bias. My theoretical models are constructed under the assumption that 
the traders are risk-neutral and rational. However, the students of diﬀerent departments 
only have some basic knowledge of ﬁnancial market. Their submission behaviors are 
diﬃcult to close to the behaviors of experienced and professional traders, who could 
minimize their bias actions. I observed the bias behaviors such as overconﬁdence, 
conservatism, overreaction, and etc. Therefore, it is important to use the behaviorial 
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ﬁnance theory in my research to interpret the diverge of the experimental results from 
the theoretical ones. 
2.5.3 Bounded rationality and related theory in behavior ﬁnance 
In many ﬁnancial models, there is an important assumption that traders are rational. 
However, the empirical research has found that some of the games reach the expected 
equilibrium while the others do not ﬁt the equilibrium. The term of boundary rational 
was ﬁrst mentioned by Herbert Simon. He points out that most of the people are par­
tially rational whose ability to achieve optimize strategy are limited by their own ability 
or resource. His research presents that because of the cost of information, their limited 
ability or other complex situation, people prefer to choose the most satisfactory solution 
other than the optimize solution. Following his research, many research approach to 
model the boundary rationality. Beauty Contest game is one of the popular method to 
research the boundary rationality of the subjects. Most of the research (Grosskopf and 
Nagel (2001),Guth and Sutter (2002), Sbriglia (2004) etc.)ﬁnd that the average bids 
are higher than zero - the theoretical equilibrium number, which shows the existence of 
the boundary rationality. Fairchild (2007) designs a beauty contest game which starts 
from multi-player and then switch to a two-player game. In his experiment, the ra­
tional boundary exists in the multi-player stage and in the two player stage as well. 
However, he also ﬁnds the evidence that the subjects have the ability to learn rapidly. 
Therefore, in the two player stage, by the ﬁnal rounds, their bids are close to zero. 
Camerer Colin et al. (2004) provide a model to observe the depth of reasoning. Their 
research ﬁnd that the 1.5-step people’ data ﬁts most of the games. They also ﬁnd that 
all professional people suﬀer from biases. 
Emotions inﬂuence the people’s decision making and give diﬀerent outcome rather 
than the expectation of theory. For example, the regret and disappointment of traders 
when they experience a negative outcome is an importance factor to aﬀect their decision 
making (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). Loewenstein et al. (2001) point out that the 
emotions that people experience during the process of decision making inﬂuence their 
eventual decision. Their risk-as-feeling model explain the process of the inﬂuence of 
feelings in the decision making of people. Furthermore, the research of Forgas (1995) 
ﬁnd that the degree of feelings to inﬂuence the decision making depends on how risky, 
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uncertain and abstract the decision is. High aﬀect infusion strategies are applied when 
the decision is complex. In another word, feeling inﬂuence people’s decision more when 
they face complex and unfamiliar situation. Therefore, the subjects in my experiment 
may suﬀer the eﬀects of their feelings such as regret, depress etc. , therefore their 
behaviors diverge from the optimal behaviors in theory. 
With the eﬀects of emotions, the boundary rational traders seek the satisfactory 
decision rather than optimal decision. The optimal decision does not mean the best de­
cision because of the eﬀects of other unmodeling factors. Maybe the choice of boundary 
rational traders is the better choice to compete with their irrational opponents since 
they recognize that their opponents are irrational. 
There is another feeling that lead to bias behaviors of people: regret aversion. 
Regret-aversion refers to that people take bias behaviors when they afraid that their 
decision would be sub-optimal. Zeelenberg et al. (1996) ﬁnd the evidence from their 
experiments that subjects prefer to choice the regret-minimizing choice. The results 
are diﬀerent from the previous research which claims that the regret-aversion people 
choose the risk-minimizing decision. Their risk-seeking or risk-aversion depends on 
the feedback they received. In my experiments, in the single-stage game, traders are 
asked to trade several times with diﬀerent parameters. Although each round of trade 
is supposed to be independent, the subjects who are regret-aversion may adjust their 
behaviors according to the feedback of previous trading experience. 
In my theoretical model, with the assumption of rational traders, traders are an­
ticipated to submit optimal order prices. While, in the experiments, the subjects are 
expected to be boundary rational because of their limited knowledge of ﬁnancial mar­
kets, their limited ability to calculate the optimal order price, and their concerning for 
the irrational behavior of the other one. All these factors hold back the subjects to 
be act as a rational traders. Therefore, the diﬀerence between the theoretical values 
and the experimental data is considered as the result of the boundary traders in the 
experiments. 
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2.5.4 Behaviorial ﬁnance in the belief updating process 
In continuous ﬁnancial markets, the traders’ behaviors to update information is com­
plex. Their behaviors depend on the combined eﬀects of various determinants. From 
the points of behavioral ﬁnance, the bias behaviors, such as conservatism, overconﬁ­
dence, overreaction, and etc, are possible to be observed the markets. Conservatism 
causes investors to underreact to short-term information and overreact to long-term 
information. The overconﬁdent traders in the ﬁnancial market take bad bets without 
aware of their information disadvantage and they act more aggressively, which results 
a high trading volume (Shefrin, 2002). Meanwhile, the costs of information decreases 
the possibility of investors to pursue new information. The belief updating of investors 
in the dynamic environment is important to explain the price formation in the multi-
period trading and the equilibrium in ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, my research on the 
traders’ behaviors in the multi-period trading links the cognitive process of the traders 
to the price formation and market eﬃciency. 
Overconﬁdence always act an important role in many situations in ﬁnancial markets. 
Overconﬁdent traders overweight their own information and underweight their own 
information of the others. Batchelor and Dua (1992) ﬁnd that overconﬁdence forecasters 
put little weight on the information of other forecasters. Richardson et al. (1999) ﬁnds 
that traders are overoptimistic at long time horizons and pessimistic at short horizons. 
Cost of the information also inﬂuence the process of belief updating simultaneously. The 
cost of information decreases the activities of investors to obtain necessary information, 
which in turn inﬂuences the decision making of investors. It is proved that people 
prefer to include the information that is easily accessible and interpreted with less cost 
to update their decision. 
Conservatism in ﬁnancial markets refers to people undervaluing or are slow to react 
to new information in markets, or overweigh pervious information to construct their 
belief on the prices. They are biased on the importance between the new information 
and the previous information. Edwards (1968) ﬁnds that people do not change their 
beliefs as much as would a rational Bayesian regarding the new information. Griﬃn 
and Tversky (1992) claim that conservatism arises when people pay attention to the 
strength of the information and pay less attention to the weight of the information. 
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Shefrin (2002) interpret the conservation as a combine eﬀect of overconﬁdence and 
anchoring-and-adjustment, which makes the investors are ineﬃcient to analysis the 
new information. 
2.5.5 Framing and anchoring 
To understand and interpret the traders’ behaviors in the experiments, researches on 
framing and anchoring provide some useful theories from the points of behavior emotion. 
Framing is interpreted as the way of people thought is under a series of mental emotional 
ﬁlters that builded by them. Amos and Daniel (1981) said that framing can inﬂuence 
the choice of decision problems. Their research develops the prospect theory, which 
models the real-life decision, rather than optimal-decision. Anchoring refers to the 
cognitive bias that in the process of decision making, people rely heavily on one aspect 
of even or one information to make the choice and adjust their values to it. Because 
people overestimate one or two factors, their evaluation must diverge from the true 
value. Either framing or anchoring can develop bias in people’s decision making process. 
Prospect theory is developed by Amos and Kahneman in 1979. It addresses the 
question of people’s decision when they need evaluate the gains and losses. Comparing 
with expected utility theory, the prospect theory tries to explain the traders’ expecta­
tion of proﬁts in term of psychology. The value is assigned to gain and loss and the 
decision weight substitute the probability (Daniel Kahneman, 1979). Prospect theory 
can interpret some economic behavior, such as frame, risk-aversion/risk-seeking, dispo­
sition eﬀect etc.. The disposition eﬀect describes the phenomena that traders hold the 
assets with loss and sell the assets with gain. The explanation is that people like to 
recognize their proﬁt and do not will to recognize their loss. 
In sum, people’s behavior in ﬁnance suﬀer from various biases, which drives their 
decision outcomes away from the prospects of theoretical model. The behavior ﬁnance 
theory such as, overconﬁdent, boundary rationality, and regret-aversion etc. can par­
tially explain the results of my experiments. However, my experiments are not designed 
to test any behavior ﬁnancial theory. The purpose of the experiments is to test the 
eﬃciency of the double auction models. It lefts the possibility to extent my experiments 
in double auction market to test the behavior bias in the ﬁnancial market in the future. 
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Limit order markets 
The double auction mechanism exists in many diﬀerent ﬁnancial markets in practice. 
One important market that is constructed according to the trading rules of double 
auction markets is the limit order markets. Limit order markets are developing dra­
matically with the development of the electronic trading systems. The majority of 
Exchanges around the world operate as Limit order markets which adopt the continu­
ous double auction mechanism. In limit order markets, normally, traders are allowed 
to submit limit orders and market orders to buy or sell. Limit order is the order that 
has an upper limit price for buy order and a lower limit price for sell order, which 
are speciﬁed by traders. Compared with other markets, limit order markets are more 
eﬃcient and attractive because they increase the probability of decreasing the cost for 
traders. Meanwhile, they also increase the uncertainty of the proﬁts to traders and put 
traders into the dilemma as to whether to increase the proﬁt or decrease the execution 
probability. As one part of microstructure theory, limit order markets have attracted 
a lot of interesting. Researchers investigate the price formation process, the eﬃciency 
and equilibrium, and the investors behaviors in limit order markets. Because limit 
order markets are more complex than standard auction markets and dealer markets, 
there are not too many theoretical models to investigate the order submission and order 
book, compared with the abundant empirical work on this market. Some theoretical 
work (Harris, 1998; Parlour, 1998; Rosu, 2008)are of note for us to better understand 
limit order markets. 
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3.1 Introduction to the limit order markets 
As order-driven markets, which are diﬀerent from price-driven markets, limit order 
markets are auction markets in which the prices are determined by the orders sub­
mitted by the participants. Order-driven markets are organized under certain trading 
rules, which include oral auctions, single price auctions, continuous electronic auctions 
and crossing networks. In limit order markets, limit buy/sell orders, which have the 
speciﬁed unilateral bounded prices, play the main role. Limit buy/sell orders cannot 
be executed with the price higher/lower than limit bid/ask. A limit order book acting 
as intermediator in limit order markets, listing limit buy/sell orders. Limit orders are 
stored in the order book on two sides according to their type and listed by their price 
sequence, and the orders with the same prices arranged by their time sequence. Diﬀer­
ent from auction markets which clearly has a uniform clear price, limit order markets 
match the highest buy order with the lowest sell order by pairs with diﬀerent trading 
prices. The remaining part of the large orders are executed as market orders or become 
a limit order according to the trading rules in the diﬀerent markets. Unexecuted limit 
orders can be cancelled by the traders or expire automatically at the end of the trading 
day. 
Two principles are followed in limit order markets: price priority and time priority. 
Price priority means that orders are executed by the price sequence. According to 
this rule, market orders are executed ﬁrst, then the limit orders with more aggressive 
price are executed before the execution of the less aggressive price limit orders. Time 
priority stipulate that limit orders ﬁrst coming into the order book are executed before 
the latter orders, where the price of these orders are the same. According to these two 
priorities, limit orders provide investors with the probability to decrease the cost of 
buy or to increase the proﬁt of sell. In particular, the informed traders have the chance 
to ﬁx their earnings by submitting limit orders. However, the traders in limit order 
markets face the problem of the improvement of their oﬀer prices and the decreasing of 
the execution probability of the orders at the same time. The uncertainty of execution 
arise by introducing limit orders. Market orders are guaranteed to be executed, while 
that does not happen to even the most aggressive limit order. Limit orders also solve 
the information disadvantage to limit order traders. Traders arriving in the market 
later incorporate the new information into their orders, and are obviously in a better 
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position than the traders who submit limit orders early. Therefore, the submitting 
strategies of the new arriving traders are one of the important factors which aﬀect 
the execution probability of the limit orders existing on the limit order book. The 
limit order traders also under the risk of ”winner’s curse”: limit orders are executed 
when market price move to bad direction for these traders. Therefore, the submission 
decision is complex for limit order traders. They need consider not only the ex post 
information such as the status of the limit order books and transaction prices, but also 
the ex ante status of the order books. They also need monitor limit markets after the 
limit orders have been submitted and adjust their orders frequently to avoid the loss 
in the line of new information. Their costs for trading by limit orders are not only the 
submission fee but also the waiting cost. 
Diﬀerent types of limit markets have diﬀerent regulation on market rules. On the 
aspect of order book, there are open book markets in which the information about 
the book is uncovered to all the traders, such as the Paris Bourse, and close book 
limit order markets in which the book information is not revealed. Some exchanges 
permit the existence of the ”iceberg” orders which hide part of them from the public 
information. On the aspect of the participants, pure limit order book markets such as 
Tokyo Stock Exchange are the markets in which order book is the only intermediary for 
trading without involving the third part of participants except the buyers and sellers, 
comparing with some exchanges which are organized as hybrid system such as NYSE. 
On the aspect of the order type, Some exchanges allow the existence of the limit orders 
and market orders simultaneously. Some other exchanges treat any orders as limit 
orders. 
3.2 Microstructure model 
As an important section of the microstructure theory, the research topics in limit order 
markets include trader behavior, liquidity provision, price formation etc. One vital 
function of limit orders is to provide liquidity for markets. Therefore, limit order mar­
kets are believed to be one of the most eﬃcient market to allocate resource. Therefore, 
most research work focus on the liquidity provision and eﬃciency of limit order markets. 
The traders’ submission strategies which involve the game theory are less investigated. 
Most work focus on the empirical research for the limit order markets. The problem 
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for theoretical model on limit order market is that the execution of the limit order is 
decided not only by the current status of limit order books, but also by the ex ante 
status of limit orders books. The proﬁts of limit orders is a non-linear function (Parlour 
and Seppi, 2007) . 
3.2.1 Static model on limit order book 
the static model presents a repeated one period trading game in which the limit orders 
just exist for one stage on the book. The static model concentrates on the equilibrium 
of the order book and the liquidity provision of the limit orders. By the static model, we 
could ﬁgure out some characteristics of the limit order market, such as the competition 
between traders, the break-even condition of the limit order book and the eﬀects of the 
costs for limit order traders. 
Some static models have been constructed to investigate the equilibrium of the limit 
order book(Cohen et al., 1981; Glosten, 1994; Rock, 1996; Seppi, 1997). In the static 
model, the order submission strategies of the traders focus on the limit order price. 
The type of the trader has been predeﬁned by his own property. The market order 
trader are impatient trader with private information. In the model of Glosten (1994), 
they are risk-averse informed trader who want to maximize their own utility function. 
These market orders match the limit orders on the order book. The large market order 
is executed by several limit orders of diﬀerent prices. Therefore, the market order 
trader need decide the quantity of his order according to the existing limit orders on 
the order book and his own private value. The limit order traders are considered as 
the patient traders who provide liquidity and are compensated by trading with market 
order traders. They are risk-neutral traders who need make the decision on the price 
and quantity of the limit orders. 
Limit order traders face risks in the limit order market. The main risk for them 
is the risk of unexecuted. The risk of non-execution is due to the uncertainty of the 
execution conditional on the status of the current limit order book and future order 
submission. The limit order will be executed only if when there is enough quantity 
of market orders arriving to match the limit orders with the same price priority. The 
other risk is the adverse section. Information disadvantage for the limit order trader is 
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inevitable with the arriving of new market orders and with the new public information 
or private information. If the limit orders are picked oﬀ by the informed traders, the 
expected proﬁts of the limit order trader become negative. 
For the limit order trader, the transaction price is ﬁxed in advance, which is his 
oﬀer price. The uncertain part is the expected value of the assets in equilibrium. Their 
expected proﬁts are also eﬀected by the costs that happen in the process. The limit 
order traders face two parts of costs: the up-front costs include the decision marking cost 
, the order submission cost; the ex post order include the cost for monitoring the market 
and execution cost which relates to the execution probability of limit order. Because of 
the existing costs, the limit order traders could not make decision continuously. They 
need choose some decision points to monitor the market. Then limit order arriving 
rate follows Poisson stochastic process. Cohen et al. (1981) proves that if the market 
price is generated by the compound Poisson process, there is a jump on the execution 
probability of limit orders, that is the execution probability never equals one whatever 
how close the limit price is to the market price. Because of this ”gravitation pull”, 
there is a small bid-ask spread between two sides of limit order price. 
The execution probability of limit order aﬀects the utility function of the limit 
order trader. Then the optimal order placement strategies of limit buyers who want 
to maximize his utility function, is to place his limit order on the point between the 
market ask price and market bid price, on which the optimal limit price to maximize 
his utility function. Beyond this point, the high price decreases the utility function and 
is greater than the execution probability increase of the utility function. There is a 
jump of utility on the market ask price, because the trader could trade by market order 
with certainty. Below the optimal price, the decrease of execution probability becomes 
slowly, then anther peak of utility function below the market bid price. 
The spread also has an eﬀect on the utility function, that is the wide spread increase 
the utility function of the trader. When the spread is increasing, the traders prefer 
the limit order not the market order. While, with the increasing of limit orders, the 
competition between limit orders marks the spread decrease. Cohen also give the 
deﬁnition of equilibrium market spread: the probability of the bid-ask spread increasing 
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is equal to the probability of the spread decreasing. This explains why the small stocks 
have larger spread while the big stocks have small spread. 
The results from static model prove that the surplus of the limit orders will decrease 
to zero because of the competition between traders, which decrease the execution prob­
ability. The competition in the limit order market is similar to the competition between 
exchanges, therefor it is not necessary to introduce the third part into the limit order 
market. This form of competition also explain why the small traders prefer the hy­
brid limit order market which involves the participant of specialists, while large traders 
prefer the pure limit order markets. The large stocks have more arrival rates which 
increase the execution probability of the limit orders. Then more limit orders come to 
and participate in the competition, and in the process of a small equilibrium spread 
forms in the trading of large stocks. 
In these static modelsGlosten (1994); Rock (1996); Seppi (1997), one important 
assumption is that informed traders with private information have incentive to use 
aggressive orders or market order to realize their proﬁts. These informed traders are 
impatient to obtain proﬁt by trading according to their private information. They think 
that the value of their private information is short-lived. Compared to the informed 
trader, the uninformed trader (liquidity provider) are patient to use limit orders to 
reduce their cost and obtain proﬁt by providing liquidity. However, the evidence of 
using limit orders by informed traders has been found. Kaniel and Liu (2006) show that 
limit orders are more informative. Similar results have been found by Cao et al. (2004) 
on the Australian Stock Exchange. Results from the experimental market constructed 
by Bloomﬁeld et al. (2005) show that informed traders use more limit orders than do 
liquidity traders. When the private information is low and the market price move to 
the true value of the asset, the informed trader act as the dealer, who provide liquidity 
to the market by limit orders. They obtain proﬁt by carrying less risk of being picked 
oﬀ. In other words, informed traders use limit orders better than uninformed traders. 
By analyzing data from NYSE, Anand et al. (2005) found the similar results in that 
the informed trader prefers to use market orders early in the trading day, while using 
more limit orders in the latter half day. They are better at using limit orders to trade 
than uniformed traders. In particular, Beber and Caglio (2005) ﬁnd the evidence of 
the strategic behavior of the informed trader. They do not submit market orders to 
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gain proﬁts according to their private information immediately when they arrive at 
the market, but submit less aggressive limit orders on the other side of the limit order 
book to hide their information. All of these empirical evidence prove that the informed 
traders include limit orders in their order submission strategies to pursue their proﬁts. 
There are some limitation in using the static model to explain the continuous dy­
namic limit order market. First, it is impossible to observe order ﬂow changes on the 
limit order book under the static model. Second, the assumption of the limit order 
trader as the liquidity provider and the market order trader as the informed trader 
prevent the decision of the trader on the order type choice. The optimal strategies 
for the trader should include the decision on the type of the order and then the price. 
However, the static models still provide some insights on the equilibrium of the order 
book and the adverse selection problems in the trading process. 
3.2.2 Dynamic model for submission strategy 
As we state above, the static model cannot draw the patterns of the order ﬂow on the 
order book and cannot present the optimal strategies of traders when they include the 
changes of the order book in the future into their consideration. The dynamic model 
for the limit order market is a better system to capture these characteristics. One 
important characteristic of limit order market is that traders enter into the market 
asynchronously, which is diﬀerent from the one of auction market in which all the 
traders exist in the market simultaneously. Then changes of the order ﬂow can only be 
observed on the multi-stage. The systematic price patterns has been observed by some 
empirical work(Biais et al., 1995). Third, the dynamic model provides insights on the 
optimal order choice of the traders in the limit order market. The traders’ decision has 
been eﬀected by the future state of the order book and strategies of following traders. 
The dynamic model is a platform to investigate the optimal order choice of the traders 
conditional on the past, current and future state of the order book. They also extend 
the space of order decision, because at some decision point, the traders needs to decide 
whether or not to cancel the old limit order, or submit a new limit order. 
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Parlour (1998) construct a multi-stage model with multi-traders in the limit order 
market . The trader’s consumption has two parts, consumption on day1 and con­
sumption on day2. β is the trader’s trade-oﬀ on his consumption between two days. 
Therefore, β is also the parameter for the trader’s patience. When β is far from 1 
that means the trader has the incentive to trade. When β is close to 1 that means the 
traders are patient to trade. Traders arrive in the market randomly. He knows that his 
order will aﬀect the submission strategies of the following trader who inversely aﬀect 
the execution probability of the existing orders on the order book. This assumption 
makes the execution probability of the order an endogenous fact in the submission 
strategies. His decision is also aﬀected by the current status of both sides of the order 
book. The trader needs to choose to submit market buy/sell order or limit buy/sell 
order price. The limit order price is not continuous in this model. The price of limit 
buy order is equal to the market bid price and the price of limit sell order is equal to 
the market ask price. The market order is executed at once, while the limit order is 
executed with uncertainty. The execution of the limit order depends on the following 
arriving market orders. Only when there is enough market orders arriving to pick oﬀ 
the limit orders beyond his limit order before the end of the trading day, the limit order 
submitted by the trader could be executed with next market order. Diﬀerent β type 
trader has diﬀerent choice on the order type. The low β type trader tend to submit 
market sell order. The mid value of β trader prefer to submit limit order. They have no 
need to trade immediately, therefore they could use limit order to improve transaction 
price conditional on other waiting cost. The high β type trader will submit a market 
buy order because of their high valuation on the asset and the urgency of trade. 
The limit order book aﬀects the order submission strategies of the traders by the 
execution probability. The execution probability has positive eﬀect on the trader’s 
order choice. The higher the execution probability, the more trader types to choose 
limit order but not market order. Both sides of the limit order book have eﬀect on the 
execution probability. On the same side of the book, the competition between the limit 
orders decrease the execution probability. The current limit orders with time priority 
and the following limit orders with price priority have higher execution probability. If 
the other side of book is thin, the trader prefers limit order. The arrival of market 
order will decrease, which in turn decreases the execution probability of limit order. 
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Empirical research provide suﬃcient support on the relation between the order 
book and the execution probability. Omura et al. (2000) ﬁnd evidence from Tokyo 
Stock Exchange that the depth of the same side of the order book has negative eﬀect 
on the order execution probability, while the depth of the other side of the book has 
positive eﬀect on the execution probability. He also ﬁnds that when the spread is large, 
the execution probability of limit orders is small, but this does not mean that the 
large spread will attract more market orders. Although the large spread decrease the 
execution probability, however market orders become more expensive because of the 
increasing cost. Therefore, it is optimal to the traders to submit limit orders when the 
spread becomes large. 
Further more, some empirical researches provide evidence on the relationship be­
tween the order book and order position. Ranaldo (2004) ﬁnd that the order book 
depth on the same side increases the aggressiveness of the limit order and the depth 
on the other side of the book decreases the aggressiveness of the limit order. However 
the results of Beber and Caglio (2005) is a little bit diﬀerent in this aspect. They ﬁnd 
that traders submit more aggressive limit orders when the depth on the same side of 
the book is thick, while , the depth on the other side of the book has diﬀerent eﬀect on 
the limit orders. Buyers act less aggressively when the depth on the other side of the 
book is large. Sellers act more aggressively when they face a large depth on the other 
side of the book. Keim and Madhavan (1995) also get similar results on the diﬀerent 
attitudes of the buyers and sellers. The possible explanation is that sellers are more 
impatient to stop their loss when the market price goes down and prefer to submit more 
aggressive limit sell order to reduce the cost of consuming liquidity under the condition 
that there is serious competition between limit buy orders. When address the question 
whether market depth conveys information for the traders with which they can use in 
their order submission strategies, some researchers announce that the limit order book 
is informative about the future order ﬂow (Cao et al., 2004; Harris and Panchapagesan, 
2005). Boehmer et al. (2005) show that there is price improvement due to information 
eﬃciency in the trading process. In particular, they ﬁnd that open limit order book 
can increase the eﬃciency of the limit order submission strategies of the trader and 
increase the liquidity of the limit order market. However, Coppejans and Domowitz 
(1999) claim that information from the order book cannot explain the future order ﬂow. 
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If the trader includes the current book status and the following status of the book 
in his decision process, there are some patterns of the order ﬂow observed by this 
dynamic model. For example, the probability of observing a limit sell order at time 
t + 1 conditional on the transaction on a market buy order is larger than the the 
probability of observing a limit sell order at time t + 1 conditional on the transaction 
on other type of orders. On time t, the arriving of market buy order matches the limit 
sell order at ask, which decreases the queue of the limit sell order. The thin limit order 
book on the sell side attract more limit sell order than market orders. If the transaction 
happens on the other side of book, not only the trader will face more competing limit 
sell orders with time priority, but also the longer queue of the sell orders lures the 
following buyers to submit limit orders not market orders, while the limit sell order will 
be executed under the condition that there are more market orders coming to match 
the existing and following limit orders. In a word, the transaction follows the same 
side of transaction while the order is not followed by the same type of order. These 
predictions on the order ﬂow pattern in the limit order market is very useful in reality 
to capture the abnormal order ﬂows on the market. For example, the large orders have 
been split into small orders to decrease its eﬀect on the market price. We will observe 
large series sequential orders on the same side of the order book. This is diﬀerent from 
the results of the model that the probability of orders that followed by the same type 
of the orders is smaller than followed by the other side of the orders. The evidence 
for the correlations between the orders in the limit order market from New York Stock 
Exchange has been provided by Ellul et al. (2003). 
There are some factors aﬀecting the liquidity provision of limit orders. The reduced 
tick size decreases the liquidity provision of the limit orders (Declerck, 2000; Goldstein 
and Kavajecz, 2000; Jones and Lipson, 2001). The reduced tick decreases the spread 
of the market, then attract more traders to consume the liquidity, not providing the 
liquidity, then the liquidity provision has been reduced. 
Another dynamic model to investigate the trader’s optimal order choice behavior 
and to address the game theoretical problems faced by the trader is constructed by 
Foucault (1999). Comparing with the work of Parlour who concentrates on the choice 
of order type, this model focuses on the price quotation of the limit order traders in 
equilibrium. The traders arrive in the market randomly, submit long-lived order which 
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could not been cancelled once submitted. Every trader just submit one unit of order. 
One restricted assumption is that only price improvement limit order can be submitted. 
This assumption turns the price priority problem into a problem of spread priority. The 
research is to investigates the price formation process and order placement strategies of 
the traders. They ﬁnd that volatility plays a main role in the traders’ order submission 
decision. When price volatility is high, the trader faces a high risk of being picked oﬀ, 
asking for more compensation. Therefore, the spread in the market is larger than the 
one with small volatility. The high spread increase the cost for the market order trader, 
then limit order become more attractive. When there are more limit order on the limit 
order book, the execution probability of limit orders decreases.There are similar results 
from the empirical research. In this three-stage model, the price quotation problem has 
been analyzed. Furthermore the risk of execution and the risk of being picked oﬀ have 
been included in the model. However, it cannot provide a clear picture of dynamic 
order ﬂows in the limit order market. 
Price volatility is relative to the execution probability and the expected proﬁt of 
the traders. The limit order trader can get proﬁt from the trade a temporary price 
ﬂuctuation due to the imbalance of the order book, while lose from trading with in­
formed trade who cause the perpetual price change. Handa and Schwartz (1996) claim 
that the trader will choose limit order when their proﬁt from the liquidity provision 
can compensate the loss of being picked oﬀ by the informed trader. Therefore, when 
the price volatility is high, the proﬁt of submitting limit orders as liquidity provision is 
higher than the loss by being picked oﬀ. Their explanation is diﬀerent from Foucault’s 
but gives the same results that price volatility attracts more limit orders. Not only 
empirical work ﬁnds evidence that high volatility increase the probability of limit order 
submissions, moreover, the trader will submit less aggressive orders under this condi­
tion. Beber and Caglio (2005) ﬁnd that the increase in volatility drives less aggressive 
limit orders for the reason that limit order traders ask for more compensation for the 
risk of being picked oﬀ by the informed traders. Zovko and Farmer (2002) ﬁnd that 
the limit order trader prefer to place a more aggressive limit order when the volatility 
of the asset price is low. Ranaldo (2004) also ﬁnd that the high temporary volatility 
increases the probability of limit order submission and causing the limit order to be 
place more aggressively. 
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Ahn et al. (2001) tell the diﬀerence between the volatility rising from the diﬀerent 
sides of the book and their eﬀect on both sides of the orders. Their research shows 
that if the limit orders on both sides are calculated together, there is evidence on the 
relationship between the volatility and the order ﬂow. They ﬁnd that the increasing 
volatility on the ask(bid) attract more limit sell(buy) orders than market orders. They 
also observe the fact that market depth rises subsequent to an increase in transac­
tion volatility, and the high volatility decreases the market depth. Their results and 
explanation coincide with the research of Handa and Schwartz (1996). 
Foucault et al. (2005) construct a dynamic model for limit order book which con­
tains the values of the formal model. The traders arrive sequentially in the market 
with diﬀerent patience level because of the diﬀerent waiting cost of them. Sellers and 
buyers come to the market alternately. Everyone just submit one unit of order. The 
time series is inﬁnite and continuous, while the price line is discrete with one tick min­
imum. Once the limit order has been submitted, it cannot be canceled or resubmitted. 
One important assumption is that the trader must submit a limit order with an price 
improved. With this restriction, the order submission strategy of the trader depends 
only on the inside spread. The eﬀect of the price priority in normal limit order market 
becomes the eﬀect of spread priority. The limit order which shorten the spread more 
has the higher execution probability. 
Their model predicts the strategies of traders in equilibrium, that is patient trader 
prefer limit order and impatient traders submit market orders. In equilibrium, the 
optimal strategies of the trader is that the margin value of the function of waiting 
cost for trader equals zero. The trader could not improve his limit order price without 
increasing the waiting cost. The equilibrium status is stationary in this model. This 
model also provides some predictions on the eﬀects of variables such as spread, trading 
frequency, and market resiliency. The transaction frequency is weakly decreasing under 
wide spread. This is because that, when the spread is small, the market order prevail 
among the patient and impatient traders. When the spread become larger, the impa­
tient traders prefer to submit limit orders. The resiliency is measured by the probability 
of the following limit orders pulling back the spread to its former level before the next 
transaction. When the traders act heterogeneously, the resiliency of the limit order 
book increases with the large proportion of patient traders and increasing the waiting 
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cost. When the waiting cost or the number of patient traders increases, the bid-ask 
spread decrease with a large number of aggressive limit orders, which raises the mar­
ket resiliency. When the order arrival rate increases, the traders act less aggressively, 
therefore, the market resiliency will decrease. 
There are some other dynamic models to investigate the limit order market. Some 
of them focus on the optimal order submission strategies of various types of traders. 
Angel (1992) constructs a single-period model to investigate the choice of an informed 
trader who is forced to purchase a security. Harris (1998) develops a dynamic model to 
investigate the optimal order submission strategies for three types traders - uniformed 
trader, informed trader and value-motivated trader. Wald and Horrigan (2005) provides 
a two-period model to investigate the trader’s decision of whether to place a limit order 
and at what price from the perspective of a risk-averse investor. He considers two 
cases - the forced-execution case and the optional-execution case, with some focus on 
the equilibrium of the order book. Rosu (2008) presents a continuous-time market, 
in which the trader could cancel or resubmit their orders. In equilibrium, the same 
type of traders have equal expected utilities. The dynamic model of Goettler et al. 
(2004) investigates the equilibrium status of the order book. This model extent the 
analysis with multi-unit and multi-type limit orders. These models are diﬀerent in their 
treatment of the trader type, time interval and waiting cost etc. 
3.2.3 Zero-intelligence traders 
The assumption of rational traders is made in many microstructure model. Although 
the degree of rationality is diﬀerent, the normal acknowledgement on the rational trader 
is based on their knowledge of how they could get rid of the systematic error to make the 
right decision. One question comes out from the assumption of the intelligent trader: 
does the eﬃciency of one market design come from the endogenous properties of the 
market or from the rational behavior of the trader? The market equilibrium is the 
cumulation of the eﬀects of all the traders’ behavior, which is diﬀerent from the simple 
disconnected sum of strategic behavior of individuals, because of the probability that 
the systematic eﬀects decrease the non systematic error. Gode and Sunder (1993) give 
the assumption of”zero-intelligence” traders in their theoretical model in double auction 
market. According their deﬁnition, ZI (zero-intelligence) traders are the traders who 
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place their orders randomly but avoid loss from the trade and do not use the information 
of previous trade and ignore market rules to explain salient aspects of this data. The 
ZI trader model is useful in giving some insights into the problem of market eﬃciency, 
because the ZI trader model presents the performance of market separate from the 
performance of the traders. Comparing the diﬀerence between the experimental results 
of the ZI trader model and the ones of the human market, we could know the extent of 
the market performance. Gode and Sunder ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the results 
on the ZI trader model and the human schedules is very small and they do the same 
equilibrium price and quantity. They claim that the convergence of the price is coming 
from the property of the market under the condition of ZI traders. In other words, the 
market is eﬃcient because of its own discipline, not from the rational behavior of the 
traders. 
Gode and Sunderhe’s work give some valuable insights on market eﬃciency. They 
also introduce the ZI traders into the research model in the markets. Cliﬀ and Bruten 
(1997) gives some critique on their research. First, the mean transaction price in 
ZI trader model can be predicted from the expected value of the probability density 
function, which is applied to both the buyer’s price probability density function and 
the seller’s price probability density function, approach the equilibrium price under the 
condition that the magnitude of the gradient of supply and demand curve is equal. They 
also ﬁnd that the price convergence in the ZI trader model does not happen in some 
special market design. They give the assumption of ZIP(zero-intelligence-plus) traders: 
stochastic traders with minimal intelligence, but they incorporate elementary machine 
learning techniques to alter their behavior on the basis of experience. They design the 
model in which the ZIP traders could adjust their oﬀer price by the information of 
the market price. The market price is the only information that the trader use in his 
strategies. The margin proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the traders’s reservation price 
and the transaction price. According to the last transaction price, he needs to decrease 
or increase his margin proﬁt restricted by the margin update rules. The experiment 
results show that the price convergence appears in most of the market design with 
ZIP trader model, although in some market, this convergence is not observed with ZI 
trader model. Furthermore, the equilibrium price and the expected proﬁt from the ZIP 
model is more close to the ones of the human market, compared with the ZI model. 
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Therefore, the more complex ZIP traders act more like humans in the reality market 
than ZI traders. Even in a very simple market design, ZIP trade could complete price 
convergence. 
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4 
Two-person single period double 
auction model 
My research begins with the analysis of submission strategies of traders in double auc­
tion markets. The investigation of the informed traders’ submission strategies in auction 
markets could help us to understand not only the decision process of investors, but also 
the mechanism eﬃciency of double auction markets, such as process of price forma­
tion and information dissemination. There are some questions attracting my interests. 
Which factors could aﬀect the traders’ submission strategies of order side and order 
prices, and what weight they have in the decision process? How do investors under­
stand the submission strategies of the others, regarding their private value distribution 
as a common knowledge in markets? Diﬀerent from other double auction markets, I 
posit a simple double auction market where traders can make choice between bids and 
asks according to their preference. Therefore, in my research, it is also important to 
analyse the probability of observing one buy and one sell in such markets. 
In this chapter, I will introduce a static model in simple double auction markets. In 
this incomplete information market, two informed traders trade one unit of the asset 
with each other in one trading period. They have their own reservation price according 
to their individual signal and the information of the other one’s value distribution. Also 
they are free to choose their order sides and order prices according to their preference. 
The trade is a single-period bargain with two stages. At stage I, two traders make their 
decision on their order side and order price, then submit their oﬀers simultaneously, and 
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at stage II, two orders match with each other. The trade could only happen following 
speciﬁc trading rules in which each trader has equal bargain power. 
Before presenting my model in details, I would like to introduce the classic bargain 
model of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), on which my model based. Chatterjee and 
Samuelson investigated conditional trading strategies with incomplete information and 
uncertainty of success under the two-side bargain game. In their model, one seller and 
one buyer submit their oﬀers simultaneously and the trade could only happen when 
the bid price is higher than the ask price. One important contribution of this model 
is that they treat the execution probability as an endogenous factor by modeling the 
interaction between the submission strategies of traders. The buyer assesses the seller’s 
strategies according to the available information of the seller’s private value distribution. 
Similarly, the seller has the information of the buyer’s private value distribution and 
understand that the buyer has the information of his private value as well. In my 
research, the game-theoretical problem among traders is one of the important questions 
that I want to address. Therefore, I construct my model based on their model such 
that the execution probability is an endogenous factor in the model. Diﬀerent from 
their model in which one buyer and one seller are ﬁxed at the beginning of trade, I 
permit the traders to choose their own sides according to their own preference with 
underlying information. my research focuses on the optimal strategies of the traders 
and the price formation process in double auction markets rather than the conditions 
of bargain success. 
4.1 Description of the model 
I posit a double auction market where two traders with incomplete information trade 
with each other. These two informed traders are indiﬀerent on every aspect, such as 
personal judgement, knowledge, and etc., such that they would take similar action 
under the similar condition. They enter into the market simultaneously to trade one 
unit of asset. According to the private signal they received separately, they get their 
own private reservation price of the asset. I use private-value rather than common-
value in my model because of the research purpose of my model. In the simple two-
trader model, the research focus is to observe the traders’ submission strategies with 
private information and the traders’ game theoretical competition between them, rather 
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than the price formation. The private value assumption simplify the decision making 
process of traders, which easy the situation of subjects in the experiments. Except 
their private information of the asset, the distribution of reservation prices of each 
trader is a common knowledge in the market. The distributions of two reservation 
prices could be same or diﬀerent from each other at the beginning of the trade. The 
private value distributions of the traders are assumed to follow normal distributions 
such that most of the private values cluster around a mean value. Then a couple 
of mean value and variance represent a speciﬁc private value distribution which is 
the available information of the opponent to the trader. Each trader could estimate 
possible situation and submission strategies of the other one according to the private 
value of his opponent. Speciﬁcally, if the private value distributions of the traders 
have the same mean value and variance, both of them are aware that his opponent’s 
private value are drawn from the same distribution as his. I denote trader 1 as trader 
i and trader 2 as trader 3 − i in my model. As the description above, trader 1 holds 
two parts of information: his own private reservation price Vi and the cumulative 
distribution function of trader 3 − i regarded by trader i according to his information 
about trader 3 − i’s private value. Gi(b3−i) denote the cumulative distribution function 
for trader 3 − i’s bid price regarded by trader i and Fi(s3−i) denote the cumulative 
distribution function for trader 3 − i’s ask price. Meanwhile, because of the game-
theoretical competition between two traders, trader 2 knows that trader 1 is informed 
by his private value distribution and assesses his submission strategies according to the 
information about him. And for the same reason, trader 1 is also aware that trader 
2 knows that his opponent discriminates his private value. The knowledge of game-
theoretical competition exists and goes on between two traders. With this assumption, 
the execution probability of oﬀers becomes an endogenous variable in my model, which 
is inﬂuenced by the submission strategies of both sides of the traders. I must point 
out that, although the private value distributions are normal distributions v ∼ N(v¯, σ), 
the oﬀer price distributions derived from the underlying private value distributions do 
not always follow normal distributions. Normal distribution is useful to describe the 
random variables that cluster around a mean value. Since the normal distribution can 
be deﬁned by two variables - mean and variance, it is easy to research the eﬀects of the 
change of the distributions. I expect that the model with other distribution, the result 
of the model would be similar to the one with normal distribution. 
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The traders are assumed to be risk-neutral, who have no preference among the 
choices of risk and only concern the expected return. With this assumption, the prob­
abilities of future cash ﬂows are not included in my model and the expected value is 
exactly the value that the traders are care about. Meanwhile, the traders are rational, 
whose trading purpose is to maximize their proﬁt. In a word, the rational risk-neutral 
traders in the model submit the optimal orders in order to maximize their expected 
return. Another important assumption is there is only one unit of the asset for trading 
in the market. In order to simplify my research and focus on the submission strategies 
and competition between the traders, I do not consider the quantity of orders. The 
order prices are derived from a continuous range without tick size. The continuous 
price range allows us to interpret the execution probability as a part of the continuous 
cumulative function of the other one’s oﬀer prices and to observe the every possible 
oﬀer prices of the traders. 
Because the traders need to choose both his order side and order price. There are 
two steps for the traders to make his decision. The ﬁrst step is that he decides his 
order side, and secondly he ﬁgures out what price he submits according to his order 
side. We should notice that during the processing of order side decision, the traders 
are not informed the order side of the other one or the order price of the other one. 
Firstly, the traders need to choose the order side of their orders after entering 
market. One feature of my model is that traders are allowed to choose the order side 
according to their preference. Here, I introduce a new variable, λb - the probability 3−i 
that trader 2 submits a buy order, regarded by trader 1 to denote the uncertainty of 
the order side choice of the traders. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) posit a bargain 
game with one seller and one buyer whose order sides are ﬁxed in advance. Therefore, 
the unsuccessful trading could only happen when the bid price is lower than the sell 
price. The uncertainty of the opponent strategies is only refer to the opponent’s oﬀer 
price. Whereas, in my model, the traders are free to choose both the order price and the 
order side such that the uncertainty of the strategy increases under this assumption. 
Therefore, after introducing the new variable, the additional condition of the successful 
trading besides the one above is that there are one buy and one sell orders in the 
market. By allowing traders to choose order side, the diﬀerence between the double 
auction markets in my research and the limit order markets is reduced. As we all know, 
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the traders’ order side choice in limit order markets is aﬀected by his preference and 
his trading purpose to pursue the proﬁts. Here, the trading purpose of the informed 
traders is to realize the value of their private information and maximize their proﬁts. 
Secondly, the trader makes his decision on the order price, which are the optimal 
price that maximize his proﬁt according to his order side. si denotes the oﬀer price 
of trader 1 if he submits a sell order and bi denotes the oﬀer price of trader 1 if he 
submits a buy order. Similarly, s3−i and b3−i are the bid and ask prices of the trader 
2 separately. Two traders submit their oﬀers simultaneously without being informed 
of the submission strategies of the opponents. To reduce the diﬀerence between my 
double auction market model and limit order markets, I assume that every trader has 
equal weight to determine the transaction price. Therefore, the transaction price P is 
b+sthe average of the two oﬀers if the trade happens: P = . However, the execution 2 
of limit orders is not guaranteed in the market, and it only happens when there is 
one bid and one ask in the market and the bid price is higher than the ask price at 
the same time. In other words, transaction price must satisfy s ≤ P ≤ b under the 
precondition of observing one buy and one ask in the market. When the transaction 
happens, the expected proﬁt is equal to the diﬀerence between the true assets value 
and the transaction price. For a seller, his proﬁt is equal to the transaction price minus 
his reservation price π(si, vi) = P −vi. For a buyer, his proﬁt is equal to his reservation 
price minus the transaction price π(bi, vi) = vi − P . As the function above, the proﬁt of 
buyer is derived from the value above the transaction price to his reservation price under 
the condition that the market price would be equal to his private value. Similarly, the 
seller could obtain proﬁts because his reservation price is below the transaction price. 
Because they are the risk-neutral rational traders, their expected proﬁts are impor­
tant dependent variables in the model. Since two traders are similar on every aspect, 
I use trader 1 as the sample to describe the status of traders. When trader 1 submits 
a sell order, under the uncertainty of the other one’s order submission strategies, his 
expected proﬁt is given by: 
+∞ si + b3−i
E[π(si, vi)] = λb [( ) − vi]gi(b3−i)db3−i (4.1)3−i 
si 2 
This function expresses that the expected proﬁt of trader 1 is decided by his price and 
the opponent’s submission strategies including his order side and order prices. Because 
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the bargain follows the rules that trade only happens when the bid is higher than the 
ask. The ask oﬀers of trader 1 are only executed when the oﬀer prices are in the area 
with the upper and lower supports of the bid oﬀer distribution of trader 2, +∞ and 
si, respectively. In other words, the execution probability of trader 1’s asks is equal 
to the cumulative distribution function of trader 2’s bids conditional on the bids being 
higher than the asks. In this function, gi(b3−i) is the density function of trader 2’s bids, 
related to the cumulative function Gi(b3−i). Because traders are free to choose their 
order side, the expected proﬁts of the seller is reduced by multiplying the execution 
probability of the opponent submitting bid oﬀers, λb 3−i. 
Similarly, when trader 1 submits a buy order, his expected proﬁt is: � bi bi + s3−i
E[π(bi, vi)] = (1 − λb ) [vi − ( )]fi(s3−i)db3−i (4.2)3−i
−∞ 2 
As a buyer, trader 1’s expected proﬁts is realized by matching the sell orders of the 
opponents. The execution probability of trader 1’s bid oﬀer is decided by the cumulative 
function of trader 2’s ask oﬀers Fi(b3−i). The bid oﬀers are executed when the sell 
prices of the opponent are in the range from −∞ to bi, since asks are lower than bids 
for traders to make proﬁts. gi(b3−i) is the density function of trader 2’s bid oﬀers. As 
the sum of the execution probability of buying and the execution probability of selling 
is equal to one, 1- λb is the execution probability of trader 2 submitting a sell order. 3−i 
The Calculation of the function of trader i’s expected proﬁts is shown as following: 
+∞ +∞ +∞ sigi(b3−i) b3−igi(b3−i)
E[π(si, vi)] = λb db3−i + λb db3−i − λb vigi(b3−i)db3−i3−i 3−i 3−i2 2si si si 
λb λb λb λb λb λb 3−isi 3−isiGi(si) 3−iX 3−isiGi(si 3−i 3−iNi(si) = − + − − + −
2 2 2 2 2 2 
λb 3−ivi + λ
b 
3−iviGi(si)
 
λb
 3−i= [si − 2siGi(si) + X + Ni(si) − 2vi + 2viGi(si) − 1]2 
(4.3) 
Where Ni(si)is the deﬁnite integral of Gi(si), N �(si) = Gi(si). X is the maximal value 
of bid oﬀers. This general function of trader 1’s expected proﬁt shows that the trader’s 
expected proﬁt as a seller is decided by his reservation price, the distribution of the 
opponent’s oﬀer price, and the probability of the opponent submitting a buy order. 
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Similarly, by resolving the expected proﬁts of trader 1 as a buyer, the general 
function of the expected value of buyer is: � b	 � b bifi(s3−i)ds3−i
E[π(bi, vi] = (1 − λb ) vifi(s3−i)ds3−i − (1 − λb )	 −3−i	 3−i 2−∞	 −∞ � b s3−ifi(s3−i)ds3−i(1 − λb )3−i
−∞	 2 
(1 − λb )biFi(bi) (1 − λb )biFi(bi) (1 − λb )Mi(bi)3−i	 3−i 3−i= (1 − λb	 )viFi(bi) − − +3−i 2 2 2 
(1 − λb )Mi(bi)3−i= (1 − λb	 )viFi(bi) − (1 − λb )biF (bi) + 3−i	 3−i 2 
(4.4) 
In this equation, Mi(bi) is the integral of Fi(bi), M �(bi) = Fi(bi). It is expected that 
the expected proﬁt of the buyer is aﬀected by the reservation prices of the buyer, 
the distribution of the opponent’s oﬀer prices and the probability of the opponent 
submitting a sell order. 
Next, I continue to investigate the traders’ optimal submission strategies by the 
function of expected proﬁts. As the assumptions above, the trading purpose of these 
traders is to maximize their expected proﬁts. Their optimal strategy is to submit an 
order, which is equal to the cut oﬀ value that maximize their expected proﬁts. In 
other words, they choose to submit an order, where the margin proﬁt is equal to zero. 
Therefore, when the ﬁrst order condition of the expected value equals to zero, the 
traders submit an optimal order to maximize their proﬁts. The ﬁrst order condition 
for a maximum for trader 1 as a seller is: 
∂E[π(si, vi)] λ3
b 
−i − λb	 λ3
b 
−iGi(si) + λb= 3−iGi(si) − λb 3−isigi(si) +	 3−ivigi(si) = 0 ∂si 2	 2 
Gi(si)	 1 + gi(si)(si − vi) = (4.5)2	 2 
Rewrite this function: 
1 − Gi(si) 
si = vi +	 (4.6)2gi(si) 
The equation 4.6 shows the relationships among the optimal sell prices and other inde­
pendent variables. From the equation, si is equal to vi and a half of the mills ratio of 
the value distribution function of trader 2’s oﬀer regarded by trader 1. This function 
explains that the seller’s optimal order price is the sum of his reservation price and an 
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amount that equals to a half of the mills ratio of the opponent’s oﬀer price distribution. 
Therefore, the private value and the opponent’s oﬀer price distribution determine the 
optimal oﬀer price of trader 1. As I state above, the reservation prices of trader 1, vi, 
are derived from his private signal and follow normal distributions. Besides his private 
value, he asks for an additional value, which is determined by the submission strategies 
of the opponent. Gi(•) is the cumulative distribution function of trader 2’s buy oﬀers 
underlying his private value distribution Xi(•) and gi(•) is the related density function. 
n nI need to point out that Gi(s ) = Xi(v ). In one word, to make an optimal oﬀer price, i i 
the seller need to consider the submission strategies of the other one besides his own 
reservation price. 
The second order condition of expected proﬁts of trader 1 as a seller: 
∂2E[π(vi, si)] � 3gi(si)= −λb [g (si)(si − vi) + ] (4.7)3−i i∂s2 i 2 
In order to conﬁrm that the expected proﬁts have one maximized value, the second order 
condition of expected proﬁts is required to be less than zero. Only when ∂
2E[π(vi,si)] < 0,
∂s2 i 
there is a maximum value for sellers’ expected proﬁts. The proof is as following: 
With function 4.6, we have: 
22g (si) 
g �(si) = − i (4.8)i 1 − Gi(si) 
Put the function 4.8 into the seconde order condition 4.7 and rearrange it. The function 
4.7 is proved always less than 0. 
� 3gi(si)− λ3b −i[gi(si)(si − vi) + 2 ] < 0 (4.9) 
� 3gi(si) g (si)(si − vi) + > 0 (4.10)i 2 
gi(si) 
> 0 (4.11)
2 
Similarly, I solve the equation of trader 1 when he submits a buy order. The ﬁrst 
order condition of equation 4.4: 
∂E[π(bi, vi)] (1 − λb )Fi(bi))3−i= (1 − λb 3−i)vifi(bi) − (1 − λb )bifi(bi) + = 0 (4.12)3−i∂bi 2 
52
 
4.1 Description of the model
 
Then the function of optimal bi for trader1 is: 
Fi(bi)
bi = vi − (4.13)2fi(bi) 
It is obvious that the bid prices depend on the reservation prices of trader 1 and 
the distribution of trader 2’s oﬀer prices regarded by trader 1. As a buyer, trader 1 
asks for his bid oﬀers which are lower than his reservation prices to obtain the proﬁts 
and the discounts depending on the submission strategies of the other one. The com­
plex function of the discount is similar to the mill’s ratio, which is composed of the 
cumulative function and density function of the other one’s oﬀer prices. 
The second conational of trader 1’s expected proﬁts as a buyer: 
∂2E[π(vi, bi)] � 3fi(bi)= −(1 − λb )[f (bi)(bi − vi) + ] (4.14)
∂b2 3−i i 2i 
To prove the expected proﬁts of buyers have one maximized rather than minimum
 
value, the second order condition of expected proﬁts is expected to be less than zero. I
 
present the process of proof as following:
 
According to function 4.13, we have:
 
2f2(bi)if �(bi) = − (4.15)i Fi(bi) 
Put the function 4.15 into the second order condition of 4.14and rearrange it. The 
function 4.14 is proved less than 0. 
� 3fi(bi)− (1 − λb 3−i)[fi (bi)(bi − vi) + 2 ] < 0 (4.16) 
� 3fi(bi)
fi (bi)(bi − vi) + > 0 (4.17)2 
fi(bi) 
> 0 (4.18)
2 
As trader2’s status is similar to that of trader1’s, the functions of trader 2’s ask and 
bid prices are similar to the functions of trader 1’s. The only diﬀerence between these 
two is the subscripts in that these two traders are the same on other aspects except 
obtaining diﬀerent signals. Their decision processes and the factors that aﬀect their 
decisions are the same. 
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4.2 Results of single-period model 
With equation 4.6 and 4.13, the optimal oﬀer prices of traders as buyer or seller depend 
on the traders’ reservation prices and the distributions of the opponents’ oﬀer prices. 
By solving these two functions of the optimal oﬀer prices, I observe the relationship 
among the oﬀer prices and the independent variables aﬀecting the traders’ submission 
strategies. With the help of software-Matlab, I use numerical method to investigate the 
relationships. It is an eﬃcient method to provide useful ﬁgures to reveal the relationship 
among variables, and it is convenient for us to understand the submission strategies of 
traders in double auction markets. 
As an implication of the functions of optimal oﬀer prices, the variables, aﬀecting 
the traders’ submission strategies, include the traders’ private reservation prices, the 
expected value and variance of the distribution of the opponents’ oﬀer prices, Further­
more, these variables have diﬀerent weights and diﬀerent eﬀects on the oﬀer prices of 
traders. Besides the oﬀer prices, I also investigate the parameters which aﬀect the 
traders’ decision of order sides and the relationship between the correlation coeﬃcient 
of two traders and their order prices. The results and implications obtained from the 
numerical method are presented as following. 
4.2.1 The determinants of oﬀer prices 
Result 1 The reservation prices of trader 1 are positively related to his oﬀers either 
he is a buyer or seller. Whereas, trader 1’s oﬀer prices are not aﬀected by the private 
values of trader 2. 
Traders make the oﬀer price decision according to their own private information 
without the private information of the other one. Their own private information should 
be the main parameter that inﬂuence their oﬀer price because the essential for earning 
proﬁts for informed traders is to apply their private information properly. Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 show the relationship between the valuation of two traders and the bid/ask 
prices of trader 1 as a buyer and seller separately. I observed that either the bids or 
the asks of trader 1 are positively related to his own reservation prices. Namely, trader 
1 prefers to submit a bid/ask with higher price when his reservation price is higher. 
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Because of the high slopes of the curves in the ﬁgures, it is safe to say that the change 
of the oﬀer prices is sensitive to the change of the reservation prices. The intuition 
behind the relationship is that when his reservation price is high, trader 1 would like 
to pay more for the asset as a buyer and ask for more compensation to sell the asset. 
Meanwhile, the ﬁgures also show that the valuation of trader 2 has no eﬀect on the 
oﬀer prices of trader 1. This result coincide with the implication of optimal oﬀer price 
functions, in which the reservation prices of the opponent are non-disclosure to trader 1. 
In a word, the reservation prices of the traders are important to the traders’ oﬀer price 
decision, whereas the reservation prices of the other one are irrelevant to the traders’ 
submission strategies. 
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Figure 4.1: The relationship between the reservation prices and bid prices
 
Note: vi,b = [105, 115]; v3−i,s = [95, 105]; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = σ3−i = 10
 
Result 2 the expected values of the distribution of the opponent’s oﬀers prices have 
positive relationship with the bid/ask prices of the trader, either he is a buyer or seller. 
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Figure 4.2: The relationship between the reservation prices and ask prices
 
Note: vi,b = [105, 115]; v3−i,s = [95, 105]; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = σ3−i = 10
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The game-theoretical competition among traders is that traders consider the sub­
mission strategies of the opponents by assessing the opponents’ private value distribu­
tion. The expected values of the value distribution are public information to traders. 
In ﬁgure 4.3 and 4.4, I observed that, when the expected values of the opponents’ pri­
vate value distribution are high, trader 1 submits the orders with high price whether 
he is a seller or buyer, and vice versa. The high expected value of the trader 2’ value 
distribution increases the probability that trader 2 has a high private value. Trader 
1 expects that his opponent prefers an order with high price. After taking the oppo­
nent’s submission strategies into consideration, trader 1 would increase his oﬀer prices 
to match the oﬀer prices of the other one. In this way, he increases the expected proﬁts 
by increasing the execution probability of his oﬀers. I also ﬁnd that the slopes in the 
ﬁgures of the expected values are ﬂatter than the ones in the ﬁgures of the private 
values in that the expected values of the opponents take less weight on the oﬀer price 
decision. 
Result 3 The variances of the opponents’ valuation distribution positively aﬀect the 
traders’ ask prices and negatively aﬀect the traders’ bid prices. 
The variance of the opponents’ private value distribution is another important pa­
rameter for traders to assess the submission strategies of their opponents. Figures 4.5 
and 4.6 demonstrate the relationship between the variance of the opponents’ private 
value distribution and the oﬀer prices of traders. The special relationship can be ob­
served that ask prices increase and bid prices decrease with the increase of variances. 
When trader 1 is informed of a high variance of the opponent’s private value distribu­
tion, he expects that the private value distribution of the other one is ﬂatter than the 
one with a low variance. Therefore, if trader 1 is a buyer, the probability of trader 2 
with low private values increases such that the probability of trader 2 submitting a low 
ask increases. The optimal strategies of trader 1 is to decrease his oﬀers to match the 
asks of opponents. Accordingly, if trader 1 is a seller, he expect that trader 2 moves 
up his bids as a result of the fat tail of his private value distribution. Trader 1 moves 
his asks to the same directions to increase the execution probability of orders. 
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Figure 4.3: The relationship between the expected values of valuation distribution and 
bid prices 
Note: vi,b = [100, 110]; v3−i,s = 95; µi = µ3−i = [95, 105]; σi = σ3−i = 10 
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Figure 4.4: The relationship between the expected values of valuation distribution and 
ask prices 
Note: vi,b = 105; v3−i,s = [95, 105]; µi = µ3−i = [95, 105]; σi = σ3−i = 10 
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Furthermore, when comparing the slopes of the private values, I ﬁnd that the slopes
 
of the variance is ﬂatter, which means that the traders are less sensitive to the changes 
of the variance, and the weight of the variance is even less than the expected value on 
the oﬀer price decision. To sum up, the private value is the most powerful parameter to 
aﬀect the oﬀer prices of traders, and the next one is the expected value of the opponents’ 
private value distribution, and then the last one is the variance of the opponents’ private 
value distribution. 
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Figure 4.5: The relationship between the variance of valuation distribution and bid prices
 
Note: vi,b = [95, 105]; v3−i,s = 95; µi = µ3−i = 100; σ2 = σ2 = [50, 100]
i 3−i 
Result 4 The change of transaction prices is positively related to the change of the 
traders’ valuations. 
The traders have equal power to decide the transaction prices. Therefore, the 
transaction prices are aﬀected by the oﬀer prices of both sides of traders. From ﬁgure 
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Figure 4.6: The relationship between the variance of valuation distribution and ask prices
 
Note: vi,b = 105; v3−i,s = [95, 105]; µi = µ3−i = 100; σ2 = σ2 = [50, 100]
i 3−i 
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4.7, I ﬁnd that, following the trade rules that seller’s valuations are lower than buyer’s 
= 10 
valuations, no transaction happens in this area. In the area where transaction occurs, 
the highest transaction price is on the point where both traders have highest private 
values and vice versa. The positive relationship between the transaction prices and the 
private values comes from the fact that the high/low valuations of two traders have 
positive eﬀect on their oﬀer prices and two oﬀer prices decide the transaction prices. 
Note: vi,b = [100, 110]; v3−i,s = [90, 100]; µi = µ3−i = 101; σ2 = σ2 i 3−i 
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Figure 4.7: The relationship between the transaction prices and the valuations of two 
traders 
4.2.2 The probability of observing one bid and one ask 
In this section, I investigate the probability of the other one submitting a bid/ask 
and relevant parameters. As I state before, traders are free to choose their order side 
according to their own preference. Therefore, the expected proﬁts of the traders are 
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conditional with the other one submitting an order on the opposite side. To search 
the value of this probability and relevant parameters, I start my research from the 
conditional expected proﬁt of traders. 
Result 5 The conditional expected proﬁt of trader 1 is positively related to his 
reservation price when he submits a buy order and negatively related to his valuation 
when he submits a sell order, under the assumption that the private value of traders 
derived from a common value distribution. 
Normally, I suppose that two traders are similar in every aspect and their private 
values are derived from a common value distribution. The positive relationship between 
the bids and the expected proﬁts of trader 1 in ﬁgure 4.8 shows that, with the increase of 
the private value, trader 1 prefers a bid to ask. On the contrary, ﬁgure4.9 demonstrates 
that trader 1 would be better oﬀ by choosing a ask than bid because of the negative 
relationship between the asks and the expected proﬁts. The reason behind the diﬀerent 
relationship is that when trader 1’s private value is high relative to the common value 
distribution, the execution probability of bids is higher than asks and vice versa. The 
statement above is under the assumption that traders’ private valuations come from 
a common distribution. If the traders’ private valuations are belong to diﬀerent value 
distribution, a high private value of trader 1 would choose diﬀerent order side when he 
faces the diﬀerent value distributions of the other one. 
The order choice of traders depends on the results of the comparison of the expected 
proﬁts between buyer and seller. Since the other one also has the right to choose the 
order side, I convert the conditional expected proﬁts to the unconditional expected 
proﬁts by embedding the probability of the other one submitting a bid/ask in the 
function. The unconditional expected proﬁt of trader 1 when he submits a sell order is 
below: 
E[π(si, vi)] = λb 3−i ∗ E[π|trader 3-i submits a buy order] (4.19) 
And the unconditional expected proﬁt of trader 1 as a buyer is: 
E[π(bi, vi)] = (1 − λb ) ∗ E[π|trader 3-i submits a sell order] (4.20)3−i
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Figure 4.8: The relationship between the buyer’s conditional expected proﬁts and his 
valuations 
Note: vi,b = [97, 103]; µi = µ3−i = 100; σ2 = σ2 = 10 i 3−i 
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Figure 4.9: The relationship between the seller’s conditional expected proﬁts and his 
valuations 
Note: vi,b = [97, 103]; µi = µ3−i = 100; σ2 = σ2 = 10 i 3−i 
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When the unconditional expected proﬁt of buying is higher than that of selling, 
trader 1 prefers a buy order. The numerical method is used to ﬁnd the relationship 
among the parameters such as the expected value, the variance of the opponents’ private 
value distribution and the probability of buying/selling. The results and analysis are 
below: 
Result 6 Under the assumption that two traders are similar on every aspect and 
their private values are derived from the same value distribution, the probability of the 
other one submitting a bid/ask is 0.5 whatever the change of the expected value and 
variance of the common value distribution. 
Figure 4.10 shows the relationship between the probability of submitting a sell 
order and the expected value of the opponents’ value distribution. In this ﬁgure, the 
probability of selling is always equal to 0.5 with the change of the expected values of 
the other one. Because the private values of traders are derived from the common 
value distribution, there is no diﬀerence between the expected values of the traders’ 
value distribution. On the other hand, two traders are similar on every aspect such that 
their behaviors are the same conditional on the same situations. Therefore, I expect the 
probability of the other one submitting a bid/ask regarded by the trader is 0.5 whatever 
the expected value of the opponent’s value distribution. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the 
relationship between the probability of the other one’s ask regarded by the trader and 
the variance of the common value distribution. The change of the variance does not 
change the value of the probability of selling which stick to 0.5. Together with the last 
result, I conﬁrm that the change of the common value distribution does not inﬂuence 
the probability of the other one’s bid/ask regarded by the trader. 
Result 7 When the valuation distributions of the two traders are diﬀerent, the 
probability of the trader’s to sell increases as the expected value of the opponent’s 
private value distribution moves beyond the his expected value and decreases as the 
expected value of the opponent’s valuation distribution move back. 
When trader 1 observes that the expected value of the trader 2’s value distribution 
is higher than his, which means that the probability of trader 2 has a high private 
value is high, he expects that trader 2 prefers a bid to ask. On the contrary, the low 
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Figure 4.10: The relationship between the probability of submitting a sell order and the 
expected value 
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Figure 4.11: The relationship between the probability of submitting a sell order and the 
variance 
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expected value distribution of trader 2 relative to the expected value of trader 1’s value
 
distribution refers to a low private value, therefore trader 2 tends to submit an ask. In 
ﬁgure 4.12, the increase of the expected value of trader 2’s private value distribution, in 
turn, is equivalent to the decrease of the expected value of trader 1. It is also coincide 
with the negative relationship between the probability of selling and the expected value 
of the private value distribution. The probability selling increase, and the probability 
of buying decreases. Then, the positive relationship between the expected value and 
the probability of buying could be conﬁrmed. 
98
99
100
101
102
98
99
100
101
102
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
Expected value of trader2
The influence of the change of expected value on the probability of selling
Expected value of trader1
P r
o b
a b
i l i t
y  
o f
 t r
a d
e r
1  
s e
l l
Figure 4.12: The eﬀect of expected value on the probability of trader i submitting a sell 
order 
Result 8: When the variances of two traders’ valuation distribution are diﬀerent, 
the probability of submitting a buy/sell order is till equal to 0.5. 
Figure 4.13shows that the probability of the other one selling regarded by the trader 
is irrelevant to the variance of the other one’s private value distribution. A basic insight 
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into the relationship is that traders’ decision of order sides is only dependent on this 
relationship between his private value and the expected value of the other one’s private 
value distribution. Without being informed of the other one’s private value, the traders 
consider the probability of the other ones’ selling or buying by the relationship between 
his own expected value and the opponent’s expected value. 
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Figure 4.13: The eﬀect of expected value on the probability of trader i submitting a sell 
order 
4.2.3 Decision of order sides 
The traders choose their order side according to their preference. Their order side choice 
is determined by the parameters such as their private value and the value distribution 
of the other one. The basic rule for rational traders is to choose the order side that 
obtains the higher expected proﬁt. The factors deciding the expected proﬁts of traders 
are the private value of traders, the valuation distribution/the oﬀer price distribution 
of the opponents and the probability of the other one submitting an opposite order. 
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According to the corollaries above, it is the expected value of the valuation distribution 
of traders aﬀecting the probability rather than the variance of the opponents’ valuation 
distribution. Therefore, the relationship between the private value of the traders and 
the expected value of the valuation distribution of the opponents decide the order sides 
of traders. 
Result 9: When the private value of the trader is lower than the expected value of 
the opponent’s value distribution regarded by the trader, he prefers a sell order to a 
buy order. On the contrary, when his private value is higher than the expected value 
of the opponent’s value distribution, he would submit a bid. 
To obtain the highest expected proﬁt, the trader is prone to choose the opposite 
order side of his opponent. For example, trader 1 expects that the high expected 
value of the opponent’s valuation distribution implies that the other one’s valuations 
distribute in an area beyond his valuation and a similar implication is expected by his 
opponent. Under this situation, trader 1 prefers to sell the assets and his opponent 
prefers to buy the assets. In the game-theories competition, traders know their own 
private value and the valuation distribution of the other one. Therefore, they judge 
their own position and their opponents by comparing the diﬀerence between these two 
values. Their expected proﬁts are high as a buyer when their private value is high 
comparing to the valuation distribution of the other one. On the other hand, they 
attain more expected proﬁts as a seller when their private value is low comparing to 
the valuation distribution of their opponents. Figure 4.14 compares the expected proﬁts 
of traders as buyer and seller simultaneously. I observe that as the diﬀerence between 
the expected value of trader 2’s valuation distribution and the private value of trader 
1 changes from negative to positive, the expected proﬁts of buying increases and the 
expected proﬁts of selling decreases continuously. At the point that the private value 
equals to the expected value, there is no diﬀerence for trader 1 to choose buy or sell. 
4.3 A special case 
In this section, a special case of the single-period model is discussed. Normally, the 
reservation prices of traders are assumed to follow normal distributions. Under this 
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72
 
4.3 A special case
 
assumption, the optimal order prices can not be solved directly by mathematically 
method because of the mill’s ratio inside it. Here, I suppose that the traders’ private 
value follows normal distribution. With the application of uniform distribution, the 
model is easier to be understood and solved directly, in that it is expected to provide 
meaningful results and supports to understand the traders’ submission strategies in the 
simple double auction market. 
In the special case, two traders’ valuation distributions are derived from one uni­
form distribution with two boundaries a and b. Therefore, every point in the interval 
[a, b] has equal probability, which means that each value of the reservation prices has 
equal probability to appear. According to the properties of uniform distribution, its 
1 x−adensity function and cumulative function are F (x) = and g(x) = separately. b−a b−a 
Other assumptions still follow the assumptions of previous model. Although the dis­
tribution of reservation prices follow uniform distribution, whether the distribution of 
the order prices following uniform distribution is unclear before calculation. However, 
it is true that for each reservation price, there is only one related optimal oﬀer price. 
Meanwhile, in the previous section, I prove that the function of expected proﬁt has 
only one maximum value. Therefore, the payability of each private value equals to the 
probability of its related optimal order price (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983). For 
example, the relationships between the probability of the order prices and the one of 
the reservation prices are demonstrated by the equations below: 
G3−i(bi) = M3−i(vi) (4.21) 
g3−i(bi) = m3−i(vi) (4.22) 
In the equations, the G(•) and g(•) are the cumulative function and density function 
of the bid prices of the trader as buyer, following the notations before. M3−i(vi) and 
m3−i(vi) are the cumulative function and density function of the reservation prices for 
trader 1 when he submit bids, regarded by trader 2. Similarly, I have the cumulative 
and density function for trader 1 when he submits asks: 
F3−i(si) = N3−i(vi) (4.23) 
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f3−i(si) = n3−i(vi) (4.24) 
With these equations, we constructed the bridges between the distribution of order 
prices and the distribution of private value, which is useful to solve the function of 
optimal order prices. 
4.3.1 The optimal oﬀer prices 
First, I present the solution of the function of optimal order prices. Optimal oﬀer prices 
are the fundamental elements before solving the more complex functions and achieving 
most of the important results. Under the assumption of normal distribution, because 
of the mill’s ratios in the function of optimal oﬀer prices, the functions of optimal 
order prices can not be solved by mathematics method. Therefore, the results are 
achieved through Matlab programm. Beneﬁting from the simply cumulative function 
and density function of uniform distribution, the optimal order prices can be solved 
directly by mathematics method. In the previous section, the optimal order prices of 
trader 1 as a buyer or seller are presented as below: 
bi = vi − Fi(bi) 2fi(bi) (4.25) 
si = vi + 
1 − Gi(si) 
2gi(si) 
(4.26) 
According to the equations above, the optimal order prices depend on the reservation 
price of traders and the order price distribution of the other one regarded by the 
trader. For each private value, there is a corresponding optimal order price: S(v) = s 
and B(v) = b. Then, I have the other two equations: S−1(s) = v and B−1(b) = v. 
S−1(•) and B−1(•) are the inverse function of S(•) and B(•) separately. 
First I solve the optimal order price of buyer. The most diﬃcult part in the equation 
of the optimal bid is the cumulative function and density function of the other one’s 
asks. With the equation 4.23, for buyer, the distribution of the other one’s asks can be 
converted into the distribution of the other one’s private values: 
Fi(bi) = Ni(S−1(bi)) = Ni(Y ) (4.27) 
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In the function 4.27, Y deﬁnes a reservation price of seller whose corresponding ask 
equals to bi. In another word, when the seller’s optimal ask equals to the optimal bid 
price of buyer, Y is exactly the underlying private value of seller. Since Y is one of the 
private value of seller, put Y into the function of the other one’s optimal sell price to 
get the function of Y . Meanwhile, according to the deﬁnition of Y , we can use bi as 
the substitute for the s3−i in the function of the other one’s optimal ask. The solution 
is below: 
1−G3−i(bi)Y = bi − 2g3−i(bi) 
1−M3−i(vi)= bi − 2m3−i(vi) 
vi−a (4.28)1− 
= bi − 2 b−a 
b−a 
= bi + vi−b 2 
Then put the function 4.28 into the function of optimal bids for buyer and obtain the 
optimal bid for trader 1 with uniform distribution: 
Fi(bi)bi = vi − 2fi(bi) 
= vi − Ni(Y ) 2ni(Y ) 
Y −a 
b−a= vi − 2 
b−a (4.29) 
= vi − Y −a 2 
vi−bbi+ 2 −a = vi − 2 
vi + b + a= 2 6 3 
Then, we have the optimal bid price of trader 1 as a buyer. From the equations above, 
the traders’ optimal bid prices are decided by their own reservation prices and the 
parameters of the other ones’ private value distributions. Similarly, we could solve the 
function of optimal order prices for sellers. X is deﬁned as a reservation price of the 
buyer, whose corresponding bid equals to si: Gi(si) = Mi(B−1(si)) = Mi(X). To solve 
the optimal ask of trader 1, we need solve the X in the probability function of trader 
2. 
= si + 
F3−i(si)X 2fi(s3−i) 
= si + 
N3−i(si) (4.30)
2ni(s3−i) 
= si + vi−a 2 
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Then, the optimal order prices for seller is: 
= vi + 
1−Gi(si)si 2gi(si 
= vi + 
1−Mi(X) 
2mi(X) 
1− X−a 
= vi + b−a (4.31)2 
b−a 
= vi + b−X 2 
vi + b + a= 2 3 6 
The functions 4.29 and 4.31 are the optimal order prices for trader 1 as buyer and seller 
separately. Similarly, we have the optimal order prices for trader 2: 
v3−i b a 
b3−i = + + (4.32)2 6 3 
v3−i b a 
s3−i = + + (4.33)2 3 6 
The optimal order prices are the keys in my model to observe the traders’ submission 
behaviors. The function of optimal order prices demonstrate that the optimal order 
prices depend on the private values of the trader and the parameters of the private value 
distributions of the other one. Furthermore, the upper boundary is more powerful to 
asks and lower boundary is more powerful to bids. 
4.3.2 The relationship between the order prices and the variables 
The variables that inﬂuence the traders’ submission strategies in the special case are 
partially diﬀerent from the ones in the previous model. The model with uniform distri­
butions has three variables: private value, upper boundary a and lower boundary b. In 
these variables, the reservation price of traders is the most important factor to inﬂuence 
the order prices of traders. The other two variables - parameters of the private value 
distribution of the other one: a and b have diﬀerent eﬀects on the bids and asks. In this 
section, I present some results of the relationship between the order prices and these 
variables. 
Results 1: The private values have positive eﬀects on the order prices either the 
traders act as buyer or seller. However, the valuations of the other ones have no eﬀects 
on the traders’ order prices. 
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The private values are the most important variable that inﬂuence the traders’ order 
This result is consistent with the one 
prices. With the increasing of private values, the traders will to pay more as buyers 
and ask more compensation as sellers. It is not diﬃcult to understand that the trader 
does not include the private value of the other one into his consideration because he 
is not informed the other one’s private value. 
of the model with normal distribution. The ﬁgure 4.15 demonstrates the relationship 
between the private values and the order prices of trader as buyer and seller. 
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Figure 4.15: Private values vs. order price 
Results 2: The lower boundary a positively inﬂuences the order prices of traders 
either for buyers or sellers. 
The result that the lower boundaries a is positively related to the bid/ask prices is 
similar to the one of previous model. The result above implies that the traders with 
higher private value prefer higher bids/asks. When the traders observe that the lower 
boundaries a of the other one is high, he expects that the probability of the other one 
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submitting an order with higher prices is high. His optimal strategies is to submit an 
order with higher prices to increase the execution probability, which in turn increases 
his own expected proﬁts. Furthermore, from ﬁgure 4.16, I observed that with the 
increase of low boundary a, the bids increase more than the asks as the result of the 
higher weight of lower boundary a in the function of optimal bids. The explanation to 
this situation is that the lower boundary is related to the lowest ask of seller on the 
other side in that inﬂuence the execution probability of buyer greatly. 
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Figure 4.16: Lower boundaries a vs. order price 
Results 3: The order prices for traders increase as the increase of upper boundary 
b and decrease as the decrease of upper boundary. 
Similar with the results of low boundary a, the upper boundary b has positive eﬀects 
on the order prices either for bids or asks. A higher upper boundary implies a higher 
order price of the other one, which in turn pushes the traders to increase their order 
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prices to match the other ones’ orders. In ﬁgure 4.17, the slope of bids is lower than 
the one of asks. Comparing with ﬁgure 4.16, the inﬂuence of the upper boundary on 
bids and asks is diﬀerent from the one of lower boundary. It is caused by the diﬀerent 
situation of buyers and sellers. For sellers, their opponents are buyers who buy the 
assets with the lower price than their reservation price. Therefore, the upper boundary 
is powerful to inﬂuence the execution probability of sellers through its eﬀect on buyers’ 
bids. 
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Figure 4.17: Upper boundaries b vs. order price 
4.3.3 The order side decision of traders 
There are two questions to answer in this section. One is the order side decision of 
the trader himself. The other one is the order side decision of the other one, regarded 
by the trader. In our model, we can ﬁnd that the order side decision of the other one 
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inﬂuences the order side decision of the trader himself and meanwhile, his order side 
decision also is involved in the order side decision of the other one. In my model, λ 
denotes the order side decision of the other one. 
4.3.3.1 The expected proﬁts of traders 
The traders’ order side decisions depend on the comparison between the expected proﬁts 
as buyer and expected proﬁts as seller. First, I start out from the expected proﬁts of 
the trader as buyer and seller. 
The traders’ conditional proﬁts is the proﬁt conditional that the order is executed. 
I denote Rb is the conditional proﬁts of trader 1 as a buyer and Rs is the conditional i	 i 
proﬁts of trader 1 as a seller. Since the optimal order prices are obtained in the previous 
part, it is easy to solve the function of conditional expected proﬁts. The conditional 
proﬁt of trader 1 as a buyer is below: 
Rb i	 = vi − P 
= vi − vi+v3−i+b+a (4.34)4 
3vi−(v3−i+b+a)= 4 
The conditional proﬁt of trader 1 as a seller: 
Rs i	 = P − vi 
vi+v3−i+b+a = − vi	 (4.35)4 
v3−i+b+a−3vi= 4 
vi+b+a−3v3−i 3vi−(v3−i+b+a)Similarly, I have Rs = and Rb =	 for trader 2 as seller 3−i 4 3−i 4 
and buyer separately. Figure 4.18 display the change of the trader’s conditional proﬁts 
as the trader’s private values change. There are positive relationship between the 
conditional proﬁt of buyer and his private values, and negative relationship for seller. 
Then I solve the functions of unconditional expected proﬁt. The unconditional ex­
pected proﬁt is the trader’s expected proﬁt, when the other one submitting an opposite 
side of order. I use trader 1 as an example to demonstrate the solution process of the 
unconditional expected proﬁts. The equation 4.36 expresses the unconditional expected 
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Figure 4.18: The relationship between the conditional proﬁt of traders as buyer/seller 
and private values 
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proﬁts for trader 1 when he bids: � biE(πi, bi) = Ribfi(s3−i)ds3−i−∞�	 a − b vi+ 3 3 3vi−v3−i−a−b=	 ni(v3−i)dv3−ia 4�	 a − b vi+ 3 3 3vi−v3−i−a−b 1=	 dv3−i (4.36)a 4 b−a 
a a 2(3vi−b−a)(vi+ − b −a) (vi+ − b )2−a3 3 3 3=	 −4(b−a) 8(b−a) 
245v −30bvi−60avi+20ab+20a2+5b2 = i 72(b−a) 
There is one important transformation in the equation above. The probability dis­
tribution of the seller’s private value substitutes for the probability distribution of the 
seller’s asks. The range of the deﬁnite integral of other one’s asks is [bi, −∞] for general 
case. In the special case with uniform distribution, the optimal order prices also fol­
low uniform distribution. Therefore, it is safe to transform the cumulative function of 
the other one’s asks into the cumulative function of the other one’s reservation prices. 
Although the value of cumulative function and density function do not change, the 
range of the deﬁnite integral changes under this situation. It is clear that the other 
one submits the lowest ask when his reservation price equals to lowest boundary of the 
uniform distribution. Therefore, the lower boundary of the deﬁnite integral of other 
one’s reservation price is a. The upper boundary of the new deﬁnite integral is just the 
sell’s reservation price, whose related sell price is equal to the bid price of trader 1 in 
that the trade can happen. 
s3−i = bi 
v3−i vi+ b + a = + b + a	 (4.37)2 3 6 2 6 3 
− bv3−i = vi + a 3 3 
The range of the deﬁnite integral of the other one’s reservation prices is [vi + a − b , a].3 3 
The unconditional expected proﬁt for trader 1 as a seller is: 
+∞
E(πi, si) = Ri
bgi(b3−i)db3−is3−i� b v3−i+b+a−vi= b − a mi(v3−i)dv3−iv3−i+ 43 3 
(b+a−3vi)( 2b + a −vi b2−(vi+ b − a )2	 (4.38)3 3 3 3=	 +4(b−a) 8(b−a) 
2	 245v −60bvi−30avi+20ab+20b2+5a= i 72(b−a) 
In the equation above, the probability distribution of the other one’s reservation price 
substitute for the one of the other one’s bids. Therefore the upper boundary is b, with 
which the other one submits the highest bid. The lower boundary is the lowest bid 
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price that is equal to the ask price to fulﬁll the transaction condition. Then the lower 
boundary is: 
b3−i = si 
+ b + a + b + a 
+ b 
6 
3 
336
v3−i vi 
= vi − a 3
=
 (4.39)
2 2
v3−i 
Figure 4.19 displays the relationship between the unconditional expected proﬁts 
and the private values of buyers and sellers. The traders’ private values have diﬀerent 
inﬂuence on their unconditional expected proﬁt. With the increase of the private value, 
the unconditional proﬁts of the seller decrease and those of the buyer increase. We 
suppose that there is one point, on which there is no diﬀerence for the trader to choose 
bid or ask. Traders whose private value is lower than this point prefer asks than bids 
to achieve higher expected proﬁts, vice versa. 
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Figure 4.19: The relationship between the unconditional expected proﬁt of trader as 
buyer/seller and private value 
83
 
4. TWO-PERSON SINGLE PERIOD DOUBLE AUCTION MODEL
 
Table 4.1: The payoﬀ matrix of two traders 
Trader 2 
B (λ3−i,b i ) S (1 − λ3−i,b i ) 
B (λi,b 3−i) 0, 0 E(πi, si), E(π3−i, b3−i) 
S (1 − λi,b 3−i) E(πi, bi), E(π3−i, s3−i) 0, 0 
Trader 1
 
4.3.3.2 The order side decision of the other one 
There is a game-theoretical problem between two traders on their order side decisions. 
Here, I assume that the two traders have the same private value distribution. Each 
trader’s payoﬀ not only depends on his submission strategy, but also is decided by the 
submission strategy of the other one. If the other one’s order side is same as the trader’s 
order side, there is no any proﬁts for the trader. If their order sides are diﬀerent, their 
expected proﬁts depend on what they choose. I use payoﬀ matrix to solve the game 
theoretical problem. 
3−i,bThen, the payoﬀ for trader 1 when he chooses to submit a bid: (1 − λ ) ∗ i 
3−i,b 3−i,bE(πi, bi) + λ ∗ 0 = (1 − λ ) ∗ E(πi, bi) The payoﬀ for trader 1 as a seller: (1 −i i
 
3−i,b 3−i,b 3−i,b
λ ) ∗ 0 + λ ∗ E(πi, si) = λ ∗ E(πi, si) To solve the Nash equilibrium matrix, i i i 
when the two equations above equal to each other, there is no diﬀerence for trader 1 
to buy or sell. 
3−i,b 3−i,b(1 − λ ) ∗ E(πi, bi) = λ ∗ E(πi, si)i i 
3−i,b 3−i,bE(πi, bi) − λ E(πi, bi) = λ )E(πi, si)i i 
λ3−i,b = E(πi,bi) (4.40) i E(πi,bi)+E(πi,si) 
23−i,b 45vi −30bvi−60avi+20ab+20a2+5b2 λ = 2i 90v −90bvi−90avi+40ab+25a2+25b2 i 
Because trader 2 is not informed with the reservation price of trader 1, he only knows 
the mean value of the reservation price of trader 1. Then vi = E(vi) = a+b . Therefore,2 
the function 4.40 can be solved. 
3−i,b 45a+45b−30ab−30b2−60a2−60ab+40ab+40a2+10b2 λ = 2i 90a+90b−90ab−90b2−90a2−90ab+80ab+50b2+50a
= 45a+45b−50ab−20b
2−20a2 (4.41)
90a+90b−100ab−40b2−40a2 
= 0.5 
Similarly, we have λi,b equals 0.5 as well. This result is consistent with the previous 3−i 
results. The probability of the other one submitting a buy order expected by the trader 
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is 0.5. Because these two traders are similar on every aspects, their order side choice 
should be half and half. Therefore, when the trader considers the other one’s order 
side decision, he can suppose that the probability that his opponent will submit a bid 
or ask is half and half since their private value distributions are same. 
4.3.3.3 The order side decision of the trader 
The trader’s order side decision depends on his private value and the order side decision 
of the other one. In the previous section, I prove that the probability of the other one 
submitting a bid is equal to 0.5 when their reservation price distributions are same. 
Then, the probability that the trader chooses to bid/ask can be obtained by comparing 
the trader’s expected proﬁts as buyer and seller. If we suppose that the trader prefers 
a bid than ask, there is a inequality below: 
payoffofbuyer > payoffofseller 
3−i,b 3−i,b(1 − λ ) ∗ E(πi, bi) > λ ∗ E(πi, si)i i 
23−i,b 45v −30bvi−60avi+20ab+20a2+5b2 λ > 2 i i 90v −90bvi−90avi+40ab+25a2+25b2 i 
2 20.5(90v − 90bvi − 90avi + 40ab + 25a2 + 25b2) > 45v − 30bvi − 60avi + 20ab + 20a2 + 5b2 i i
 
15a2−15b2
15avi − 15bvi > 2 
> a+bvi 2 
(4.42) 
Therefore, the inequality shows that the trader prefers a bid than ask when his private 
value is higher than the middle value of the valuation distribution of the other one. 
He will submit an ask when his private value belongs to the lower valuation area, vice 
versa. On the point of mean value, there is no diﬀerence for him to buy or sell. 
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5 
Two-person multi-period double 
auction model 
In this chapter, I extend my models from single-period trading markets to multi-period 
trading markets to search the traders’ submission strategies with information updating 
and the process of equilibrium transaction price formation. In double auction markets, 
traders submit their orders by their analysis of available private and public informa­
tion. In the single-period model, the information available to traders is their private 
signal about the asset value and the opponent’s private value distribution as public 
information. With the information, the traders would choose the order side, decide 
the price of their oﬀers and submit the orders simultaneously to trade with each other. 
Although the static model provides useful insights into the traders’ submission strate­
gies in single-period trading markets, there are still some anomalies left, which require 
further research to understand the traders’ behaviors in double auction markets. As we 
know, in ﬁnancial markets, when the informed traders take advantages of their private 
information to obtain proﬁts, their private information is revealed and captured by 
the markets though their order prices and volumes. The private information becomes 
available to the public with the continuous trading process. The high liquidity of the 
market is one of the important characteristics for assessing the eﬃciency of the market 
mechanism. Many researchers design dynamic models to search the traders’ behaviors 
in the multi-period trading process and observe the process of market liquidity. In 
my research, the dynamic model in multi-period trading markets, which is designed to 
search the traders’ submission strategies in multi-periods, makes my research closer to 
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the realistic ﬁnancial markets. 
Under the condition of multi-period trading, I focus on the process of information 
updating of traders and the process of information disclosure. It is important to clarify 
the diﬀerent strategies of traders with previous trading information, which is diﬀerent 
from the strategies of traders in the single-period trading. Furthermore, understangding 
the equilibrium price formation process would help us understand the eﬃciency of 
the double auction mechanism. This multi-period model is constructed in a double 
auction market with two informed traders under similar assumptions like single-period 
model. However, in this model, trades would be repeated a ﬁnite number of times 
and the previous transaction data is available to the public. I expect that the multi-
period model would not only reveal the relationship between the oﬀer prices and the 
parameters, which aﬀect the submission strategies of traders, but also clarify the process 
of information disclosure in double auction markets. 
5.1 The description of the model 
I design the multi-period double auction market similar to the single-period double 
auction market before, where there are only two informed traders to trade one unit of 
asset. At the beginning of the ﬁrst trade, individuals receive their private signal of the 
asset value and are informed of the value distributions of their opponents. Similar to 
the single-period model, several assumptions are applied to simplify my analysis: the 
risk-neutral informed traders are rational, whose trading purpose is to maximize their 
proﬁts; the private value distributions follow normal distributions; and there is no tick 
size. Their own private values are constant during the whole trading periods, because 
there is no new private information any more. Traders’ submission strategies are based 
on their analysis of their own reservation price and the value distribution of the other 
one. 
Diﬀerent from single-period auction markets, traders could submit orders repeat­
edly whatever the transaction happens or not. They are allowed to adjust their oﬀer 
prices to make trade happen or attain more proﬁts according to their private infor­
mation. Although one condition for transaction happening is that one private value is 
higher/lower than the other one, in my model, transactions are not guaranteed even 
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if the diﬀerence between two traders’ private values is signiﬁcant. The multi-period 
trading provide the opportunity for traders to increase the execution probability by 
changing order sides or oﬀer prices. On the other hand, because of the uncertainty 
of their private value to the other ones, they could make proﬁt by their private infor­
mation until their private information is revealed. At the end of each stages of trade, 
the oﬀer prices of traders are available to everyone as the new information to make 
reassessment of the other one’s valuation. Then traders could adjust their submission 
strategies according to all the information available. In the multi-period model, after 
each round of trade, there is an additional stage of belief updating. For example, trader 
1 updates his belief on the value distribution of the other ones. He understands that 
the oﬀer price of the other one is based on his private value and his assessment of the 
value distribution of trader 1. Therefore, the new distribution of trader 2’s valuation 
regarded by trader 1 is the previous value distribution of trader 2 conditional with his 
latest oﬀer price. Then at the beginning of next period of trade, trader 1 submits a 
new order according to his private valuation and the latest distribution of trader 2’s 
valuation regarded by him. Next stage, two oﬀers match with each other following the 
trading rule that two orders are on the diﬀerent sides and bid price is no less than ask 
price. The rounds are repeated again and again until the private information of traders 
is revealed. 
When two traders enter into the market initially, they face similar circumstance as 
the ones in the single-period market. They hold their own private information of asset 
value and make assessment of the opponent’s valuation by his value distribution. At the 
end of the ﬁrst trade, the transaction data, including the oﬀer prices and transaction 
price if trade happened, is available to traders to update their beliefs about the other 
one’s private value distribution. In every period t, I denote trader 1’s private valuation 
tdistribution has the expected value µ (t = 0) and variance σt and trader 2’s valuation i,v i,v 
tdistribution has the expected value µ and variance σt 3−i,v 3−i,v. 
Then, the valuation distributions of traders regarded by the other one at time 
interval t + 1 are equal to the valuation distributions at t conditional on his oﬀer prices 
at t. For example, if trader 1 submits a sell order s at t, the expected value of the value 
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distribution regarded by trader 2 should be: 
tcov(vi, s)(s − µ )t+1 t i,sµi,v = µi,v + )2 (5.1)(σt i,s
Similarly, when trader 1 submits a bid at time t, the expected value and the variance 
tof the value distribution of the bids are µi,b i,band σ
t . Then, the new conditional expected 
value of the value distribution regarded by trader 2 is: 
tcov(vi, b)(b − µi,b)t+1 t µ = µ (5.2)i,v i,v + (σt )2 i,b
On the other side of the market, trader 2’s value distributions regarded by trader 
1 are similar to trader 1’s valuation distributions. The latest valuation distributions 
of trader 2 are equal to the previous valuation distributions conditional on his oﬀer 
price. It is the updated value distribution of trader 2 which is considered by trader 1 
to assess the private value of trader 2 when he makes his decision. The function of the 
conditional valuation distribution of trader 2 when he submits an ask is below: 
tcov(v3−i, s)(s − µ )t+1 t 3−i,sµ = µ (5.3)3−i,v 3−i,v + (σt )2 3−i,s
The conditional expected value if trader 2 choose to be a buyer is: 
tcov(v3−i, b)(b − µ )t+1 t 3−i,bµ = µ (5.4)3−i,v 3−i,v + (σt )2 3−i,b
At the beginning of each stage (except stage 1), traders would use the new infor­
mation of the oﬀer price at the previous stage to update his belief on the valuation 
distribution of the other one. The valuation distributions of the opponents is the only 
information for traders to make assessment of the submission strategies of the other 
one. As the functions of the updated expected values of the valuation distributions 
above, the valuation distributions of the opponents are updated after every trade with 
the arrival of the new information from the trade. I use numerical method to investigate 
the belief updating process of the traders and the change of their submission strategies. 
The relationship among the main parameters that aﬀect the submission strategies of 
traders and the oﬀer prices of traders could be observed by this method. 
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5.2 Results and implications 
5.2.1 the relationship among the order prices and the variables 
I am interested in clarifying the relationship between the oﬀer prices and the factors 
that inﬂuence the submission strategies of traders. Similar to the single-stage model, 
there are two factors that inﬂuence the submission strategies of traders: the private 
value of traders and the value distribution of the other one. The private value of traders 
is stationary in the trading process as there is no new private information added. On 
the other hand, the traders update their belief on the value distribution of the other 
one. 
Result 1: The private values of traders have positive eﬀects on the traders’ oﬀer 
prices whether they are sellers or buyers during the whole trading process. 
As informed traders, the private valuations of traders are the most important factor 
that decide the order prices of traders either in the single-period trading or the multi-
period trading. As this is a private value model other than common value model, 
the private value of traders is stationary during the process of continuous trading. The 
results in the single-period model show that the relationship between the private values 
and the oﬀer prices of traders is positive for all types of orders. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
display the relationship between the oﬀer prices and the private values in the multi­
stage trading for bids and asks separately. I ﬁnd that the order prices increase with the 
increase of private value for buyers as well as for sellers. The linear positive relationship 
is observed at each stage in multi-stage trading as their regulation to assess optimal 
order prices and their private values do not change when the trades are repeated. The 
ﬁgures also demonstrate the change rate of the order prices decreasing as the number 
of stages increases. At the beginning of the trading stages, traders expect to earn more 
from their private value. However, they need adjust their order prices rapidly as the 
disclosure process of their private information. On the latter stages, because there is 
only a smaller diﬀerence between their private values and their order prices, buyers 
slowly increase their bids and sellers decrease their asks less. As the continues trading 
process, the traders’ private information are fully revealed and their optimal strategies 
are to submit orders that equals to their private values. 
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Figure 5.1: The relationship between the private value of trader 1 and his bid prices
 
note: vi = [95, 102]; v3−i = 98; µi = 100; µ3−i = 100; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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Figure 5.2: The relationship between the private value of trader 1 and his ask prices
 
note: vi = [98, 105]; v3−i = 102; µi = 100; µ3−i = 100; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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Result 2: At the ﬁrst time of trading, the trader’s oﬀer prices are positively related 
to the initial expected value of the opponents’ valuation distribution regarded by the 
trader. Whereas, at the other stages of trading, the trader’s oﬀer price decision is 
irrelevant to the initial expected value of the other one’s valuation distribution. 
The expected values of the opponents’ valuation distributions are the only informa­
tion for traders to make assessment of the submission strategies of the other one. In 
the single-period model, the expected value of the valuation distribution of the other 
one has positive relationship with the oﬀer prices of the traders whether they buy or 
sell. The traders increase their oﬀer prices when they expect that the opponents would 
submit an order with high price because of the high expected value of their valuation 
distribution, vice versa. In the multi-stage trading, at the ﬁrst time of trading, the 
traders submission strategies are similar to their strategies in the sing-stage trading. 
The expected value of the valuation distribution of the other one has positive eﬀect on 
the trader’s oﬀer price. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the relationship between the oﬀer 
prices and the expected values of the other one’s valuation distribution for bids and asks 
over stages separately. The positive relationship between the initial expected value and 
the oﬀer prices demonstrate that traders move their oﬀers in the same direction with 
the change of the initial expected value at the ﬁrst time of trade. Then, traders alter 
their beliefs of the expected values of the opponents’ valuation distributions according 
to the information of the oﬀer prices of the opponents, such that the initial expected 
values of the opponents’ valuation distributions are irrelevant to the traders’ oﬀer price 
at the later stages of trading. Compared with the relationship of the private values, 
the slope of the expected value of the valuation distribution is ﬂatter than that of the 
private values. The diﬀerence, which is similar to the explanation in the single-period 
market, is caused by the higher power of the private values to decide the oﬀer price. 
Moreover, the changes of the oﬀer prices over stages show that, to increase the exe­
cution probability, buyers increase bids and sellers decrease asks with the number of 
stages increases. 
5.2.2 The changes of the order prices over stages 
In the repeated trading game, the traders could adjust their oﬀer prices to increase 
the execution probability, which in turn increase their expected proﬁts under the new 
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Figure 5.3: The relationship between the expected value of trader 1 and his bid price
 
Note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 98; µi = µ3−i = [98, 105]; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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Figure 5.4: The relationship between the expected value of trader 1 and his ask price
 
Note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 98; µi = µ3−i = [98, 105]; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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conditions. However, the changes of the oﬀer prices are diﬀerent because of the diﬀerent 
relationship between the traders’ private valuations. I classify the relationship between 
the buyers and sellers into two types: type I The ask price is higher than the bid price 
at the ﬁrst stage because the valuation of the buyer is lower or slightly higher than that 
of seller. type II The ask price is lower than the bid price at the ﬁrst stage because the 
valuation of the buyer is much higher than that of seller. Figure 5.5 and 5.6 display 
the changes of the oﬀer prices for two types separately. From these two ﬁgures, I could 
tell the diﬀerence between them and the common implications behind them. In ﬁgure 
5.5, the buyer increases his oﬀer price to match the oﬀer of the other one and the seller 
decreases his oﬀer price to increase the execution probability on the other side over 
stages. During the process of repeated trading, the two oﬀer prices cross at one point 
to make trade happen. In the process of continuous trading, the traders continually 
submit orders with prices closer to their redemption prices until their private values 
are revealed. For type II, at the ﬁrst stage, as the reservation price of buyer is much 
higher than that of seller, the bid price is higher than the ask price and the transaction 
happens. Then traders would trade with the other ones continually and update their 
beliefs of the other ones’ reservation prices as well. Both of them understand that they 
could obtain proﬁts by trading until their private information is revealed completely. 
Figure 5.6 displays the process that traders’ private information are revealed over stages 
after transactions occur. Specially, I expect that, similar to the traders’ behavior in 
type I, traders decrease the diﬀerence between their private value and their order prices 
to increase their execution probability. 
5.2.3	 The change of the expected value of opponents’ valuation dis­
tribution regarded by the traders 
The expected values of the opponents’ valuation distribution regarded by the traders 
are updated by the traders during the repeated trading process. By updating their 
beliefs of the other one’s valuation distribution, the traders understand the private in­
formation of the opponents better and better. One of the functions of repeated trading 
is about information dissemination. The private information of the informed traders 
could be revealed fully by their orders during the process of trading. Even in the simple 
double auction market with two traders, the process of information dissemination is 
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Figure 5.5: The bid and ask prices in the multi stage trading (type 1)
 
note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 98; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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Figure 5.6: The bid and ask prices in the multi stage trading(type 2)
 
note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 87; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = 15; σ3−i = 15
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observed as the result of the game-competition between two traders. During the belief 
updating process, the valuation distribution of the opponent regarded by the trader 
should converge on his private value. Figure 5.7 shows the change of the mean values 
of the buyer’s and seller’s valuation distribution regarded by their opponents. In this 
ﬁgure, I observe that the expected values of the trader’s valuation distribution regarded 
by the other one swing around the reservation price over stages and converge on his 
private valuation. On the other hand, because the variance of the conditional normal 
distribution is always smaller than the unconditional normal distribution, the variance 
of the valuation distributions decrease continuously with the increasing number of trad­
ing. We could ﬁgure out that, with repeated trading, the shape of the density function 
of the valuation distributions becomes steep with low variance until all the points of the 
valuation distributions concentrate on the line of expected value. Therefore, at last, the 
traders exactly know the opponents’ private valuation and the two sides uncertainty in 
the markets diminishes. 
5.2.4	 The traders’ submission strategies over stages with order side 
change 
If the traders’ decision of order sides is considered in the multi-period trading, there 
is a process that traders change their order sides into one buy and one sell before 
the process of order price converging. The traders would submit the same sides of 
orders under two situations: their private values are all lower than the mean values 
of valuation distributions and their private values are higher than the mean values of 
valuation distributions. After the traders submitting the two bids/asks at the ﬁrst stage 
of trading, they would update their beliefs on the other ones’ valuation distributions. 
Their updating behaviors make the valuation distributions of the other ones regarded 
by them diverge from each other in the process of repeated trading. Then, when one 
trader observe that his private value is lower than the mean value of his opponent’s 
valuation distribution, he would change his order side to maximize his proﬁts. When 
there are one bid and one ask on markets, the submission strategies of traders are 
similar with the ones without including the decision of order sides. Figure 5.8 displays 
the traders’ submission strategies over stages when they could change their order side. 
We observe that the trader with lower private value change his order side to ask at the 
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note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 98; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = σ3−i = 15
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second stage of trading. However, his ask is much higher than the bid. Then these two 
order prices converge in the later stages in the process of repeated trading. Meanwhile, 
their beliefs on their opponents valuation distribution become closer to their private 
values. Table 5.1 show the change of the order prices and decisions, the expected values 
of valuation distribution of two traders over stages. 
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The submission strategies of traders over stages
Order prices of trader 1
Order prices of trader 2
Figure 5.8: The submission strategies of traders over stages 
note: vi,b = 102; v3−i,s = 98; µi = µ3−i = 100; σi = σ3−i = 15 
To sum up, I conclude the traders submission strategies in the multi-period model 
as following: 
1. The trader increases his expectation on the mean value of his opponent’s valuation 
distribution if the other one is a buyer, and decrease his valuation on the other 
one’s mean value when the other one as a seller. 
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Table 5.1: The traders’ order submission strategies over stages 
Stages
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
 
Order side-1 bid bid bid bid bid bid 
Order side-2 bid ask ask ask ask ask 
Order price-1 100.19 101.55 102.03 102.61 102.96 103.25 
Order price-2 97.056 104.91 104.47 103.98 103.54 103.35 
Expected value-1 100 105.89 106.62 106.21 105.72 105.9 
Expected value-2 100 102.11 101.3 101.98 101.96 101.89 
Note: private value-1=105; private value-2=101; expected value=100; variance=10 
2. The trader submits a sell order when his private value is lower than the mean 
value of the other one’s valuation distributions and a buy order when his private 
value is higher than the other one’s mean value. 
3. If the two traders submit the diﬀerent sides of orders and the bid price is lower 
than ask, then two order prices converge gradually in the subsequent stages. 
4. If the two traders submit two diﬀerent sides of orders and the bid price is higher 
than ask, the buyer would increase his order continually and the seller would 
decrease his ask until their order prices is equal to their private values. 
5. If the two traders submit the same side of orders, the one with lower (higher) 
private value would change his order side to ask (bid) in the later stages. 
5.2.5	 The comparison between the single-period model and the ﬁrst-
stage of multi-period model 
The trader’s submission strategies depend on his judgement on the information avail­
able to him either in the single-period market or in the multi-period market. In the 
single-period model, besides his private value, the trader is informed of the valuation 
distribution of his opponent’s valuation distribution which follows normal distribution. 
There is no historical transaction data or any other useful information for the trader 
to assess the situation of his opponent. His optimal oﬀer prices following the function 
4.13 and 4.6 for buyer and seller. 
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At the ﬁrst-stage of multi-stage market, the trader has his own private value and is 
informed of the opponent’s valuation distribution. His initial situation at the ﬁrst stage 
of trading is similar to the one in the single-period model. They need make his decision 
according to his private value and the initial value distribution of his opponent. By 
comparing the trader’s submission behaviors in the single-period model and the ones 
at the ﬁrst stage of the multi-period model, we link the single-period model to the 
multi-period model to understand the trader’s submission behaviors. 
Figure 5.9 and 5.10 display the relationship between the order prices in the single-
period model and the ones at the ﬁrst stage of the multi-period model when all the other 
variables are ﬁxed. I observe that the slope of the ﬁtted curve is on 45 degree. The 
result indicates the order prices in the single-period model are identical to the oﬀer 
prices in the multi-period model when the other variables are the same. In another 
word, in theory, when all the other condition is same, the trader would adopt the same 
submission strategies, either he is in the single-period market or he is at the ﬁrst stage 
of the multi-period market. The intuition behind this result is that the trader at the 
ﬁrst stage of the multi-period model face the same information as what he has in the 
single-stage model. In my model, the traders only trade one unit of assets and maximize 
their proﬁts at each stage, their order decision are not aﬀected by their expectation in 
the future. Meanwhile, there is not any other cost related to the stages. In a word, the 
traders’ submission strategies are only aﬀected by the information at previous stage 
and not inﬂuenced by the circumstance in the future. Therefore, at the ﬁrst stage 
of multi-period market, the information at the previous stage is equaled to zero, the 
traders’ submission strategies is similar to their behaviors in the single-stage market. 
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period model 
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6 
Experiment 
Before this chapter, I present the theoretical models where two-informed traders trad­
ing in a simple double auction market. The theoretical models display the informed 
traders’ competition and submission strategies in double auction markets, also they 
show the process of private information dispersion. Based on these theoretical models, 
I design the experiments to research the traders’ submission strategies in the double 
auction markets under experimental environment. Experiment is one of important 
methodologies in ﬁnancial markets. Under the experimental environment, researchers 
are easier to observe the objects’ behaviors and obtain ﬁnancial data conditional with 
various speciﬁed conditions and limitations. It has been widely used to discover various 
ﬁnancial phenomena and test the eﬃciency of theoretical models by providing empirical 
supports. There are two beneﬁts of experiments in my research: on the one hand, the 
experimental results could provide useful supports to verify the eﬃciency of my theo­
retical models; on the other hand, under the experimental environment, by reducing 
the diﬀerence between my theoretical model and the real world, we could better under­
stand the traders’ behaviors in double auction markets and capture other important 
parameters that aﬀect the traders’ submission strategies. To compare the results of 
the experiment and theoretical model, it is important to construct the experimental 
environments following the requirements of theoretical models, . Whereas there are 
still some factors that could not be controlled in the experiments, such as the irrational 
behaviors of the subjects. I design the experiments carefully to simulate the procedures 
and conditions of theoretical model and minimize the diﬀerence between them. 
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The potential participants are the students from management and economic de­
partments, who have some basic knowledge of ﬁnancial markets. In the experimental 
markets, the subjects acted as the informed traders and traded with their opponents 
via the computer network following the speciﬁcal trading rules. They were divided into 
pairs automatically by the computer programm and each pair of traders submit their 
seal orders simultaneously. The computer system recorded every pairs of transaction 
data such as order sides, oﬀer prices, transaction prices etc. The experimental data 
is aggregated and analyze to investigate the trading behaviors of subjects in the ex­
perimental markets. The experimental results would be compared with the theoretical 
results to clarify the diﬀerent and common grounds of traders’ submission behaviors in 
double auction markets. Not only the auction theory but also the behavioral ﬁnance 
theory would be involved to explain the traders’ behaviors in the experimental markets. 
6.1 Selection and background of subjects 
I do the experiments based on the facilitation of University of Bath. The experiments 
are held in large computer rooms in the university. The volunteers are students from 
School of Management and Department of Economy. The computer program is the 
software from Comlabgames.com which is designed to conduct experiments with human 
subjects over via Internet. 
In the theoretical model, I assume that the traders are rational investors, who 
maximize their proﬁts in their trading action. It is expected that the person who has 
higher level of knowledge on ﬁnancial markets can act more rational and professional. 
The most suitable subjects are the students in Accounting and Finance. Because the 
feedback rate of other projects is normally about 10% and there are only around one 
hundred students in this subject. I extend the range of potential participants to all the 
students from the undergraduate and postgraduate programs in School of Management 
and Economic department. Then the number of potential participants is over 1000, 
and these students are expected to have basic knowledge of ﬁnancial markets. 
I invite the students to participate in the trading game by emails. I sent an email 
to all the students in the two departments to invite them to participant this trading 
game. In this email, I said that for the research purpose on the trading behavior of 
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traders in ﬁnancial markets, a trading game would be held and call out participants. 
To encourage the students to participate, I speciﬁed that volunteers only need know 
basic knowledge of computer and no special professional skill required. I also provided 
the experiment timetable, in which several sessions are available for students to choose 
according to their timetable. These sessions would be held during two weeks. Each 
student is asked to make his ﬁrst and second choice of the sessions in order to facilitate 
my arrangement on the number of students for each session. This email was sent again a 
few weeks later to inform the students who ignore the last email. Meanwhile, handouts 
were distributed in some classes to attract more participants. One hundred and twelve 
students show their interests to participate by email or by forms of handouts. The 
percentage of response is about 10%. 
I allocate the students into the sessions according to their preference. The students 
from diﬀerent subjects are mixed in the same secession to cancel out the potential 
eﬀects of their background. The numbers of students expected to participate for each 
section are 38, 45, 29 respectively. In each session, there are undergraduate students 
and postgraduate students from diﬀerent programs. We prepared one bilingual session, 
for international students, in which the introduction would be presented in both Chinese 
and English. After allocating all the volunteers into the sessions, another email was 
sent to inform the students of time and location. One day before each session, I also 
sent an email to remind the students again of all the details of the trading game 
respectively. Due to the reason of midsemester and others, the actual numbers of 
participants available for each session are 42,34,26. 
The experiments are held in the same computer room to provide similar experi­
mental condition. The large computer room provides enough spaces for students, in 
which normally students could not know who are their opponents. To run the game, 
one computer is used as the host computer to construct the whole network. The stu­
dents could log in to play the game from any other computers. There is no any other 
speciﬁed requirement for the participants. To keep the participants active, each session 
are controlled around 1.5 hours. 
109
 
6. EXPERIMENT
 
At the beginning of each session, I gave a short introduction of this trading game. 
The introduction is presented to the participants as following. We simulate a simple 
double auction market. All the participants would be allocated in pairs to trade by the 
computer automatically. They act as informed traders to trade one unit of asset with his 
opponent. They do not need to know their opponents as the computer would reallocate 
the groups after the end of trade. They would be informed their private values, which 
is true value of the asset by their beliefs. Meanwhile, they would be also informed of 
their opponents’ valuation distribution, from which their opponents’ private values are 
drawn. The valuation distributions follow normal distributions and the mean values 
and variances of normal distributions are drawn from uniform distributions. They know 
that their opponents could also make assessment on their submission strategies by their 
valuation distributions. According to their information, ﬁrst, they need to choose their 
order sides. Then they need to decide their order prices. These two sealed orders are 
submitted simultaneously to match with each other by computers. The transaction 
happens only if there are one bid and one ask, and the bid price is higher than ask 
price. The transaction price is the mean value of the bid price and ask price. Their 
proﬁts are the diﬀerence between their oﬀers and the related transaction price. It is 
equal to the private value minus the transaction price for buyers and the transaction 
price minus the private value for sellers. In the single-period trading game, they could 
only submit their orders once with the series of information. In the multi-period trading 
game, they play the trade several rounds with the same information. The multi-trading 
game provide their the chance to improve their orders to make trade happen. 
6.2 Design of the experiments 
Before the formal experiments, a pre-experiment was held to test the procedures of the 
trading game. The pre-experiment provides useful implication to improve the experi­
ment design. First, I ﬁnd that the number of the participants in each session should be 
controlled in a proper range. If there are too many participants in one session, the main 
computer becomes very slow to process the whole system. Second, variances should 
be drawn in a wide range to attract the attention of students. In the pre-experiment, 
the variances in a small range have not too much inﬂuence on the students’ submission 
strategies. Therefore, in the large experiment, I controlled the number of participants 
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in each sessions less than 50 and enlarge the range of uniform distribution for variances. 
I design two experiments: the single-period trading game and the multi-period 
trading game, corresponding to the single-period model and the multi-period model. In 
each session, after the introduction, the participants play the preparatory game without 
the uncertainty of their opponents several times to familiar the computer programm 
and the conceptions in games well. Then the participants trade under the single-period 
trading game several rounds with diﬀerent private values and valuation distributions 
each round. The multi-period trading game is played after the single-period game. 
Because of the time limitation, the multi-period trading game is only held in the last 
two sessions. 
6.2.1 Experiment for single-period trading 
In the single-period trading game, the computer would draw out private values and 
mean values and variances of valuation distributions at the beginning of every round. 
The students are allocated to couples automatically and randomly by the computer. 
The students could access these information during the whole process of trading. At 
the end of each round, the computer reports the transaction data: the order prices, the 
transaction prices and the proﬁts of two parts. When the last round ends and the new 
round begins, the students would face the diﬀerent series of information provided by 
the computers. Normally, the students are asked to process ﬁve rounds of single-period 
trading. 
First, the students are informed of his private value about the asset, the mean value 
and variance of his opponent’s valuation distribution. The mean values of the valuation 
distributions were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [80, 120] and the 
variances of the valuation distributions were drawn from a uniform distribution on the 
inter val [2, 15]. The introduction page 6.1 shows the participants all the information 
available and initiate their decision process. 
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Figure 6.1: The introduction page for the experiment 
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Second, the students entered into the decision process. The ﬁrst step is to make 
their decision on the order side according to the information they have. It is a com­
mon sense that, to make a proﬁt, bid prices should be lower than reservation prices of 
buyers and ask prices should be higher than reservation prices of sellers. According to 
the results of theoretical model, the trader prefers a bid(ask) when his private value is 
higher(less) than the mean value of his opponent’s valuation distribution. For the stu­
dents’ convenience to compare these two values, in the page of stage 1 6.2, we represent 
their private values and the valuation distributions of their opponents. According to 
the information, the students need to make their choice from two optional- buy or sell. 
Their decision of order sides could not change any more after this stage. Furthermore, 
their order price choices are base on their decision at this stage as well. 
Figure 6.2: Stage 1 - order choice 
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Third, at this stage, the students need to make their decision on their oﬀer prices, to 
maximize their proﬁts. All the available information and their decision of order sides are 
listed in page 3 (see ﬁgure 6.3) above their oﬀer price choices. Based on their decision of 
order sides, the students are required to ﬁll the blank their bid/ask prices according to 
their preference . Before they press ’enter’ key to conﬁrm their order prices, they could 
change it in the blank. The order price decision is more complex than the decision of 
order sides, which is expected to spend more time to ﬁnish. The basic principle to make 
proﬁt is that buyers should submit orders with the prices lower than their reservation 
prices and sellers should submit orders with the prices higher than their reservation 
price 1 . It is obviously that the students face the choice between the improvement on 
the order price and the execution probability. Lower (higher) bid(ask) prices give lower 
execution probability, which in turn reduce the execution probability. On the other 
hand, higher(lower) bids(asks) decrease the diﬀerence between the transaction prices 
and their order prices, and reduce the expected proﬁts as well. 
At last, the computer system received the orders of two traders and matched the 
orders automatically to give the last report. In the last page(see ﬁgure 6.4), besides 
indicating the relevant information, the computer reported the order prices of two 
traders and transaction result. If the transaction happened, the transaction price is 
the mean value of two orders and the proﬁts of traders are the diﬀerence between their 
private values and transaction prices. If the transaction did not happen, the transaction 
is equal to zero and the proﬁts of two traders are equal to zero as well. We provide 
these information to the students for their better understanding of the trading game 
and their behaviors. In the single-period model, these information is not used for the 
traders’ trading decision in the later round because the private values and valuation 
distributions in each round are independent of the ones in other rounds. Therefore, the 
results of their trading behaviors have no eﬀect on their later behaviors such that their 
trading purpose is to maximize their proﬁts in the present trade. 
1In the experiments, most students understood this principle properly, although we still found that 
few students submitted orders to make negative proﬁts. It is the evidence of the existence of irrational 
behaviors in our experiments. 
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Figure 6.3: Stage 2 - order price decision 
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Figure 6.4: Stage 3 - transaction price and proﬁt 
The single-period experiments is designed to observe the submission strategies of 
participants in the single-period trading. Comparing with the corresponding single-
period theoretical model, we should point out some diﬀerence. In the theoretical model, 
we assume that the traders are rational and risk-neutral. Actually, the students have 
no professional back ground of ﬁnance and their risk preference is uncertainty. We ﬁnd 
some evidence of their irrational behaviors in experiments. Furthermore, the single-
period theoretical model presents single-period markets, where all the factors in the 
markets are independent of all the factors in other markets. Whereas, in the single-
period experiments, the information is dependent from the one in other rounds. How­
ever, we could not make sure that the students’ behaviors could be independent from 
the ones in other rounds 1 . In the process of transaction, a series of data, such as the 
private value, the bid and ask price, and the transaction price, has been collected for 
analysis. Compared with the multi-period trading game, in the single-period trading 
game, the historical transaction data could not be considered in the submission deci­
1We can imagine the situation: a student maybe think to submit a relevant lower order prices 
because he regrets that he submit a higher order prices in the previous stage, although his decision on 
the last stage is proper. The irrigational behaviors of students aﬀect the experimental results. 
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sion of traders, which makes the decision is simpler for the students. Next section, we 
introduce the design of multi-period trading game. 
6.2.2 Experiment for multi-period trading 
The multi-period trading experiments focus on the order submission strategies and 
the information dispersing in multi-period trading. In the progress of repeated trad­
ing, with the additional new information - the order prices, the traders could update 
their assessment on their opponents’ valuation distributions to improve their own order 
prices. Therefore, they have diﬀerent submission strategies in the process of repeated 
trading and the probability of transaction also increases with their adjustment. In the 
multi-period theoretical model, the results indicate that the oﬀers of the traders con­
verge to increase the probability of agreement if bids are higher than asks. When the 
trade happens, their oﬀer price incline to their own private value, which indicate the 
process of private information disclosure. The main steps of multi-period experiments 
are similar to the ones of single-period experiments. The main diﬀerence is that, for 
multi-period trading game, a series of information was used in serval rounds and the 
students consider the transaction data at previous stages for their decision of order 
prices at the later stages. 
Similar to the steps in the single-stage trading game, the students are allocated 
into pairs by the computer. Meanwhile, the computer provide each group with their 
private value and valuation distribution. The uniform distribution of the mean values 
of private valuation distribution has the interval [80, 120] and that of the variances of 
private valuation distributions has the interval [2, 15]. Their private values are drawn 
stochastically from the same valuation distributions. The introduction page6.5 is same 
as the one in the single-period trading game, which includes the information of the 
trader’s private value and the valuation distribution of his opponents. 
The next steps is similar to the ones in the single-period trading game. The second 
page 6.6 requires the students to make their decision on the order side. And the third 
page6.7 asks the students to provide their order prices based on their order sides. In 
these two pages, the private value and the mean value and the variance of the valuation 
distribution listed above the black for their decision, providing fully access for students. 
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Figure 6.5: The introduction page for the experiment 
Diﬀerent from the single-period trading game, on the bottom of each page, there is a 
sign to show which round it is. In the multi-period experiment, the steps in every round 
are the same but there are several round for students to accomplish. 
The last page6.8 reports the available information and the results of the transaction. 
The design of this page is same as the result page in the single-period experiments, but 
act more important role in the multi-period experiments, in that the transaction results 
provide useful information for the students to updating their belief on their opponents’ 
valuation distribution and adjust their submission strategies in the later trading round. 
The statement above present one round of trading in the multi-period trading game. 
Since the trade repeated several times with the same private values and the valuation 
distribution, the next round began with the previous private value and valuation dis­
tribution. Although the information of the valuation distribution is not change, the 
students’ expectation on their opponents’ valuation distribution is updated conditional 
to their opponents’ order prices in the previous round as well as the decision of order 
sides of their opponents. Actually, the students know more about their opponents from 
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Figure 6.6: Stage 1 - order choice 
Figure 6.7: Stage 2 - order price decision 
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Figure 6.8: Stage 3 - transaction price and proﬁt 
their orders after the ﬁrst time of trading. The decision procedure for the students is 
more complex than their decision in the single-period trading game. The new valuation 
distributions of their opponents are indirect to them, which ask their own assessment. 
Therefore, the results page at the end of each round is important for the students to 
obtain new information to update their belief on their opponents’ valuation distribution 
and make their decision in the later rounds. Because of the time limit, we only run the 
multi-trading game once with three rounds for each session. In the multi-period game, 
the students have the chance to change their order sides and improve their order prices. 
To design the experiments for the corresponding theoretical model, I put eﬀorts 
to imitate the theoretical trading conditions in the laboratorial environment. For the 
uncertainty between two traders in the same group, the students are allocated into 
pairs by the computer automatically. The mean values and the variance of the valua­
tion distributions are drawn from the uniform distributions and the private values are 
drawn from the normal distributions deﬁned by these two values. In the whole process 
of trading, the students are only informed their own private value and unaware of their 
opponents’ private values. One separate page for the decision of order sides is used to 
120
 
6.3 Results and implications of the experiments
 
call the students’ attention and control their decision steps as requirements. Each stage 
ended until two traders made their decisions, by which the orders are submitted simul­
taneously. Totally, the design of the experiments coincides with their corresponding 
theoretical model. 
6.3 Results and implications of the experiments 
As the statement above, the single-period experiments and the multi-period experi­
ments are designed to investigate the subjects’ behaviors in the laboratorial environ­
ment, following the trading rules of the theoretical model. The experiments properly 
designed provide the trading system for the students to trade in the similar trading 
environments of theoretical models. Meanwhile, these volunteers are limit on knowl­
edge of ﬁnancial market and have bias behaviors to submit optimal order prices. The 
comparison of the traders’ submission behaviors in the experiments and in the theoret­
ical models could provide consistent results as well as diﬀerent results. The consistent 
experimental results support the results in the theoretical model. On the other hand, 
the diﬀerence between the results of experiments and theoretical models give insight 
into the traders’ behaviors in the laboratorial environments. In the following section, 
I would discuss the results of the experiments by comparing with the ones in the 
theoretical model. Most of the experiments results are consistent with the ones in the 
theoretical models. The diﬀerence between these two could be explained by the traders’ 
bias behaviors. 
6.3.1 Experiment for single-period trading 
The traders’ behaviors in single-stage trading game include their order side choice and 
order price decision. As the description above, the subjects are required to submit 
their orders simultaneously according to their preference only once. The information 
available to them exists only in one period, then they face new opponents and infor­
mation next time. The subjects are informed of the transaction results at the end of 
trade, but this information is just used to assess their previous submission behaviors. 
In every session, each student is asked to trade several times with diﬀerent opponents 
who are selected automatically. In total, I collect 423 observations from these three 
121
 
6. EXPERIMENT
 
sessions, in which the numbers of the buy oﬀers and sell oﬀers are 212 and 210 sepa­
rately. The mean values of their valuation distributions are drawn from a continuous 
uniform distribution on the interval [80, 120]. The variances of the normal distributions 
are drawn from a continuous uniform distribution on the interval [2, 15]. For each pair 
of students, both of their private values are drawn from a common valuation distribu­
tions 1 . They are aware of that their opponents’ private values come from the same 
valuation distributions as theirs’. In the single-stage trading, besides the uncontrolled 
factors such as personal traits, I do not provide other factors that inﬂuence the sub­
jects’ behaviors. The statistical analysis is approach from two aspects according to the 
traders’ submission behaviors: the determinants of oﬀer prices and the ones of order 
sides. 
6.3.1.1 The determinants of oﬀer prices in single-period experiments 
As the statement in the single-period theoretical model, the main determinants of oﬀer 
prices in my research are the private value, the expected value of valuation distribu­
tion and the variance of valuation distribution. The corresponding theoretical values 
are obtained by the theoretical functions, with the values of independent variables 
in experiments. Because the irrational subjects provide some extreme values, robust 
regression with the iteratively reweighted least squares algorithm is used to estimate 
coeﬃcients. 
Experimental result 1: the subjects’ order prices increase with the increase of their 
private values either for buyers or sellers. 
The positive relationship between the order prices and the traders’ private values 
coincide with the results of the theoretical model. In the experiment, the information 
of private values is provided to the subjects at the beginning of trade. Most students 
understand the basic rule that bid prices should be lower than their reservation prices 
and ask prices should be higher than their reservation prices to obtain positive proﬁts. 
Their submission behaviors show that they would move their oﬀer prices in the same 
1Although I permit that the valuation distributions are diﬀerent for two traders, normally, I use 
the same valuation distribution for both traders. The main relationships between the variables for the 
common distributions are similar with the dissimilar distributions 
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direction as the change of their private values. The intuition behind this relationship 
is that as informed traders, the subjects would provide proper order prices according 
to their private information to maximize their proﬁts. Their private information is the 
most important and essential factors to determine their proﬁts from trading. The ﬁgure 
6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate the relationship between the independent variable - private 
values and the dependent variable - order prices for buyers and sellers separately. In 
these ﬁgures, the slopes of the ﬁtted curves for experimental order prices are positive 
and close to the ones of theoretical values. The estimated coeﬃcients are in statistically 
signiﬁcant level, which are listed in table 6.1. 
Although the positive relationship between private values and order prices is con­
ﬁrmed by the experiments, there are statistically signiﬁcant structure change between 
these two groups of data. I do the hypophysis test that the parameter vectors of these 
two is equality. The F test results are signiﬁcant (p < 0.01) for buyers and insigniﬁcant 
(p > 0.1) for sellers. Meanwhile, I allow that these two groups of data have diﬀerent 
constants and test the change of slopes. The signiﬁcant change of slopes exists (p < 0.01 
for buyer and p > 0.1 for seller). Therefore, there are some other important factors 
inﬂuence the traders’ submission strategies. From the graphs, I ﬁnd that the slope of 
the experimental ﬁtted curve is ﬂatter than that of theoretical values. The diﬀerence 
between the experimental results and the theoretical results is the result of the heuristic 
bias of the experimental subjects. The explanation are presented below in details. 
Further complimentary to support the implications above is the relationship be­
tween the diﬀerence between the experimental oﬀers and its related theoretical values. 
Diﬀerent from the method above that observing the inﬂuence of the private values to 
the submission strategies of traders as a whole, we test the eﬀects of the private val­
ues on the diﬀerence between the experimental price and related theoretical value in 
each pair. The ﬁgure 6.11and 6.12 demonstrate the relationship between the diﬀerence 
between experimental and theoretical bids and private value. Following the ﬁgures, 
table 6.2 displays the statistic results. The statistic results for the ask prices coincide 
with our expectation that the change of the diﬀerence between the experimental and 
theoretical values is dependent from the change of the private values in that the similar 
relationship for theoretical values and experimental values is supported. On the other 
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Table 6.1: The relationship between private value and order price 
Bid Ask 
Theory Experiment Theory Experiment 
Constant 17.3158*** 43.8523*** 25.6412*** 25.8144*** 
(5.899) (6.8416) (13.229) (6.9494) 
Private value 0.7699*** 0.5116*** 0.7888*** 0.7915*** 
(27.103) (8.3135) (39.5) (20.654) 
F - Coeﬃcients 9.1108*** 0.4325 
diﬀerence 
F - Slope 17.9388*** 0.1488 
diﬀerence 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure 6.9: The relationship between private value and bid price of buyer 
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Figure 6.10: The relationship between private value and ask price of seller 
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hand, we observed that the coeﬃcients for the buyers’ bids are signiﬁcant. The nega­
tive relationship between the private value and the diﬀerence between the experimental 
and theoretical values shows that the private values decrease as the diﬀerence between 
the experimental and theoretical values increase. In another word, as the changing of 
the the increasing of the private value, the experimental bid prices increase less than 
the related theoretical values. This result implies that the subjects in the single stage 
trading game prefer to increase their bid prices less than the related values in theory. 
Similar result is derived from the previous method of comparing the experimental bids 
and theoretical bids. Therefore, it is safe to say that positive relationship between the 
experimental oﬀer prices and the private values exists in our experimental environment. 
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Figure 6.11: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical bids and private values 
Experiment result 2: The mean value of the valuation distributions positively in­
126
 
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
Private value
Ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l a
sk
 −
 T
he
or
y 
as
k
Difference between Experimental asks and Theoretical asks vs. Private values
6.3 Results and implications of the experiments
 
Figure 6.12: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical asks and private values 
Table 6.2: The relationship between private value and the diﬀerence between theoretical 
and experimental values 
Bid Ask 
Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. 
Constant 15.442 3.741 0.000 -1.372 -0.385 0.701 
Private value -0.149 -3.815 0.000 0.015 0.420 0.675 
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ﬂuence the subjects’ order prices either for buyers or sellers. 
The theoretical models demonstrate that the relationship between the expected 
value of value distributions and the order prices is positive. The subjects’ behaviors in 
the experiments support the theoretical results. Based on their knowledge of economy, 
it is not diﬃcult for the students to understand the mean value of the valuation distribu­
tion. Their submission strategies corresponding to the changes of expected value show 
that they consider the other one’s situation during the process of decision making. As 
a consequence of this consideration, they move their order prices to the same direction 
as the moving of the valuation distribution of their opponents to increase the execution 
probability as well as their expected proﬁts. Figure 6.13 and graph 6.14 display the 
relationship between the expected values of valuation distributions and the order prices 
for buyers and sellers separately. The statistical data is listed below in table 6.3. The 
estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant for buyers and sellers. Meanwhile, 
there is no structure changes between the experimental data and theoretical values. 
I ﬁnd that the experimental data ﬁt the corresponding theoretical values better than 
they do for private values. As we know, to inﬂuence the order prices, the expected value 
of the opponent’s valuation distribution has less power than the trader’s private value. 
Therefore, compared with the ﬁgures for private values, the slopes of the ﬁtted curve 
for expected values are ﬂatter than the ones for private values. Then the eﬀects of 
irrational behaviors are less signiﬁcant. On the other hand, if the private value and the 
expected value are main determinants of order prices, when the traders weigh less on 
their own information, they must weigh more on the information of the other ones, vice 
versa. Combining the ﬁgures for private values and expected values, in the experiments, 
the buyer has a lower coeﬃcient of slope for private values and a higher coeﬃcients 
for expected values, compared with the theoretical values. The situation of seller is 
inverse. The implication behind this fact is that as my expectation the private value 
and the expected value are most important variables for order prices choice . 
Similarly, we test the relationship between the expected values and the diﬀerence 
between the experimental and theoretical values. As we know, the expected value has 
less eﬀects on the order prices of traders than the private value does, therefore the 
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Table 6.3: The relationship between expected value and order price 
Bid Ask 
Theoretical Experiment Theoretical Experiement 
Constant 44.474*** 36.5753*** 43.8431** 50.288*** 
(9.2362) (6.8821) (6.6866) (5.8985) 
Expected value 0.5708** 0.6466*** 0.5661*** 0.5112*** 
(11.622) (11.928) (8.8238) (6.1281) 
F -coeﬃcients 1.4461 0.2088 
diﬀerence 
F -slope 2.7200 0.1797 
diﬀerence 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure 6.13: The relationship between expected value and bid price of buyer 
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Figure 6.14: The relationship between expected value and ask price of seller 
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results are inﬂuenced by the private values and more diﬃcult to observe. Figure 6.15 
and ﬁgure 6.16 display the results with dependent variable - the diﬀerence between the 
experimental and theoretical bids and ask separately. The statistic results are listed in 
table 6.6. For buyers, the points of dependent variables surround the ﬁtted curve with 
zero degree. The results of the positive relationship between the expected values and 
bid prices can not be rejected because that no negative relationship are observed in the 
ﬁgure. While, the results for sellers show that the subjects in the experiments increase 
their asks less with the increasing of the expected value of the valuation distributions. 
This implication is consistent with the observations above that the coeﬃcient of the 
theoretical values is slightly higher than the one of the expected values. Therefore, the 
results for seller also can not discredited the result that there is the positive relationship 
between the expected values and ask prices. 
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Figure 6.15: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical bids and expected values 
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Figure 6.16: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical asks and expected values 
Table 6.4: The relationship between expected value and the diﬀerence between theoretical 
and experimental values 
Bid Ask 
Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. 
Constant -6.497 -1.590 0.114 8.897 1.945 0.053 
Expected value 0.062 1.493 0.137 -0.085 -1.900 0.059 
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The variance of the valuation distribution is another independent variable that 
aﬀects the order submission strategies of the traders in the theoretical model. The 
results of my theoretical model demonstrate that, when facing a high (low) variance, 
the buyer would decrease (increase) his order prices, to increase his expected proﬁts. 
On the contrary, when facing a high (low) variance, the seller increase (decrease) his 
order prices to maximize his proﬁts. Whereas, in the experiments, the observing of the 
inﬂuence of the variance on the order prices encounters the limitation of sample size 1 . 
Because the variance are least powerful to inﬂuence the order prices, in the experiments, 
the diﬀerence among the oﬀer prices are derived from the diﬀerence between the private 
value and expected value. Therefore, with the eﬀects of other variables, the estimated 
coeﬃcients for variances are diﬃcult to be statistically signiﬁcant and the slope is close 
to 0. The graph 6.17 and 6.18 show the relationship between the bid/sell orders and 
the variance of the other one’s valuation distribution. The statistical data is listed 
in the table 6.5. For bids, as the slope coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant, the 
diﬀerent sign of slopes of experimental data and theoretical values could not prove 
the existence of diverging of experiment and theory for the eﬀects of variance. For 
asks, the coeﬃcients of slope for experiment and theory have same positive sign, which 
are statistically signiﬁcant. The result demonstrates that the relationship between the 
variances and asks is similar in experiment and theory. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient 
equivalent test shows that there is no statistical diﬀerence between the experimental 
data and theoretical values. Furthermore, the reason that the asks ﬁt better than bids 
is that the buyers prone to act irrationally than sellers. The implication coincides with 
the result of buyers’ bias behaviors as the presentation of experimental data for private 
values. 
As the statement above, variance is the least powerful variables that inﬂuence the 
oﬀer prices of traders. Therefore, most of the observations above provide non-signiﬁcant 
results for the relationship between the oﬀer prices and variances. Using the depen­
dent variable - the diﬀerence between the experimental and theoretical values, we could 
1In theoretical model, to observing the eﬀects of variance, all the other variables are constant. 
Because of the limitation of time and participants, I did not design the experiments for diﬀerent 
variables respectively 
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Table 6.5: The relationship between variance and order price 
Bid Ask 
Theory Experiment Theory Experiement 
Constant 97.3733*** 101.2201*** 106.4098*** 107.9211*** 
(41.775) (39.54) (54.141) (46.441) 
Variance 0.1106 -0.2861 -0.555** -0.6495** 
(0.4493) (-1.0421) (-2.4839) (-2.4583) 
F -coeﬃcients 0.9187 0.3110 
diﬀerence 
F -slope 0.7920 0.1164 
diﬀerence 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure 6.17: The relationship between variance and bid price of buyer 
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Figure 6.18: The relationship between variance and ask price of seller 
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observe if there are big negative relationship existing as the change of independent vari­
able. The ﬁgures 6.19 and 6.20 demonstrate the relationship between the variance and 
the diﬀerence between the experimental and theoretical bids/asks. The insigniﬁcant 
coeﬃcients show that there is no relationship between the variance and the diﬀerences 
between two values. This results supports our previous results in some extent. 
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Figure 6.19: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical bids and standard deviation 
The multi-regression test results show that the independent variables have diﬀerent 
power to inﬂuence the order prices. The multi-regression model includes three indepen­
dent variables: b/s = α+β1 ∗vi +β2 ∗µ+β3 ∗σ. The statistical data is listed in the table. 
In the table, the coeﬃcients of private values and mean values of valuation distribu­
tions are statistically signiﬁcant for both buyers and sellers. Compared with the related 
theoretical values, the experimental coeﬃcients of private values and mean values for 
bids are diﬀerent from the theoretical coeﬃcients statistically signiﬁcant. These results 
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Figure 6.20: The relationship between the diﬀerence between experimental and theoret­
ical asks and standard deviation 
Table 6.6: The relationship between standard deviation and the diﬀerence between the­
oretical and experimental values 
Bid Ask 
Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. Coeﬃcient t-stats Prob. 
Constant 0.883 0.624 0.534 1.789 1.589 0.114 
Standard deviation -0.145 -0.968 0.334 -0.205 -1.603 0.111 
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show that buyers put more weight on the information about their opponents and less 
weight on their own information. The results are caused by the bias behavior of buyer, 
and I will explain the bias behavior in details in a separate section. The experimental 
coeﬃcients for sellers are closer to the theoretical coeﬃcients, which indicate that the 
sellers’ submission strategies in the single-period experiments are consistent with the 
strategies in the theoretical model. The coeﬃcients of the variances of the valuation 
distribution are diﬃcult to be statistically signiﬁcant because of the trivial eﬀects of the 
variance on the order prices and the ignorance of subjects with limited knowledge in 
ﬁnancial markets. One useful observation is that the experimental coeﬃcients and the 
theoretical coeﬃcients for variance have same sign in the multi-regression. It indicates 
that the relationship between the variances and the order prices for both buyers and 
sellers are similar to some degree. 
As indicated above, most of the relationships between the variables and order prices 
in the single-period experiments are consistent with the ones in the single-period model. 
The results imply that the subjects’s submission strategies in the experiments are sim­
ilar to the ones in the theoretical models. Next, I investigate the relationship between 
the experimental order prices and the related theoretical values. To reduce the inﬂuence 
of some outliers, I use robust regression to test the relationship between the theoretical 
value of order prices and the experimental order prices. The result indicates that there 
is a strong relationship between the theoretical values and experimental order prices 
(table 6.8). Figure 6.21 and 6.22 display that the slopes of ﬁtted curves are close to 
45 degree. The experiment results support that the theoretical model is eﬃcient to 
capture the important variables that determine the order submission strategies of the 
trader in the simple double auction market. In the line of the results above, the asks 
ﬁt the theoretical values better than bids because of the better performance of sellers. 
6.3.1.2 The analysis of the heuristic bias behavior of the subjects 
According to the analysis above, the experimental results are consistent with the ones in 
the theoretical models. Whereas, I also observed some diﬀerence between the subjects’ 
submission strategies in the experiments and the traders’ behaviors in the theoretical 
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Table 6.8: The correlation between the experimental oﬀers and the theoretical oﬀers 
Bid Ask
 
Constant 8.9139* 2.0387 
(1.9326) (0.43195) 
theoretical value 0.9065*** 0.9814*** 
(19.424) (21.307) 
theoretical value = 1 (-0.9533) (-0.9539) 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure 6.21: The relationship between the experimental bid price and the theoretical bid 
price 
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models. The diﬀerence is caused by the heuristic bias behaviors of subjects. I expected 
that they are overconﬁdent to make their decision. Overconﬁdent is a robust physio­
logical phenomenon and attains a lot of research interest. A lot of research reported 
the observation of the overconﬁdent behaviors in the experiment or the ﬁnancial mar­
ket. As a bias trait of the human, overconﬁdent is explained as the bias on their own 
abilities or their judgement on the reliability of the events. In the ﬁnancial market, 
the overconﬁdent traders act more aggressively: they trade more frequently; they un­
derreact to the information from rational traders (Odean, 1998); they overestimate the 
precision of their own information on the asset value and prefer to push the market 
price higher (Benos, 1998). Allen and Evans (2005) search the overconﬁdent inﬂuence 
in the bidders and ﬁnd that the overconﬁdence exist in 40% traders and are not re­
duced by experience. Because the overconﬁdent traders have bias on the judgement of 
the expected value of their trade, they could not weigh their own private information 
properly (Hirshleifer, 2001). By observing the ﬁgure 6.9, I ﬁnd that most traders sub­
mit bids lower than the related theoretical values and some outliers drive the slope of 
ﬁtted curve ﬂatter. Compared with the ﬁgure 6.10 for sellers, the buyers express bad 
performance to provide optimal order prices. The interpretation for the phenomenon 
is that the overconﬁdence of buyers are more serious than that of sellers. The buyers 
are overconﬁdent on their ability to submit optimal orders to maximize their proﬁts. 
Therefore, they take too much advantage from their private values by submit the or­
ders with relatively low prices. They ignore the fact that because of the existence 
of uncertainty in markets, they should submit the relatively higher bids to increase 
the execution probability, which in turn increase their expected proﬁts. On the other 
side, most of the sellers’ asks are slightly higher than the related theoretical values. 
This indicates that sellers submit higher asks to take the advantages of their private 
information. 
Overconﬁdence is observed by many researches in ﬁnancial markets. In our ex­
periments, the subjects are students with basic knowledge of ﬁnancial market. The 
single-period experiments held at the beginning of each sessions. Although the stu­
dents are not familiar with the trading game, their overconﬁdence of their ability to 
obtain proﬁts lead them to submit orders with better price and lower execution prob­
ability. They overvalue the more direct determinant and undervalue the less direct 
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determinant for the expected proﬁts because of their overconﬁdence. However, as they 
realize the results of the trade after trading several times with diﬀerent opponents, their 
submission behaviors change in the multi-period trading. 
6.3.1.3 The determinants of decision of order sides 
As indication in the theoretical model, the traders’ decision of order sides depends 
on the relationship between their private values and the mean values of the valuation 
distribution. The variances of the valuation distribution are irrelevant to the decision 
of order sidess. To observe the subjects’ decision of order sidess in the experiments, 
ﬁrst, I analyze the relationship between their order prices and the diﬀerence between 
the private values and the expected value of valuation distribution. The ﬁgure 6.23 and 
6.24 display the relationship between the oﬀer prices and the values of private values 
minus expected values. Because the private values are more powerful to inﬂuence 
the order prices than the expected values, when the gap between the private values 
and the expected values increases, the order prices increase as well either for bids or 
asks. However, as indicated in table 6.9, the slope of the ﬁtted curve for the buyers 
in the experiments are not statistically signiﬁcant. The result shows that the change 
of the diﬀerence between the private values and the expected values does not inﬂuence 
the subjects’ order prices. In another word, the eﬀects of the private values are not 
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from the ones of the mean values. The results coincide 
with the results above that buyers put less weight on their private values and more 
weight on the mean values of their opponents’ valuation distributions. Whereas, the 
sellers’ performance is better than buyers in understanding the diﬀerence between the 
private values and mean values. The slope of the ﬁtted curve is in the signiﬁcant 
level and there is no slope diﬀerence between the theoretical values and experimental 
data. Comparing the ﬁgure 6.23 with the ﬁgure 6.24, I could observe that the bids 
concentrate around the front of the ﬁtted curve, while the asks allocate around the 
back of the ﬁtted curve. This phenomena show that the subjects prefer to submit bids 
when they observe that their private values are higher than the expected values of the 
valuation distributions and submit asks when the private values are lower than the 
expected values. This observation is consistent with the results of theoretical model 
about the decision of order sides. In the theoretical model, the trader would submit a 
bid when his private value is higher than the expected value of his opponent’s valuation 
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distribution, vice versa. Therefore, the ﬁgures show that the subjects’ decision of order 
sides depends on the relationship between the private values and expected values. 
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Figure 6.23: The relationship between the bid price and the diﬀerence between the private 
values and the expected values 
Further more, I present the regression for the determinants of order sides. In table 
6.10, the slope of the values of private values minus expected values is positive with 
statistically signiﬁcant result, which implies that the bids increase with the increase 
of the diﬀerence between the private values and expected values. The private values 
are also positively proportional to the numbers of bids. Whereas, the expected values 
of the opponents’ valuation distribution are negatively proportional to the numbers 
of bids. The subjects in the experiments prefer bids when their private values are 
relatively higher or the expected values of their opponents’ valuation distribution are 
relatively lower, vice versa. This observation ﬁts the traders’ decision of order sides in 
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Figure 6.24: The relationship between the bid price and the diﬀerence between the private 
values and the expected values 
Table 6.9: Private value - expected value vs. order price 
Bid Ask 
Theory Experiment Theory Experiement 
Constant 95.9895*** 98.6729*** 103.797*** 105.0363*** 
(115.54) (100.94) (136.74) (120.66) 
Private value 0.2551*** 0.0017 0.3257*** 0.4217** 
- expected value 
(5.3613) (0.0296) (6.0313) (6.8085) 
F -coeﬃcient 13.1542*** 0.5737 
diﬀerence 
F -slope 13.0007*** 0.3071 
diﬀerence 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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the theoretical model. More evidences for decision of order sides are presented below to 
support the strong relationship between the theoretical values and experimental data. 
Table 6.10: The variables that aﬀect the decision of order sides 
Private value-expected value Private value Expected value 
constant -0.0373 -7.9367 6.5208 
(-0.3189) (-8.2707***) (6.7823***) 
slope 0.0806 0.0791 -0.0651 
(9.6488***) (8.3527***) (-6.8212***) 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
To investigate the subjects’ decision of order sides, I would introduce Chi-square test 
to test the correlation between the experimental order sides and theoretical order sides. 
Before presenting the results of Chi-square test, we provide an intuitionistic evidence 
for the relationship between the experimental order sides and theoretical order sides. In 
the theoretical model, the results show that if two traders are the same on every aspect 
except diﬀerent private values, the probability of submitting a buy/sell order is 0.5. 
Because there is no diﬀerence between two expected values of the valuation distribution, 
traders expected that the probability of their opponents to submit a bid/ask is equaled 
to 0.5 and their opponents have same expectation on their decision of order sides. In 
the experiment, there are 212 of buy orders and 211 of sell orders, then the percentage 
of buying is 0.5024, which is close to 0.5. This result supports the result in theoretical 
model that the percentage of observing a buy/sell order is equaled in simple double 
auction markets. 
Chi-square tests are used here to investigate the goodness of ﬁt of the experimental 
data and theoretical values in the aspect of decision of order sides. The statistical 
results are listed in table 6.11. The results show a strong relationship between the 
experimental data and theoretical values for decision of order sides. The order side 
choice of the subjects in the experiment are expected to follow the results of theoretical 
model. In another word, the theoretical model demonstrate the proper submission 
strategies of traders on their decision of order sides. 
146
 
6.3 Results and implications of the experiments
 
Table 6.11: Chi-square test for the decision of order sides 
Theory 
Bid Ask 
Experiment Bid 
Ask 
176 
44 
36 
166 
Chi-square 
Yates 
χ2 
162.858*** 
160.38*** 
Chi-square test 
p-value 
0 
0 
Note: χ in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
6.3.1.4 The transaction happening 
Because of the existence of two sides uncertainty, the probability of transaction is 
low. As the descriptions in the theoretical model, the transaction only happens when 
the two traders submit the diﬀerent sides of orders and meanwhile, the bid is higher 
than the ask. There are 423 observations in total. The chi-square test is used to test 
the goodness of ﬁt of the experimental data to the theoretical values. The statistical 
results are listed in table 6.12. The critical value χ2 equals 78.685 and the probability 
of insigniﬁcant is 0. The results show that the hull hypophysis of the independency has 
been rejected. The experiment data ﬁts their theoretical values. 
Table 6.12: Chi-square test for the transactions 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment Trade 80 30 
No trade 78 233 
Chi-square test 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 78.685*** 0 
Yates 76.666*** 0 
Note: χ in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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6.3.1.5 Summary 
First, in the aspect of the determinants of order prices, most of the estimated coeﬃcients 
of the experimental oﬀer prices are close to the ones of the corresponding theoretical 
values for privates and expected values. The only slope diﬀerence statistically signiﬁ­
cant is the regression for the bid prices and the private values. The slopes of the ﬁtted 
curves of the experimental bids are lower than that of related theoretical values. The 
possible reason behind this diﬀerence is that the subjects’s heuristic bias. The over 
conﬁdent subjects submitted the bids with higher unconditional proﬁts and lower exe­
cution probabilities. For the variance, the estimated coeﬃcient is not in the signiﬁcant 
level for buyers, which means that buyers’ behaviors is irrelevant to the variance of 
the valuation distributions. The insigniﬁcant result is caused by the bias behaviors of 
buyers, compared with the behaviors of sellers. The variance could explain parts of 
the oﬀer prices of sellers and the slopes are close to each other. Furthermore, the slope 
of the ﬁtted curves for the relationship between the theoretical value and experimen­
tal order prices are close to 45 degree. The strength of the relationship between the 
theoretical value and experimental order prices prove that the theoretical model could 
explain the subjects’ submission strategies in the laboratorial environment. 
Second, for the decision of order sides, the experimental data coincides with the 
theoretical values. The experimental result shows that 81% of order sides are in the 
same side as the expectation in theory. The Chi-square test conﬁrm that the strong 
relationship between the decision of order sides in the experiments and the ones in 
theory. The students’ decision of order sides follows the theoretical rules that traders 
choose bids (asks) when their private values are high (low) than the expected value of 
valuation distribution. Furthermore, as the subjects’ behaviors in the experiments are 
very similar to the traders’ behaviors in the theoretical model, the observations for the 
transaction happening are also close to the expectation in the theoretical model. The 
statistically test results support this implication. To sum up, the results of single-period 
experiments are consistent with the ones of single-period model. 
6.3.2 The experiment for multi-period trading 
The multi-period trading model explain the traders’ repeated submission behavior in 
the continuous trading progress. Diﬀerent from the trading behaviors of the traders 
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in single stage, the traders in multi-period trading game have the opportunity to ad­
just their trading behaviors according to the new trading information. Meanwhile, the 
dynamic price pattern is observed during the continuous process. I design the multi-
period experiment to observe the subjects submission behaviors in the multi-period 
trading. In the multi-stage trade experiments, the students were asked to trade three 
rounds for each pair of data, and also they can change their oﬀer prices by updating 
their expectation on the value distribution of the other one according to the informa­
tion of the other one’s oﬀer price from the previous stages. The multi-period trading 
experiment were held only on two sessions because of the time limitation. There are 
19 pairs of eﬀective data collected after delete several groups of unﬁnished trading. In 
this section, by analyzing the experimental data and comparing the diﬀerence between 
the experimental data and theoretical values, the experimental implication are given 
by analyzing the trading behavior of the traders in multi-stage trade. Meanwhile, the 
comparison between the theoretical model and the experiments by statistical analysis 
is made to observe the eﬃciency of my theoretical model. 
6.3.2.1 Submission behaviors of the traders in experiment and theory 
In this section, I discuss the results of the comparison between the subjects’ submission 
strategies in the experiments and the traders’ behaviors in the theoretical models. With 
statistical analysis, I could clarify the traders’ submission strategies from the points of 
auction theory, as well as the subjects’ bias behaviors in laboratory environments from 
the points of behavioral ﬁnance. To compare the results between the theoretical models 
and the experiments, the corresponding theoretical values underlying the same series 
of variables are obtained. 
Traders’ behaviors over stages As the description in my theoretical model, the 
trader updates his belief on his opponent’s valuation distribution according to the infor­
mation at pervious stage. His estimation of his opponent’s private information is based 
on all the historical transaction data and information available to him. He changes 
his oﬀer price because of the updated valuation distribution of his opponent, by which 
the trader could improve his execution probability. In the process of repeated trading, 
the opponent’s valuation distribution regarded by the trader is expected to concentrate 
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on its private value. Because the students are not required to provide their updated 
expected value of their opponents’ valuation distribution, my observation focuses on 
the changes of their order prices and order sides. The related theoretical values could 
be calculated from two points of views. Method 1: the theoretical values are calculated 
by updating the expected value with the theoretical oﬀer prices at the previous stage. 
Method 2: the theoretical values are calculated by updating the expected value with 
the experimental oﬀer prices at the previous stage. With method 1, the theoretical 
values are calculated from the extent of whole period of trading. By these two method, 
I could observe the total diﬀerence between the strategies of subjects in laboratorial 
markets and ones in theoretical markets. My mainly focus is to analysis the diﬀerence 
between the pure theoretical data and pure experimental data. Meanwhile, to observe 
the individual updating behaviors at each stage, I introduce method 2 a complement 
to obtain the theoretical values by which the diﬀerence between the experimental data 
and the corresponding theoretical values is concentrated on each stage. I need to point 
out that the theoretical values with method 2 are inﬂuenced by the irrational behav­
iors of traders because of the underlying experimental order prices. Therefore, when 
observing the whole process of trading by theoretical values with method 2, the hybrid 
theoretical values would diverge the experimental order prices more than the theoreti­
cal values with method 1 do. Inversely, the similar results of these two methods would 
prove the close relationship between the subjects’ behaviors in the experiments and the 
traders in the theoretical model. 
The traders’ behaviors are based on their own private value and the value distri­
bution of the other one. As the statement in the theoretical model, their decision of 
order sides depend on the relationship between their private valuation and the valuation 
distribution of the other one. And their oﬀer price are decided by their private value 
as well as their opponent’s valuation distribution. Therefore, to observe the change 
of their submission strategies, I classify the groups into three types according to the 
relationship between the two private values in each pair. 
•	 Type I : The private values of the subjects in one group are both lower than the 
expected value of their valuation distribution. 
•	 Type II : The private values of the subjects in one group are both higher than the 
mean value of their valuation distribution. 
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•	 Type III : In the same group, one of the private values of the subjects in one 
group is lower than the mean value of his opponent’s value distribution and the 
other one’s private value is higher than his valuation distribution. 
Because of the diﬀerent relationship between the traders’ private value and their oppo­
nent’s valuation distribution, the transaction probabilities of these types are diﬀerent. 
The situations of type I and type II traders are similar. The transaction probability 
of ﬁrst two types of traders are relatively low, because the diﬀerence between their 
private values is low. They are expected to submit the same side of orders, whatever 
the diﬀerence between their private value is. To match their orders, the process of 
their adjustment has two stages: changing from the same order side to diﬀerent sides 
and improving their order prices to make bids higher than asks. The transaction are 
easier to happen for the type III traders with bigger diﬀerent private values. Actually, 
the main diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two types of traders and type III traders is their 
decision of order sidess, which are inﬂuenced by the diﬀerence between their private 
values and the expected values of their opponents’ valuation distributions. I collected 
19 pairs of data to observe the subjects’ submission strategies over stages 1 
In theory, the type I traders submit sell orders simultaneously at the ﬁrst stage 
because their private values are lower than the expected values of the valuation distri­
butions. At the later stages, the traders update their assessment on the expectation 
valuation distribution of their opponents continuously. Conditional to the ask prices, 
both seller’s expected value would decrease. Whereas, their private values are diﬀerent 
such that their order prices are diﬀerent at the ﬁrst stage of trade. Then, their expecta­
tion on the other one’s valuation distributions are diverge from the common valuation 
distribution with diﬀerent speed. During the process of repeated trading, when one 
trader’s assessment on the other one’s expected value is lower than his private value. 
He would change his order side to bid. If his bid price is higher than the ask price, 
the trade happens. On the contrary, the traders will continue to adjust their order 
prices by updating information until the trade happens. Meanwhile, during the process 
of repeated trading, the trader’s order prices would be close to their private values 
gradually. This is the process of private information disclosure. 
1All the graphs for the comparison between the theoretical and experimental values over stages are 
listed in appendix A. 
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As the description in the theoretical model, the procedure of order match is complex. 
It depends on the traders’ correct updating behaviors and their proper decision on the 
sides and prices of orders. Despite this, the subjects’ performance in the experiments 
show their ability to match their orders somewhat.For example, ﬁgureA.3 displays the 
order match between two subjects with low private values. In this group, I observe 
two asks with diﬀerent order prices at the ﬁrst stage. Then, one of them change his 
ask to bid and both of them adjust their order prices to make the trade happen. The 
procedure of adjustment on the sides and prices of orders are consistent with the process 
in the theoretical model. I infer that with the increase of the number of stages, the 
probability of transaction would increase. 
The trading behaviors of the typeII traders with relatively high private values are 
similar to the type I traders. Because the traders’ private values are higher than the 
mean value of the valuation distributions, they would prefer bids to asks. It is expected 
that, in theory, two bids would be submitted at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period trading. 
Conditional to bid prices, the expected value of buyers’ valuation distributions increase 
regarded by their opponents. Similarly, diﬀerent private values produce diﬀerent bids 
and diﬀerent bids cause diﬀerent expected values of the valuation distributions. Then, 
during the repeated trading process, I could observe that one trader would change his 
bid to ask when he ﬁnds that his private value is lower than the expected value of the 
other one’s valuation distribution according to his belief updating of his opponent’s 
valuation distribution. Next, one bid and one ask would converge to match order 
prices. The similar situation is observed in the subjects’ behaviors in the experiments. 
For example, ﬁgure A.4 displays the submission behaviors of two subjects over stages, 
whose private values are relative high. I observed that the student with lower private 
value changed, his order side to ask at the third stage. Although the ask price is still 
a little bit higher than the bid price, it is expected that, with the increase of the stage 
number, the seller would decrease his ask and the buyer would increase his bid to make 
trade happen. 
For the type III traders, the adjustment is only to match the bid and ask prices 
since they would submit one buy and one sell at the ﬁrst stage of trading according to 
the rules of the theoretical model. During the process of repeated trading, the buyer 
would increase his bid and the seller would decrease his ask to make the trade happen. 
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Once the trade happens, the buyer continually increases his bid and the seller decreases 
his ask as well until their order prices equal to their reservation prices. In fact, the 
procedures of order price change and information disseminate for the type III traders 
are similar to the rear part of the trading process for the type I and type II traders. 
In the experiments, many of the groups show the process of price converge (ﬁgure 
A.11). As for the aspect of private information disseminating, because there are only 
few stages, I could only observe that the subjects performance better to match their 
opponents’ oﬀer prices, but could not ﬁnd obvious evidence that the traders prone to 
move their order prices to their private values after transaction happening. I ﬁnd that 
the traders’ behaviors become ambiguous after the transaction happens. Some of them 
may think that to increase the diﬀerence between their order prices and their private 
values could increase their proﬁts. Some of them decrease this diﬀerence and then 
increase it at the next stage. To obtain a better understanding about the information 
dissemination in the multi-period trading, more stages of repeated trading game are 
needed in the future work. 
Totally, the results show that there are some similarities between the subjects’ sub­
mission strategies in the experiments and the trades’ behaviors in the theoretical model. 
The subjects adjust their order prices and sides over stages to increase the probability 
of transaction happening. The bid and ask prices tend to converge during the process 
of repeated trading. There are two reasons that inﬂuence the correlation between the 
observations in the experiments and the theoretical model. On the one hand, the stu­
dents’ irrational behaviors diverge their submission strategies to the optimal ones. On 
the other hand, there are only a few stages for the students to understand the updating 
process and observe the private values of their opponents. 
Experimental and theoretical order prices In the last section, I indicate the 
subjects’ activities on updating their information, adjusting their order prices in the 
multi-period trading game and the comparison between the theoretical values and the 
experiment data. Next, I compare the bid/ask experiment data with their theoretical 
values at each stage respectively. At last, all the order prices are put together to be 
compared with their theoretical values. 
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According to the methods above, the theoretical values are calculated by updating 
the theoretical order prices and the experimental order prices separately. Most of the 
statistical results show that the experimental order prices are consistent with the theo­
retical values. In another word, the theoretical value capture the most of the important 
experiment data and there is no statistical diﬀerence between the theoretical value and 
the experimental data. Figure B.7 and table B.7 display the comparison between the 
experiment and the theory for the order prices in the total stages. Other tables and 
ﬁgures for each stage are shown in appendix B. There is one exceptional insigniﬁcant 
result - the bid prices at stage 2 with theoretical updating. The explanation for this 
result is that traders’ updating behaviors are inﬂuenced by their irrational behaviors 
especially at stage 2. Whereas, with the experimental updating, the slope coeﬃcient 
is statistically signiﬁcant, which in turn supports my inference above. Furthermore, I 
also observed that the traders’ performance at the ﬁrst stage and third stage is better 
than their performance at the second stage. There are two implications: ﬁrst, the 
belief updating in the multi-period trading is complex to the subjects which in turn 
increases their irrational behaviors; second, with the increase of the number of stages, 
the traders’ submission strategies are possibly closer to the optimal strategies in the 
theoretical model. 
Table 6.13: Bid price of experiment & theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 75.276 9.523*** 0.000 72.345 9.925*** 0.000 
Slope 0.271 3.425*** 0.001 0.282 3.877*** 0.000 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
The traders’ choices on the order sides are decided by the relationship between the 
trader’s private values and the value distributions of the other one. As indicated in the 
theoretical model, the traders prefer a bid to ask when their private values are higher 
than the mean value of their opponents’ valuation distribution, vice versa. This rule 
is validated either in single-period markets or multi-period markets. In the multi-stage 
trading, when the relationship between their private values and the mean value of the 
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Figure 6.28: Bid oﬀers at stage 1 − 3 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Table 6.14: Ask price of experiment & theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 51.382 5.169*** 0.000 38.179 3.214** 0.002 
Slope 0.475 4.790*** 0.000 0.587 4.924*** 0.000 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
opponents’ valuation distribution changes, the traders change their order sides during 
the continuous trading process. Especially, when both traders have relatively low(high) 
private values, one of them would change his order side to increase the probability of 
transaction happening. To investigate the relationship between the experimental order 
sides and theoretical order sides, 2 × 2 chi-square tests is used to test the goodness 
of ﬁt for the experimental data to the corresponding theoretical values. The decision 
of order sides on bid/ask frequency are calculated for each stage separately and then 
for total stages. As for the decision of order sides, the statistical results prove that 
the experimental data ﬁts the theoretical values well for each stages as well as the 
total stages. Therefore, I could conﬁrm that the subjects’ decision of order sides in the 
experiments are consistent with the traders’ decision of order sides in the theoretical 
model. In another word, the theoretical model demonstrate the similar rules of the 
decision of order sides to the subjects’ behaviors in the experiment. All the tables are 
listed in appendix B. Here, I present the table B.12 for total stages. We can observe 
that the critic values of Chi-square test are very high for the theoretical values with 
theoretical updating as well as the ones with experimental updating, which imply a 
strong relationship between the experimental data and theoretical values. 
To compare the trader’s behaviors in the experiment and the theory, the frequency 
of the transaction occurrence is an important variable to be investigated. In the single 
stage, the transaction frequency is low because of the strict trading rules. Whereas, 
in the multi-stage trade, the transaction frequency increases with the increase of the 
trade rounds, as the result of traders’ adjusting their order prices and sides. Therefore, 
by comparing the experimental transaction frequency with the theoretical transaction 
one, I could observe the consistency of the subjects’ updating behaviors as well as their 
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Table 6.15: Bid/ask decision in the experiment and theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 45 
Ask 18 
Ask 
11 
40 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 47 
Ask 20 
Ask 
9 
38 
χ2 
Chi-square 28.035*** 
Yates 28.035*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
χ2 
Chi-square 28.748*** 
Yates 26.744*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: χ in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
submission strategies in multi-period model. Corresponding to the method above, the 
theoretical values are obtained with theoretical updating and experimental updating 
for comparison. The test for the transaction frequency is approached for each stages 
and total stages as well. 
The contingency tables and statistical data are listed in appendix B. Here, I present 
the table B.16 for total stages to demonstrate the statistical results. Most of the crit­
ical values are not statistically signiﬁcant. This result is expected to be caused by 
the irrational behaviors of the subjects in the experiments and the low number of ob­
servations. One exceptional test result is the Chi-square test for the data at total 
stages (χ2 = 4.079, p = 0.043). Therefore, with the increase of the number of observa­
tions, it is expected that the relationship between the experimental transaction data 
and the theoretical transaction one becomes stronger, as the inﬂuence of the individ­
ual’s irrational behaviors decreases. Another signiﬁcant result happens at stage one 
(χ2 = 3.971, p = 0.046). The traders behaviors in the single-period market are similar 
to their behaviors in the multi-period market. During the experiments, I found that the 
students’ could better to underhand and adopt proper strategies in the single-period 
model. Whereas, in the multi-period model, they are in more complex situation. Es­
pecially, when the transaction happens at the ﬁrst stage of trading, they confused and 
their strategies diverged. Therefore, the experimental transaction frequency is heav­
ily inﬂuenced by the irrational behaviors of subjects at the later stages. Despite the 
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Table 6.16: Transaction and no transaction in the experiment and theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
11 5 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
16 25 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
7 9 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
11 30 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 4.079** 0.043 
Yates 2.974* 0.085 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.525 0.217 
Yates 0.842 0.359 
Note: χ in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
insigniﬁcant results at the rest stages, I could conclude in some degree that the ex­
perimental transaction frequency could interpret the theoretical transaction frequency. 
Now I analyze the traders’ updating behaviors in the multi-stage trading. To 
investigate their updating behaviors, I introduce the independent variable - the in­
creas/decrease of the traders’ order prices. The increasing and decreasing of oﬀer 
prices are related to the changes of traders’ submission strategies in the multi-stage 
trade according to their information. Although, I think it is not a very reliable param­
eter 1, it still could provide some useful information for the research of the subjects’ 
behaviors in the laboratorial environment. Following the method above, the theoretical 
order prices are calculated by theoretical and experimental updating. The price trend 
is observed by the diﬀerence between the order prices at stage 1 and stage 2, the order 
prices at stage 2 and stage 3, and the order prices at stage 1 and stage 3. 
1The increase/decrease of traders’ order prices include the inﬂuence of order sides in the multi-
period model. As the traders’ change their order sides during the multi-period trading, an improvement 
of the transaction probability could be realized by decreasing the bid prices as well as increasing the 
ask prices. 
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The contingency tables and chi-square tests are listed in appendix B. The tests for 
the diﬀerence between stage 1 and stage 2 and the diﬀerence between stage 2 and stage 
3 got insigniﬁcant results. The results demonstrate that the subjects’ improvement on 
their orders are not consistent with the expectation in the theoretical model. Whereas, 
the test for the diﬀerence between the order prices at stage 1 and stage 3 is out of 
the conﬁdential interval (table B.19), which imply the strong relationship between the 
experimental data and theoretical value in the aspect of price changes. The signiﬁcant 
result is only available to the theoretical values with theoretical updating. The exper­
imental updating theoretical values are greatly inﬂuenced by the irrational behaviors 
of subjects. There are two implications for the results of the price change. First, the 
irrational behaviors of subjects in the experiments are greatly inﬂuence the consistency 
between the experimental data and theoretical values. Because the subjects are limited 
to understand the information in the multi-period trading, their adjustment on the 
order prices according to their preference is diﬃcult to follow the expectation in the 
theoretical model. Second, with the increase of the number of stages, the price trend in 
the experiments shows a closer relationship with the trend in the theory. Therefore, it is 
safe to say that the subjects express their ability to improve the transaction probability 
and could performance better with the increase of the number of stages. To sum up, 
with a large stage distance, the subjects’ order prices change could explain the price 
change in the theoretical model in some degree. 
6.3.2.2 The determinants of order prices in multi-stage trade 
The traders’ submission strategies include the choice of their order sides and the choice 
of their order prices. As the implication of the theoretical model, the order prices de­
cision is more complex than the decision of order sides, which is inﬂuenced by more 
parameters. The traders’ preference on the order prices is determined by their infor­
mation. In the single stage, the information includes their private values, the expected 
values of the value distribution of the other one, and the variance of the value distri­
bution of the other one. Normally, a common value distribution is used as a public 
information for both traders. The theoretical model demonstrates that the private 
value and the expected value are proportional to the oﬀer prices of the traders, while 
variance is proportional to the ask price and inversely proportional to the bid price. In 
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Table 6.17: Increase and decrease in the experiment and theory - stage 1-3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
18 2 
D
ec
re
as
e
9 9 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
15 5 
D
ec
re
as
e
9 9 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 7.370*** 0.007 
Yates 5.553** 0.018 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 2.545 0.111 
Yates 1.584 0.208 
Note: χ in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
the multi-period model, at the ﬁrst stage of trading, the traders’ situation is similar 
to their situation in the single-stage market. However, they receive new transaction 
data at the end of the ﬁrst stage. After that, the oﬀer price of the other one in the 
previous stage are considered by the traders to make their decision of the order side 
and the order prices on the current stage. Meanwhile, the mean values and variances of 
the valuation distributions of the traders regarded by their opponent diverge from each 
other after information updating. Compared with the single-stage trading game, the 
eﬀects of these determinants on the order prices of traders in the multi-stage trading 
would provide new implications to understand the submission behaviors of traders in 
double auction markets. These two methods are used to obtain the related theoretical 
values in this section. 
In the multi-stage trading, the trader’s private value does not change during the 
process of trade as no new private information is considered. The constant private value 
contributes heavily to the order price decision. The theoretical model demonstrates 
that the relationship between the private value and the oﬀer prices is positive either 
for buyers or sellers. The positive eﬀects of the private value on the order prices are 
expected in both the single-period trading game and multi-period trading game. 
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On stage 1, the information available for the subjects are their private value, the 
expected value and variance of the other one. The submission strategies of the subjects 
are similar with the trader behaviors in the single-stage market. Figures C.1 and C.2 
show that the experimental data is close to the theoretical data. The only diﬀerence 
between the bids and asks is that the experimental bid prices are higher than their 
theoretical value and the ask prices are lower than their theoretical value. This diﬀer­
ence is caused by the diﬀerent characters between sellers and buyers from the points 
of behavioral ﬁnance theory. I would explain the reasons in details below. However, 
the statistical test shows that there is no slope change as the result of signiﬁcant test. 
Therefore, the experimental results coincide with the theoretical model and conﬁrm 
that the private value is a signiﬁcant explanatory for the oﬀer prices with positive 
relationship. 
As we know, the traders’ submission behavior changes from the second stage because 
of their updating behaviors. In the stage 2, the positive relationship between the 
private values and oﬀer prices from the experimental data are similar to the one in 
the stage 1. Compared with the theoretical model, the slope of the ﬁtted curve of 
experimental bid prices is higher than the slope of corresponding theoretical values, 
while there is no diﬀerence between the slopes of the experimental ask prices and 
theoretical ask prices. The negative experimental results of the higher bids show that 
some uncontrolled factors aﬀect the judgement of the traders on their private values. 
Meanwhile, the slope of the experimental ask oﬀers is slightly lower than it should be 
in theoretical model. The higher slope of the experimental bid prices implies that the 
traders submit higher bids than the related theoretical values. On the contrary, the 
sellers submit asks with relative low values. The explanation for traders’ bias behaviors 
in details is presented below in separate paragraph. 
In the stage 3, the positive relationships between the private value and oﬀer prices 
are observed in this stage trade as well. It is the ﬁrst time that the experimental bids 
are lower than their corresponding theoretical value attained by method 1. As we know, 
the method 1 is adopted to calculate the theoretical values from the points of whole 
progress, while the method 2 is adopted from the points of traders’ updating behaviors 
on each stage. Therefore, the lower bids imply that after serval times of trading, the 
traders weigh less on their own private information. Similarly, I also ﬁnd that subjects’ 
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Figure 6.30: The eﬀects of private values on bid prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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ask prices are closer to their theoretical value after repeated trading and information 
updating. This result coincide with the point of behavioral ﬁnance that the subjects’ 
behaviors could be reduced by experience. 
At last, I combine the data on each stage to observe the relationship between the 
private values and the order prices. Most of the comparison between the experimental 
oﬀer prices and the theoretical prices are not statistically signiﬁcant expect the bid 
prices with method 2. The positive experimental results support the point that my 
theoretical model properly describes the relationship between the order prices and their 
determinants. The theoretical values attained by updating the previous experimental 
oﬀers are greatly inﬂuenced by the irrational behaviors of traders. Therefore, with 
method 2, the big gap between the theoretical order prices is expected. However, with 
method 2, I could observe the bias behaviors of traders because the theoretical values 
describe their bias behaviors stage by stage. As the results listed in the table C.4, with 
method 2, the experimental bids have higher slope than the theoretical oﬀers. In each 
stage, their reaction to their private value is bigger than it should be. 
In sum, as one of the important variables that aﬀect the traders’ submission strate­
gies, the private value is the most powerful to inﬂuence the order prices on each stages. 
The results of the experiment conﬁrm that there is positive relationship between the 
traders’ private values and the oﬀer prices of similar to the inference in the theoretical 
models. Although some groups’ experimental data aﬀected by the bias behaviors of the 
subjects and show signiﬁcant higher slope than the corresponding theoretical values, 
most of the results of experimental data coincide with those of the theoretical value. 
In my experiment design, the traders’ private values are drawn from the same 
distribution. Then, the initial expected values of the valuation distribution are the 
same for both traders. Diﬀerent from the constant private value, the expected values 
are updated repeatedly by the traders according to the order prices of the opponents 
at the previous stages. As the implication of the theoretical model, the expected 
values of the opponents’ valuation distribution have positive eﬀects on the traders’ 
order prices. In the process of continuous trading game, the trader’s assessment on his 
opponent’s valuation distribution is updated and the updated valuation distribution of 
the other one with new expected value provides the trader a clearer ﬁgure of the other 
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one’s private information. This process is one of the properties of the eﬃcient double 
auction markets - the double auction market disseminate information eﬃciently as the 
demonstration in the experiments (Plott and Sunder, 1988). Although in this simple 
double auction market, the number of the buyers and the sellers is too small to achieve 
the competitive equilibrium, I ﬁnd that this double auction market still has the function 
of information dissemination. The two dimension graphs C.9 and C.10 display the 
relationship between the expected value and bid/ask prices with comparison between 
the experimental data and theoretical values. For asks, the experimental coeﬃcients 
are not in the signiﬁcant level. This statistical result is probably caused by the small 
sample size and the big inﬂuence of some irrelevant observations. 
At the second and third stages, the subjects could adjust their order prices by updat­
ing their assessment on their opponents’ valuation distributions according to the order 
prices submitted by their opponents at the previous stages. The statistical results show 
that most of the slope coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant for the experimental data. Some of 
the slope coeﬃcients of the theoretical values are also insigniﬁcant. There are three 
reasons behind these insigniﬁcant results. First, the expected values of the opponents’ 
valuation distribution are less powerful to inﬂuence the order prices of the traders than 
their private values. Since the order prices are obtained with various combination of 
the variables’ values, to observe the eﬀects of the expected value, its eﬀects would be 
inﬂuenced by other variables, especially the private value. Second, the updating pro­
cess is complex for the students with basic knowledge of ﬁnancial markets. Their bias 
and irrational behaviors diverge their order prices from the theoretical values at the 
later stages when they begin to update their assessment on the other ones’ valuation 
distribution. On the other hand, the new expected value of the other one’s valuation 
distribution is not intuitionistic for the students, the complex updating process make a 
gap between their assessment of the expected values and the corresponding theoretical 
values. Third, the observations in the experiments are small. As the number of ob­
servations are not enough, the inﬂuence of some outliers is great even with the robust 
regression. 
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In total stages, the bid orders show a positive relationship with the expected values 
of the opponents’ valuation distribution, while the asks still are insigniﬁcant. The 
buyers’ performance in the multi-period model is better than the sellers’ behaviors as 
a result of sellers’ bias anticipation on the expected value of their opponents’ valuation 
distribution. The results show that the theoretical expected values of the opponents is 
irrelevant to the sellers’ asks during the process of repeated trading. On the other side, 
the theoretical expected values have positive inﬂuence on the other ones’ order prices. 
The theoretical expected value is indirectly related with the subjects’ order prices. 
Because of the complex process of valuation distribution updating, the subjects’ pri­
vate assessment on their opponents’ valuation distributions is expected distinctively 
diverge from the theoretical valuation distributions, which results in the big diﬀerence 
between the experimental data and theoretical values. Furthermore, the small number 
of observations enlarges the inﬂuence of individual irrational behaviors of traders. Ex­
cept the regression at stage 1, most of the regression results show that the theoretical 
expected values could not explain the traders’ order prices at each stage. Whereas, I 
still ﬁnd some evidences that the relationship between the theoretical expected values 
is positively related with the order prices in the theoretical model. The clue is expected 
to be clearer when the number of observations and stages increase. 
As the results of theoretical model, the variances are less powerful to inﬂuence the 
trader’s order prices and have no eﬀects on the traders’ decision of order sides. As 
indicated in the single-period model, there are two diﬃculties to investigate the eﬀects 
of variances. It is diﬃcult to observe the inﬂuence of variances since other powerful 
variables shade its contribution. Meanwhile, compared with the private values and the 
expected values, the variances are the most complex factors to be uderstood by the 
subjects. Therefore, I observed the irrelevant relationship between order prices and 
variance in the single-period trading game. In the multi-stage trading, the variance 
of the valuation distributions decreases continually conditional to the order prices of 
the other ones. Therefore, it always increases the bids and decreases asks. Similarly, 
their eﬀects in the experiments are diﬃcult to capture after combined with the eﬀects 
of private values and variational expected values. 
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The ﬁgures and tables are listed in appendix C. Most of the regressions show 
insigniﬁcant results. The experimental data for total stages has a positive slope in 
week signiﬁcant level for bids, but the coeﬃcients of theoretical data are insigniﬁcant. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to show the correlation between the experimental data 
and theoretical data in the aspect of variance. 
As the complimentary of the observations of relationship between determinants and 
order prices, the regressions with the dependant variable - the diﬀerence between the 
theoretical order prices and related experimental ones show us the eﬀects of the deter­
minants from the points of each pair of order prices. The explanation is similar to the 
one for single-stage experiment. If the coeﬃcient of slope is not statistical signiﬁcant, 
the new regression supports the related one in that the eﬀects of the determinant on 
the theoretical order prices is similar to the ones on the experimental prices. Therefore, 
we expect that the values of the diﬀerence between the theoretical prices and related 
experimental prices stochastically swing around the ﬂat ﬁtted line. 
For the multi-stage experiment, I present the regression results in table 6.19 and 
6.20 below. From the table, most of the regression results are statistic insigniﬁcant 
as we expected. Therefore, it is safe to say that there is no other statistic signiﬁcant 
relationship between the determinants and the experimental order prices. In another 
word, the relationship between the determinants and the theoretical order prices reﬂects 
in the behaviors of the subjects in the experiment. Although there are some signiﬁcant 
slope coeﬃcient in some stages, the possible reason is the small number of observations 
in the multi-stage experiment. Therefore, we can observe that the sum of the data in 
total stages presents non-signiﬁcant results. 
Trader’s bias behaviors in multi-stage trading In the multi-period, we observed 
that traders submit order with high execution probability and less optimal prices, 
compared with the related theoretical values. This observation is diﬀerent from their 
bias behaviors in the single-period experiment, where the overconﬁdence dominates 
the subjects’ behaviors. Figure C.1 displays that the buyers submit a higher bids 
than the theoretical values at stage 1. Their order prices increase the transaction 
probability but reduce their expected proﬁts by decreasing the diﬀerence between the 
order prices and their private values. Figure C.2 shows that the sellers provide a lower 
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Table 6.19: The relationship between the determinants and the diﬀerence between the 
theoretical and experimental order prices - theoretical updating 
Bid 
theoretical updating 
Ask 
Coeﬃcient t - stats Prob. Coeﬃcient t - stats Prob. 
C -22.865 -0.687 0.501 14.611 0.682 0.511 
Private 0.197 0.664 0.516 -0.200 -0.821 0.431 
C -51.980 -1.700 0.107 -2.420 -0.039 0.970 
Stage 1 Expected 
C 
0.573 
-7.913 
1.674 
-1.659 
0.113 
0.115 
-0.005 
0.311 
-0.008 
0.069 
0.993 
0.946 
Stdev 1.160 1.931 0.070 -0.488 -0.836 0.423 
C -59.707 -1.243 0.240 11.167 0.283 0.782 
Private 0.539 1.249 0.237 -0.143 -0.310 0.763 
C -100.236 -2.350 0.038 -28.693 -0.738 0.476 
Stage 2 Expected 
C 
0.929 
-9.552 
2.369 
-1.084 
0.037 
0.302 
0.320 
10.591 
0.714 
2.111 
0.490 
0.058 
Stdev 1.124 0.906 0.384 -2.027 -2.698 0.021 
C 32.357 1.060 0.312 3.888 0.315 0.758 
Private -0.304 -1.126 0.284 -0.052 -0.381 0.710 
C 20.237 0.746 0.471 11.458 0.758 0.462 
Stage 3 Expected 
C 
-0.193 
-9.152 
-0.822 
-1.663 
0.429 
0.124 
-0.130 
3.909 
-0.814 
1.377 
0.430 
0.192 
Stdev 1.027 1.257 0.235 -0.767 -1.787 0.097 
C 10.618 0.551 0.584 7.675 0.624 0.536 
Private -0.112 -0.649 0.520 -0.107 -0.767 0.448 
C -2.071 -0.180 0.858 5.707 0.455 0.652 
Total Expected 
C 
0.004 
-8.953 
0.039 
-2.941 
0.969 
0.005 
-0.078 
4.682 
-0.591 
2.007 
0.558 
0.052 
Stdev 1.151 2.786 0.008 -1.045 -3.125 0.003 
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Table 6.20: The relationship between the determinants and the diﬀerence between the 
theoretical and experimental order prices - experimental updating 
experimental updating 
Bid Ask 
Coeﬃcient t - stats Prob. Coeﬃcient t - stats Prob. 
C 21.224 0.701 0.492 20.220 0.736 0.479 
Private -0.210 -0.778 0.447 -0.268 -0.858 0.411 
C -28.575 -0.913 0.374 2.874 0.036 0.972 
Stage 1 Expected 0.304 0.869 0.397 -0.057 -0.075 0.942 
C -7.878 -1.716 0.104 0.562 0.095 0.926 
Stdev 1.108 1.916 0.072 -0.520 -0.675 0.515 
C 11.864 0.372 0.717 10.016 0.199 0.846 
Private -0.139 -0.480 0.640 -0.113 -0.194 0.850 
C -112.169 -7.128 0.000 -30.238 -1.245 0.241 
Stage 2 Expected 1.061 7.215 0.000 0.360 1.320 0.216 
C -3.400 -0.502 0.625 9.672 1.154 0.275 
Stdev 0.063 0.058 0.955 -1.973 -1.631 0.134 
C -13.204 -0.550 0.592 20.273 1.218 0.247 
Private 0.103 0.484 0.636 -0.228 -1.237 0.240 
C -30.139 -3.265 0.006 8.402 0.382 0.709 
Stage 3 Expected 0.272 3.140 0.008 -0.084 -0.353 0.730 
C -9.463 -2.682 0.019 1.767 0.405 0.692 
Stdev 1.341 2.500 0.027 -0.253 -0.377 0.713 
C -0.360 -0.023 0.982 18.070 1.297 0.203 
Private -0.015 -0.109 0.914 -0.218 -1.382 0.176 
C -26.563 -3.314 0.002 -1.492 -0.109 0.914 
Expected 0.250 3.114 0.003 0.010 0.070 0.945 
C -7.654 -3.237 0.002 3.747 1.357 0.183 
Stdev 1.014 3.031 0.004 -0.687 -1.749 0.089 
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asks at stage 1, by which the transaction probability increase and the expected proﬁts 
decrease. I consider this bias is caused by their overreaction because of their experience 
in the single-period model. Because the traders play the single-period trading game 
several time before play the multi-period trading game, their emotion is inﬂuenced by 
the experience in the single-period trading game. In the single-period trading game, 
they are overconﬁdent to submit orders with better price and less execution probability. 
However, they found that the probability of making proﬁts from successful transactions 
is lower than their expectation. They are pessimistic at the end of single-period trading. 
Therefore, they change their submission strategies to submit orders with worse order 
price and high execution probability. During the process of trading, they overreact 
to the new information by change their order prices dramatically in the multi-period 
trading. 
I also observed the bias of conservatism in the repeated trading process. Some 
traders are slow to change their order prices after they get new information from previ­
ous stages. Some order prices even never change during the process of repeated trading. 
This phenomenon also can be explained by the less change of the market prices with 
the change of valuation caused by the new information. Kirchler (2009) claim that, 
when the fundamental value following a stochastic process, the change of market price 
is less than the change of fundamental value. Although, the subjects received the new 
information of the other ones’ order prices. It looks that they did not consider the 
information entirely and update their belief on their opponents. 
6.3.2.3	 The comparison between the single-period trading game and the 
ﬁrst stage of the multi-period trading game 
In the theoretical model, the traders’ submission strategies in the single-period model is 
identical to their strategies at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period model. The basic intuitions 
behind the result are that the traders submit similar orders with similar private and 
public information, since their trading purpose is to maximize their proﬁts at each 
stage. The relationship between the determinants and their order sides or order prices 
in the single-period model are similar to the ones in the multi-period model. 
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I observed that either in the multi-period experiment or at the ﬁrst stage of single-
period experiment, the subjects’ order prices are positively related to their private 
value. The mean values of the opponent’s valuation distributions positively inﬂuence 
the subjects’ order prices in the single-period experiment. Whereas, because of the 
small number of observations, the positive eﬀects of expected values at the ﬁrst stage 
of multi-period experiment are only displayed by buyers. The slope of the ﬁtted curve 
for the relationship between the asks and the the expected values of valuation dis­
tributions are not statistically signiﬁcant. As for the variance, there is no signiﬁcant 
result for the order prices at the ﬁrst stage. Although some of the coeﬃcients for the 
experimental data at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period trading are weekly signiﬁcant or 
insigniﬁcant, most of the relationships between the order prices and the variables are 
similar to the ones in the single-period trading. A closer comparison displays that the 
subjects in the single-period trading prefer to submit lower bids to higher asks rela­
tive to their private values. Whereas, the subjects prefer to submit higher bids and 
lower asks at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period trading. In another word, they submitted 
orders with lower execution probability and better price at the single-period experi­
ment and orders with higher execution probability and worse price at the ﬁrst stage 
of multi-period trading. The explanation behind the diﬀerent submission strategies is 
that the subjects are overconﬁdent with their ability to assess their situation although 
uncertainty of their opponents dramatically decrease the execution probability of their 
orders. They pursue their proﬁt by oﬀering less or asking more compensation. The 
submission strategies in the multi-period experiment are slight diﬀerence because the 
students become pessimism after the single-period experiment. They overreact to the 
information in the multi-period experiments by putting more weights on the execution 
probability, instead of their order prices. 
In the aspect of deciding of order sides, their behaviors in the single-period exper­
iment and the ones at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period experiment are similar according 
to the results of statistical tests, which is consistent with the results in the theoretical 
model. In theory, their decision of order sides depends on the relationship between 
their private values and the expected value of the opponents’ valuation distributions. 
The chi-square test conﬁrm a strong relationship between the experimental order sides 
and the theoretical order sides under both situations. Generally speaking, the subjects’ 
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submission strategies in the single-period experiment are similar to their strategies at 
the ﬁrst stage of multi-period experiment on most aspect and consistent with the results 
in the theoretical model. 
6.3.2.4 Summary 
Although the observations of multi-period experiments are not as suﬃcient as the ones 
in single-period experiments, I still obtain useful results consistent with the theoretical 
models. First, I observed the converge of order prices in the process of repeated trading, 
by which the transaction probability increases. Most of the subjects show their ability 
to adjust their order sides and price to increase the transaction probability and make 
proﬁts. However, because the decision making process in the multi-period model are 
more complex than in the single-period model, the divergence of the experimental order 
prices from the related theoretical values in the multi-period model is larger than in 
the single-period experiments, especially after the ﬁrst stage. Whereas, the subjects’ 
behaviors is close to the expectation in theory with the increase of the number of trading 
periods. The results of linear regression for the experimental order prices and the related 
theoretical value prove that the experimental data could explain the theoretical values 
in some degree. 
Because there are only three periods, the tests for their updating behaviors does’t 
provide strong supports for the correlation relationship between the theoretical values 
and experimental data. However, some tests provide signiﬁcant results, such as the 
test of transaction frequency in total stages, the test of increase or decrease between 
stage 3 to 1. I conclude that with the increase of the observations and the number of 
trading, the experiment data have stronger relationship with the theoretical values. 
In the aspect of the determinants of order prices, the main results of experiments are 
consistent with the ones of theory. As the inﬂuence of subjects’ irrational behaviors, 
some of the estimated coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant, especially for the 
variables which have less power to inﬂuence the order prices. Similarly, I ﬁnd that 
with the increase of the observations and the number of trade, the experimental data 
performance better. 
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6.3.3 Conclusion of the experiment 
In this chapter, we introduce two experiments - single-period experiment and multi-
period experiment to investigate the traders’ submission behaviors in the laboratorial 
environment. With the help of experiments, not only I could understand the traders’ 
submission strategies better by observing the subjects’ behaviors in the experiments, 
but to verify the eﬃciency of the theoretical models by compared with the experiments. 
In the single-period model, the experimental results are consistent with the the­
oretical results. The good results beneﬁt from the large number of observations and 
the simple design for students to understand. In the aspect of decision of order sides, 
the experiment results support the rules in the theoretical model that traders prefer 
bids to asks when their private values are higher than the expected value of the other 
ones’ valuation distribution, and vice versa. In the aspect of decision of order prices, 
the relationship between the order prices and their determinants in the experiments 
are similar to the ones in the theoretical models. I also observe that the subjects’ bias 
behaviors cause the diﬀerence between the theoretical data and experimental data. For 
example, because the buyers weigh their own private value less, the slope of the ﬁtted 
curve for the experimental orders is ﬂat than the one for the theoretical values. The 
diﬀerence between the theoretical values and experiment data is results of the diﬀer­
ence between the assumption of theoretical model and the conditions of experiments. 
Despite these small diﬀerence, there is a strong relationship between the experimental 
data and theoretical values in the single-period markets. 
In the multi-stage experiments, the consistency between the theoretical values and 
experimental data only available on certain aspects. There are two diﬃculties in the 
multi-period experiments: the small number of observations and the complex process 
of making decision for the subjects. In the aspect of the decision of order sides, the 
chi-square tests provide positive results to support that the subjects’ decision of order 
sides in the experiments are similar to the traders’ decision of order sides in the the­
oretical model. The statistical tests for the transaction probability and price trend in 
the multi-period experiment do not make too much sense on their relationship with the 
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corresponding theoretical values. In the aspect of decision of order prices, the relation­
ship between the private values and the order prices is consistent with the results in the 
theoretical model. Whereas, the expected values and the variances of the other ones 
do not inﬂuence the order prices on most of the stages as the results of statistical test. 
However, I observed that the subjects’ performance better when the number of stages 
increase. The results of multi-period experiment imply that the subjects have diﬃcult 
to adopt optimal strategies in multi-period trading game, especially when they face 
more indirect and ambiguous information such as the variance and expected values. 
But their submission strategies are closer to the traders’ submission strategies grad­
ually with the number of stages increase. Totally, the subjects’ submission behaviors 
in the multi-period experiments are similar to the traders’ submission strategies in the 
theoretical models on some aspects. 
The data at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period trading are comparable with the one in the 
single-period trading, since the subjects are in the similar situations. The similarities 
between these two groups of data are that they display the same relationship between 
the variables and the order prices, which is consistent with the results in the theoretical 
models. The traders’ behaviors are identical in the theoretical model. However, the 
traders’ behaviors are slightly diﬀerence on these two stages. The subjects in the single-
period trading prefer to submit lower bids and higher asks relative to their private 
values and prefer to submit higher bids and lower asks at the ﬁrst stage of multi-period 
trading. The diﬀerence of their behaviors are the results of their heuristic bias. 
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7 
Discussion and conclusion 
The double auction markets arise much of interests because of their importance as 
the fundamental mechanism in most of the ﬁnancial markets around the world. In 
the double auction markets, the highest bid order matches with the lowest ask oﬀer 
automatically without involving intermediate between the buyers and sellers. There are 
many researches to investigate the double auction markets from the aspects of market 
eﬃciency, participants’ submission strategies and market equilibrium, and etc. In my 
research, I focus on the traders’ submission strategies in double auction markets to 
investigate their optimal strategies and the theoretical competition between them. My 
research starts from a single-period double auction market with two informed traders, 
and then extent the single-period model to the multi-period one. The models are 
designed to link the double auction markets and limit order markets, by which include 
the features of both markets to provide some new insights into the traders’ behaviors 
in double auction markets. Diﬀerent from the previous research on double auction 
markets, I allow the traders to choose their order sides as well as order prices. The 
traders’ order side choices according to their information increase the uncertainty in the 
market and inﬂuence their optimal submission strategies. Comparing to the research in 
limit order markets, my models deal with the execution probabilities as an endogenous 
factor by involving the game theoretical competition between traders. In another word, 
I apply the bargain theory into the research of limit order market to investigate the 
optimal submission strategies of traders. 
My research aim is to investigate the informed traders’ submission strategies in a 
dynamic double auction market and the eﬃciency of the market to disseminate private 
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information. The research start out from a single-period static model, in which two 
informed traders trade one unit of assets. One feature of the model is that I impose 
no restrictions on the traders’ order sides. A parameter, the probability of the trader’s 
opponent submitting a buy(sell) order, is introduced into the model, allowing traders 
to choose their order sides. Besides their decision of order sides, the optimal submission 
strategy is another question to address in the static model. With the assumption that 
their private valuation distributions follow normal distributions, the parameters that 
inﬂuence the traders’ decision of order sides and prices include their private values, the 
expected value and the variance of opponents’ valuation distribution. The static model 
illustrate the inﬂuence of these determinants on the traders’ decision of order sides and 
optimal order prices. In order to investigate traders’ submission strategies in multi-
period markets and the process of information dissemination, I extend the single-period 
static model to the multi-period dynamic model. In multi-period markets, at the end 
of each stage of trading, the order prices of their opponents are available for traders 
to update their belief on their opponents’ valuation distributions. They are allowed to 
change their order sides and prices by submitting a new order at next stage, according to 
their private values and their opponents’ updated valuation distributions. With trade 
repeated continuously, their valuation distributions regarded by the others concentrate 
on their reservation prices. This is the process of information dissemination, by which 
traders’ understanding of their opponents’ private value become more and more clearly. 
In order to provide evidence to support the results of theoretical models, I carried 
out the experiments: the single-period experiments and multi-period experiments, cor­
responding the static and dynamic model respectively. The subjects are students of 
the Economy department and School of Management of the University of Bath. In the 
experiments, traders were allocated into pairs automatically by the computer. They 
were require to trade with their opponents in the laboratorial environment to maxi­
mize their proﬁts. In the single-period experiments, the students submitted their orders 
only once according to the information of private value and their opponents’ valuation 
distributions. They played the single-period trading several times with diﬀerent oppo­
nents. In the multi-period experiments, the students traded with the same opponents 
underlying the same series data serval rounds. In the process of repeated trading, the 
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subjects changed their order sides and prices according to the updated order prices 
of their opponents. Although the irrational behaviors of traders had inﬂuence on the 
experiments results, I observed the improvement on the transaction probability and 
convergence of order prices during the process of repeated trading. Most experimental 
results are consistent with the results of theoretical models. The diﬀerence between 
the traders’ submission strategies in theoretical models and the students’ submission 
strategies in the experiments can be interpreted by the traders’ heuristic bias, such as 
overconﬁdence, bounded rationality, etc. Overall, the experiments provide fair supports 
to the results of the theoretical models in the extent to explain the traders’ submission 
strategies. 
7.1	 The two-trader trading in the single-period double 
auction market 
The single-period model describes the situation when two informed traders trade one 
unit of asset in a single-period double auction market. The informed traders are sup­
posed to be rational and risk neutral, whose trading purpose is to maximize their proﬁts. 
After entering into the market, they are allowed to choose their order sides and price 
according to their private information of the asset’s fundamental value and the infor­
mation of the value distribution of the other one. Their private values are drawn from 
the normal distributions, which can be same or diﬀerent. It is a common sense that 
every one in the market knows his opponent’s valuation distribution, and his opponent 
knows that he knows, and continue. They submit their order simultaneously and have 
equal power to decide the transaction price. The single-period model investigates the 
inﬂuence of the determinants on the order side and price of traders. 
In the aspect of decision of order prices, the static model illustrates that the traders’ 
private values are most powerful to inﬂuence order prices. The traders’ order prices 
increase with the increasing of their private values. It shows that traders will to pay 
more(less) as buyers the asset and ask more(less) compensation as sellers, when their 
private value is high (low). Similarly, their order prices increase with the increase of 
the expected value of their opponents’ valuation distribution, and vice versa. The ex­
pected values of their opponents’ valuation distributions imply that their opponents’ 
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private value are located in the area with relatively high or low values. Therefore, they 
need move their order prices closer to the mean values of their opponents’ valuation 
distribution to improve the execution probability of their orders, which in turn increase 
their expected proﬁts. The variances of their opponents’ value distribution have dif­
ferent eﬀects on traders’ bids and asks respectably. With the increase of the variances 
of their opponents’ valuation distributions, ask prices increase and bid prices decrease. 
The intuition behind the diﬀerence is that increase of asks or decrease of bids could 
improve traders’ expected proﬁts by increase the diﬀerence between their private values 
and order prices. Diﬀerent variances display the shape of normal distribution’ tail. For 
a buyer (seller), high variances of the other one’s valuation distribution increase the 
execution probability of his orders and allow him to improve his order prices, that is in­
creasing asks and decrease bids . Compared with the eﬀects of variances, the inﬂuence 
of correlation coeﬃcient between traders is similar to that of variances. The increase 
of correlation coeﬃcient decreases traders’ bid prices and increases their ask prices, 
and vice versa. The explanation is that the increase of correlation coeﬃcient between 
traders decreases the level of uncertainty between traders. As a result, to improve 
their order prices, buyers decrease their bids and sellers increase their asks. When the 
uncertainty between them increases with the increase of correlation coeﬃcient, traders 
decrease the diﬀerence between their private values and order prices to improve the 
execution probability. 
The static model illustrates that their decision of order sides only depends on the 
relationship between the private value of traders and the expected values of their oppo­
nents’ value distributions. When the traders’ private values are higher than the mean 
value of their opponents’ value distribution, traders prefer bids to asks. They expected 
that the probability of their opponents’ private values lower (higher) than their private 
values is related to the positive values (negative values) of the diﬀerence between their 
private values and the mean values of their opponents’ valuation distributions. There­
fore, it is safe to infer that the probability to observe one buy and one sell is equal to 
0.5, when every aspect of traders are similar and their private values are drawn from a 
common valuation distribution. If two traders’ valuation distributions are diﬀerent, the 
probability of observing a buy order on the order side increase with the increasing of 
the mean values of the opponent’s value distribution, while the probability of observing 
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a sell order increase with the decreasing of the opponents’ mean values. Furthermore, 
variances have on eﬀect on traders’ decision of order sides, even under asymmetric dis­
tributions. I conclude that values of variables aﬀect order prices, while the relationship 
between variables aﬀect decision of order sides. 
The experiment for the single-period model construct the similar double auction 
market, in which the subjects trade with their opponents by pairs, following the trading 
rules of the single-period model. The experiments investigate the subjects submission 
strategies in laboratorial environment. Most of the experimental results are consistent 
with the results of theoretical model, in the aspects of decision of order sides and prices. 
Whereas, the eﬀects of variances are only statistically signiﬁcant for asks. I interpret 
the insigniﬁcant result as the fact of the limited ability of non-professional students to 
understand the inﬂuence of variances and their irrational behaviors. It is also caused 
by the reason that the eﬀects of variance are inﬂuenced by the eﬀects of other powerful 
variables as all the variables change together. Given a closer observation, for private 
values, the slope of experimental order prices for bids is lower than that of the relative 
theoretical values. This diﬀerence could be explained by traders’ overconﬁdence that 
they undervalue their uncertainty situation with other side and submit bids with low 
execution probability and high unconditional proﬁts. Corresponding to buyers bias 
strategies, sellers’ performance is better, although they are also overconﬁdent to submit 
asks with low execution probability and high unconditional proﬁts. 
7.2	 The two-trader trading in the multi-period double 
auction market 
In multi-period double auction markets, traders submit their orders repeatedly un­
til their private information is fully revealed. Compared with the single-period static 
model, the multi-period dynamic model includes the traders’ adjustment on their order 
prices and sides by updating their information of their opponents’ valuation distribu­
tion. At the end of each stage of trading, their assessment on their opponents’ valuation 
distribution are conditional with their opponents’ order prices. Traders increase their 
execution probability as well as expected proﬁts by submitting a new orders based on 
the updated valuation distributions of their opponents. During the process of repeated 
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trading, the information of their opponents’ private values is delivered by their order 
prices continuously, until fully revealed. Therefore, with the repeated trading process, 
not only the transaction probability increases, but the private information is dissem­
inated. The multi-period dynamic model illustrates that the simple double auction 
markets is eﬃcient to disseminate information, even with two traders. 
The multi-period model describe the submission strategies of traders in multi-period 
double auction markets. The determinants of order prices in the multi-period dynamic 
model are the same with the ones in the single-period model. The traders’ private 
values are constant in the whole period of trading. The relationship between private 
values and order prices of traders are always positive at each stage. The relationship is 
in line with the one in the single-period model. The expected value of their opponents’ 
valuation distribution are variable during the process of repeated trading, because that 
traders’ updating their belief on their opponents’ valuation with their order prices at 
previous stage. The mean values of their opponents’ value distributions regarded by 
traders ﬂuctuates around their private values and are closer to their private values 
gradually. In another word, the continuous updating process make the mean values of 
their opponents’ value distributions equal the opponents’ private values. In the multi-
period trading, the variances conditional with the opponents’ order prices continue 
to reduce. The relationship between the expected value of the conditional valuation 
distribution and the order prices is positive at each stage. Whereas, the initial expected 
values of the valuation distribution are irrelevant to the order prices at the later stages 
since the valuation distributions are updated by traders. 
The change of order prices are diﬀerent when the relationship between the traders’ 
private values and the expected values of their opponents are diﬀerent. If both traders’ 
private values are higher(lower) than the expected values of the valuation distributions, 
they probably submit the same side of orders. The theoretical model demonstrates that 
the one with lower(higher) private values change his bid(ask) to ask(bid) very quick, 
when his private values is lower than the expected values of the other one. When the 
traders have diﬀerent sides of orders but the bid is lower than the ask, their order prices 
converge as the buyer increases his bids and the seller decreases his asks. When the 
bid price is equal to the ask price, the transaction happens. However, the trade would 
continue until their private information is fully revealed. After the transaction happens, 
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the buyer continuously increases his bids as the mean value of his valuation distribution 
regarded by the other one is closer to his private value, and the seller decreases his asks. 
The multi-period experiments are designed to observe the subjects’ order submission 
strategies in the multi-period double auction market, corresponding to the multi-period 
theoretical model. The students are required to trade with the same opponent several 
times by maximizing their proﬁt at each stage. Most of the results in the multi-period 
experiments are consistent with the ones in the theoretical model. Because of the irra­
tional behaviors of traders in the complex multi-period trading and the small number 
of observations, there are more insigniﬁcant results in the multi-period model. How­
ever, I ﬁnd that the experimental data performance better at stage 3 or at total stages. 
Therefore, I believe that with the increase the number of stages, traders’ submission 
stages in the multi-period trading are closer to the ones in the theoretical model. 
The comparison of the traders’ submission strategies in the single-period model and 
at the ﬁrst stage in the multi-period model illustrate that their behaviors under these 
two situation are identical. Whereas, in the experiments, the subjects’ behaviors at 
the ﬁrst stage of multi-period trading are slight diﬀerent from their behaviors in the 
single-stage experiment. In the single-period experiment, the overconﬁdent subjects 
prefer to submit orders with low execution probability and high unconditional proﬁts 
relative to their private values. In the multi-period experiment, after experiencing 
some unsuccessful trading, the pessimistic subjects prefer to submit orders with high 
execution probability and low unconditional proﬁts. 
7.3 Limitations and future research 
My research investigates the traders’ submission strategies in double auction markets. 
It provides some useful results to understand the relationship between the submission 
strategies of the traders and the determinants of their order sides and prices. It also 
observe the game-theoretical competition between traders with uncertainty and the in­
formation disseminating of the simple auction market. Here, I address some limitations 
in my research and remained questions from future research. 
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My model investigate the submission strategies and game-theoretical competition 
between two informed traders. My models do not address the submission behaviors 
of uniformed traders, who are important parts in the double auction market to pro­
vide liquidity. One possible extension is to investigate the competition between one 
uninformed trader and one informed trade in a two-person double auction market. The 
one-side uncertainty model is more meaningful under multi-period trading environment 
to observe the process of market liquidity. 
Besides the type of the traders, in my model, there are only two traders in markets. 
I only observe the individual eﬀects of traders and their competition. The question 
about the systematical eﬀects of numerous traders remain unsolved. Given that, it is 
possible to observe the eﬀects of order follows and the formation of market clear price. 
As we know, with the increase of the number of investors in markets, markets become 
more eﬃciently. Therefore, the model with numerous traders are useful to investigate 
the market eﬃciency and equilibrium. The extension of the model with numerous 
inﬁnite or ﬁnite traders could address traders’ behaviors from more aspects. 
Moreover, in my model, there are only one unit of the asset for traders to trade. 
However, with this assumption, I rule out the traders’ decision of order size. In my 
model, I only address the traders’ decision of order prices and sides. Their behaviors 
would become more complex by considering their order size decision. The informed 
traders would consider to conceal their private information by their choice of order 
size and the uniformed traders observe and make assessment on the informed traders’ 
private information through their order size. Therefore, the another extension is to 
allow traders to chose their order size. 
It is also possible to relax some other assumptions of my model in further research. 
For example, it is possible to relax the limitation on the trader’s risk preference, such as 
risk-adverse traders. The extension of my theoretical model in further research would 
provide more useful results to better understand the submission strategies of the traders 
in the limit order market. 
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Appendix A 
The graphs of multi-period 
trading experiment 
In the multi-trading experiment, the multi-stage trading game are accomplished in the 
last two sessions. Because of the time limitation, the multi-stage trading game only 
round once for each session with three stages. Comparing to the single-stage trading 
game, the submission strategies in multi-trading game are more complex because of new 
information available. The students’ reaction to the multi-stage trading game diﬀerent 
from each other such that their decision times various compared with the single-stage 
game. 
We got 19 pairs of eﬃcient data for the subjects’ order prices in multi-stage trading. 
As the statement before, the corresponding theoretical values for every oﬀer price are 
calculated by two methods. Method 1: theoretical values are obtained by updating the 
theoretical oﬀer prices. And method 2: theoretical values are calculated by updating 
the experiment order prices. The pure theoretical values with method 1 focus on the 
observing the diverges of trader’s behaviors in the whole process. While the hybrid the­
oretical value with method 2 provide the opportunity to observe the diﬀerence of the 
traders’ updating behaviors at each stage. For every group, two ﬁgures with diﬀerent 
theoretical value list together for comparison. The comparison between the experimen­
tal and theoretical oﬀer prices gives insights into the eﬃciency of theoretical models 
and other uncontrolled determinants for traders’ submission behaviors in laboratorial 
environment. On the other hand, the comparison between t 
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The following is the graphs for the 19 groups of data. We observe that the diﬀer­
ence between the theoretical values and the experimental data is large because of the 
irrational behaviors of subjects. The irrational unsystematical behaviors of students is 
caused by their limitation of ﬁnancial knowledge and ability to submit optimal orders. 
However, some groups’ orders prices move towards the same direction with the theo­
retical model. To some degree, the subjects’ submission strategies in the laboratorial 
environment are similar with our expectation in the theoretical models. 
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Figure A.4: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 4 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure A.6: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 6 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.7: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 7 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.8: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 8 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.10: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 10 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure A.11: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 11 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.12: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 12 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.13: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 13 (theoretical updating 
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Figure A.14: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 14 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure A.15: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 15 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure A.16: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 16 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
210 
1 1.5 2 2.5 397
98
99
100
101
102
103
Stages
O
r d
e r
 p
r i c
e
Theoretical orders of trader1
Theoretical orders of trader2
Experimental orders of trader1
Experimental orders of trader2
1 1.5 2 2.5 397
98
99
100
101
102
103
Stages
O
r d
e r
 p
r i c
e
Theoretical orders of trader1
Theoretical orders of trader2
Experimental orders of trader1
Experimental orders of trader2
Figure A.17: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 17 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure A.18: Theoretical and experimental oﬀer prices of group 18 (theoretical updating 
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Appendix B 
The comparison between the 
experimental data and related 
theoretical values 
In chapter 6, we compare the experimental data with the related theoretical value to 
clarify the diﬀerence between the theoretical models and experiments. The statistical 
comparison is necessary for us to prove the eﬃciency of our theoretical models. Mean­
while, it helps us to better understand the traders’ submission strategies in the labo­
ratorial environment. First of all, we compare the experimental data and the related 
theoretical values at each stages separately and then put all the oﬀer prices together. 
Secondly, we do the chi-square test for some important variables, such as buy or sell 
decision, trade or no trade, and etc. The analysis of the results are shown in chapter 6 
in details. 
The correlation between the experimental order prices and the related theoretical 
values: 
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Figure B.1: Bid oﬀers at stage 1 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Table B.1: Bid price of experiment & theory - stage 1 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 72.422 9.315*** 0.000 77.697 9.310*** 0.000 
Slope 0.265 3.315*** 0.003 0.202 2.358** 0.029 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.2: Ask price of experiment & theory - stage1 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 55.021 2.628** 0.020 50.237 1.909* 0.077 
Slope 0.444 2.096* 0.055 0.494 1.855* 0.085 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.3: Bid price of experiment & theory - stage 2 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 87.898 6.271*** 0.000 65.295 3.713*** 0.002 
Slope 0.163 1.185 0.254 0.390 2.267** 0.039 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.4: Ask price of experiment & theory - stage2 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 68.217 4.578*** 0.000 47.197 2.409** 0.027 
Slope 0.294 1.996* 0.061 0.474 2.413** 0.027 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure B.2: Ask oﬀers at stage 1 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Figure B.3: Bid oﬀers at stage 2 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Figure B.4: Bid oﬀers at stage 2 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Figure B.5: Bid oﬀers at stage 3 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Table B.5: Bid price of experiment & theory - stage3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 67.033 3.041*** 0.008 51.987 2.861** 0.012 
Slope 0.384 1.772** 0.097 0.495 2.771** 0.014 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.6: Ask price of experiment & theory - stage3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 22.993 1.426 0.170 18.391 0.944 0.357 
Slope 0.769 4.779*** 0.000 0.788 4.053*** 0.001 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.7: Bid price of experiment & theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 75.276 9.523*** 0.000 72.345 9.925*** 0.000 
Slope 0.271 3.425*** 0.001 0.282 3.877*** 0.000 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.8: Ask price of experiment & theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Variable Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient t-Statistic Prob. 
C 51.382 5.169*** 0.000 38.179 3.214*** 0.002 
Slope 0.475 4.790*** 0.000 0.587 4.924*** 0.000 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Figure B.6: Bid oﬀers at stage 3 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Figure B.7: Bid oﬀers at stage 1 − 3 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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Figure B.8: Bid oﬀers in stage 1 − 3 (theoretical updating & experimental updating) 
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The buy or sell decision for traders at each stages:
 
Table B.9: Bid/ask decision in the experiment and theory - stage 1
 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 19 
Ask 4 
Ask 
3 
12 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 19 
Ask 4 
Ask 
3 
12 
χ2 
Chi-square 14.599*** 
Yates 12.144*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
χ2 
Chi-square 14.599*** 
Yates 12.144*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.10: Bid/ask decision in the experiment and theory - stage 2 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 13 
Ask 8 
Ask 
4 
13 
Theory 
Bid Ask 
Experiment Bid 13 4 
Ask 9 12 
χ2 
Chi-square 5.596** 
Yates 4.152** 
p-value 
0.018 
0.042 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 4.354** 0.037 
Yates 3.085* 0.079 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Table B.11: Bid/ask decision in the experiment and theory - stage 3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 13 
Ask 6 
Ask 
4 
15 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 15 
Ask 7 
Ask 
2 
14 
χ2 
Chi-square 8.622*** 
Yates 6.812*** 
p-value 
0.003 
0.009 
χ2 
Chi-square 11.617*** 
Yates 9.474*** 
p-value 
0.001 
0.002 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.12: Bid/ask decision in the experiment and theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 45 
Ask 18 
Ask 
11 
40 
Theory 
Bid 
Experiment Bid 47 
Ask 20 
Ask 
9 
38 
χ2 
Chi-square 28.035*** 
Yates 28.035*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
χ2 
Chi-square 28.748*** 
Yates 26.744*** 
p-value 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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AND RELATED THEORETICAL VALUES 
The transaction happens or not for each stages:
 
Table B.13: Transaction and no transaction in the experiment and theory - stage 1
 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
3 2 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
2 12 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
2 3 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
2 12 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 3.971** 0.046 
Yates 1.963 0.161 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.466 0.226 
Yates 0.327 0.567 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Table B.14: Transaction and no transaction in the experiment and theory - stage 2 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
3 2 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
7 7 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
2 3 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
4 10 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.148 0.700 
Yates 0.019 0.890 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.223 0.637 
Yates 0.008 0.929 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.15: Transaction and no transaction in the experiment and theory - stage 3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
5 1 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
7 6 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
3 3 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
5 8 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.534 0.216 
Yates 0.529 0.467 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.224 0.636 
Yates 0.001 0.975 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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B. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
AND RELATED THEORETICAL VALUES 
Table B.16: Transaction and no transaction in the experiment and theory - total 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
11 5 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
16 25 
Theory 
Trade No trade 
Experiment T
ra
de
7 9 
N
o 
tr
ad
e
11 30 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 4.079** 0.043 
Yates 2.974* 0.085 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.525 0.217 
Yates 0.842 0.359 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Table B.17: Increase and decrease in the experiment and theory - stage 1-2 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
12 6 
D
ec
re
as
e
11 9 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
12 6 
D
ec
re
as
e
13 7 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.540 0.462 
Yates 0.162 0.687 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.012 0.913 
Yates 0.055 0.815 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level.
 
The trader’s order prices is increase or decrease at later stages:
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B. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
AND RELATED THEORETICAL VALUES 
Table B.18: Increase and decrease in the experiment and theory - stage 2-3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
15 1 
D
ec
re
as
e
17 5 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
6 10 
D
ec
re
as
e
12 10 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.891 0.169 
Yates 0.855 0.355 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.080 0.299 
Yates 0.504 0.478 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
Table B.19: Increase and decrease in the experiment and theory - stage 1-3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
18 2 
D
ec
re
as
e
9 9 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
15 5 
D
ec
re
as
e
9 9 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 7.370*** 0.007 
Yates 5.553** 0.018 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 2.545 0.111 
Yates 1.584 0.208 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Table B.20: Increase and decrease in the experiment and theory - stage 1-2 and 2-3 
Theoretical updating Experimental updating 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
27 7 
D
ec
re
as
e
28 14 
Theory 
Increase Decrease 
Experiment In
cr
ea
se
18 16 
D
ec
re
as
e
25 17 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 1.526 0.217 
Yates 0.955 0.328 
χ2 p-value 
Chi-square 0.331 0.565 
Yates 0.118 0.731 
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10% 5%,1% level. 
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Appendix C 
The determinants of order prices 
in the multi-stage trading 
experiment 
In the multi-stage trading experiment, students were required to trade with the same 
opponent three times. We attempt to observe the relationship between the eﬃcient 
variables and the oﬀer prices of traders. The experimental data is compared with 
the related theoretical values to search the diﬀerence between the theoretical model 
and the experiment environment. The theoretical values are attained by two methods: 
updating the theoretical oﬀer price on the last stage and updating the experimental 
oﬀer price on the last stage. The comparison could make between these two methods 
as they address the question of traders’ behaviors from diﬀerent points of view. The 
analysis are approach stage by stage to observe any change of the traders’ submission 
strategies in the continuous trading process. 
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Figure C.1: The eﬀects of private values on bid prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.2: The eﬀects of private values on ask prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.3: The eﬀects of private values on bid prices - stage 2 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.4: The eﬀects of private values on ask prices - stage 2 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.5: The eﬀects of private values on bid prices - stage 3 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.6: The eﬀects of private values on ask prices - stage 3 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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Figure C.7: The eﬀects of private values on bid prices - stage 1-3 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.8: The eﬀects of private values on ask prices - stage 1-3 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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The ﬁgures and table for the expected value are listed as following:
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Figure C.9: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.10: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.11: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 2 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.12: The eﬀects of expected values on ask prices - stage 2 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.13: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 3 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.14: The eﬀects of expected values on ask prices - stage 3 (theoretical updating 
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Figure C.15: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 1-3 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.16: The eﬀects of expected values on bid prices - stage 1-3 (theoretical updating 
& experimental updating) 
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Figure C.18: The eﬀects of variance on ask prices - stage 1 (theoretical updating & 
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Figure C.19: The eﬀects of variance on bid prices - stage 2 (theoretical updating & 
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Figure C.22: The eﬀects of variance on ask prices - stage 3 (theoretical updating & 
experimental updating) 
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